This chapter begins with a discussion of the common methodologies, starting assumptions, and key aims that shape philosophical work in this sphere. This part of the chapter aims to lay bare the bones of philosophy of parenthood as this field currently stands, providing a critical tool for investigation of existing theories of parenthood, but also further demonstrating the complex interdependence between moral parenthood and the concepts of parenthood covered in the previous chapters. I then give an overview of the approaches philosophers have taken to defining the grounds of moral parenthood, and the different problem cases motivating these accounts. Whilst all these problem cases deviate from the ‘paradigm’ case – in which biological, social, legal, and moral parenthood neatly coincide – literature on parental obligations tends to focus on situations in which candidate parents are disinclined to take on some form of parenting role. Philosophers focusing on parental rights, on the other hand, have often been concerned with an overabundance of candidate parents and have aimed to provide solutions to potential disputes. These disputes might arise between parties to surrogacy agreements, biological parents and step- or adoptive parents; and, more speculatively, between biological parents and the hypothetical ‘best available parents’.

The first half of this chapter investigates the ways in which the concept of biological parenthood is used in philosophy of parenthood but also in non-academic contexts, noting that ‘genetic parent’ is often – but not always – used interchangeably with ‘biological parent’. I raise the question of whether gestation constitutes biological parenthood in the absence of genetic connection, and I consider two possible explanations for discrepancy in the use of the concept of biological parenthood. I highlight ways in which the interplay between this and other concepts of parenthood means that discrepancy in our use of language has significant consequences and give an argument against geneticist understandings of biological parenthood. The second part of the chapter considers the right to be a biological parent and the right to not be a biological parent. The discussion of these rights-claims is illustrated by reference to current legal and philosophical dilemmas: debates over access to reproductive technologies; the dilemma faced by separated couples who disagree over the use of their frozen embryos; and the philosophical questions raised by the possibility of ectogenesis with regards to abortion. Is the right to end a pregnancy the same as the right not to be a parent?

In the final chapter of the book, I argue that future research in philosophy of parenthood should take either a significantly broader or significantly narrower view of parenthood (or parental rights/obligations). We should not assume that we can use any of these four key concepts of parenthood independently, without taking into account their interrelations with others. We may therefore move forward either by considering problem cases in light of these concepts as an interrelated web (or ‘family’) or by stripping back the questions being asked to investigate more specific concepts. For example, the latter approach to moral parenthood might involve putting aside the widespread presupposition that parental rights and obligations are a concomitant ‘package’ and instead focusing on isolated issues, such as the right not to be separated from one’s biological offspring. The rights and obligations with which philosophers are chiefly concerned should, on this approach, be stripped away from the myth of ‘the parent’ as one straightforward entity with clear and consistent characteristics.

This chapter begins by clarifying the distinction between social parenthood and parenting and explain how the longstanding but malleable association between social and biological parenthood depends upon social and legal conventions determining who is eligible to parent. One way in which to place oneself in that situation is to conceive a child biologically – however, biological parenthood often comes apart from social parenthood. I explore the significance of clinical assistance, money, and distance, in navigating this separation in the context of assisted reproduction. The second part of the chapter incorporates gender into the analysis, looking in detail at the social roles of motherhood and fatherhood, and the interplay of biological parenthood and moral parenthood with the expectations associated with these roles – for example, the effect of the visibility of pregnancy on attributional parenthood, the characterisation of fatherhood as more detached and less sentimental than motherhood, the persistence of associations between fatherhood and breadwinning, and so on. In this chapter, I explore the findings of sociological, psychological, and anthropological research into motherhood and fatherhood in order to demonstrate that one can inhabit a social role comprised in part by normative standards, even if one does not conform to those standards.

This book delves into the four concepts of parenthood – social, biological, legal, and moral – at play in our understandings of parental rights and obligations, reproductive ethics, governance of parenthood, and ontologies of kinship. Our view of what it means to be a parent in any given context is shaped by all of these concepts, which are themselves subject to the influence of changing expectations, as new technologies are produced, cultural views of the family are transformed, and laws shift in response. These changes give rise to questions: who has the right to raise a child? What do we owe our children? Who should the law recognise as a parent, and what is the meaning of that recognition? Many of these questions are not questions about some independent notion of ‘parenthood’ but about the relationships between different concepts of parenthood. In doing so, I highlight newer but no less important questions for philosophical attention, including the scope of rights to become a biological parent (or to avoid that state), the impact of gendered norms on the social role of ‘parent’, and the legal difference between having a child and acquiring one.

This book delves into the four concepts of parenthood – social, biological, legal, and moral – at play in our understandings of parental rights and obligations, reproductive ethics, governance of parenthood, and ontologies of kinship. Our view of what it means to be a parent in any given context is shaped by all of these concepts, which are themselves subject to the influence of changing expectations, as new technologies are produced, cultural views of the family are transformed, and laws shift in response. These changes give rise to questions: who has the right to raise a child? What do we owe our children? Who should the law recognise as a parent, and what is the meaning of that recognition? Many of these questions are not questions about some independent notion of ‘parenthood’ but about the relationships between different concepts of parenthood. In doing so, I highlight newer but no less important questions for philosophical attention, including the scope of rights to become a biological parent (or to avoid that state), the impact of gendered norms on the social role of ‘parent’, and the legal difference between having a child and acquiring one.

This chapter investigates the common presuppositions we make about legal parenthood – for example, the assumption that biological parents are legal parents by default in most jurisdictions. Looking back at some of the ways in which legal rules of parenthood have shifted in recent history, I show that these rules are often more tightly knit with legal structures surrounding marriage and other kinship structures, than with biological parenthood, particularly for men. I examine the problems faced by unmarried fathers who either do not know they have biological offspring or discover this too late to claim legal parental rights. I also discuss the role of the principle of ‘the best interests of the child’ and the conflicts that arise when laws motivated by the best interests of children are broken for the sake of the best interests of a specific child. I then focus on the regulation of adoption and surrogacy in order to illustrate the fragility of distinctions between these practices, in which the difference between parenthood and a criminal offence sometimes hinges on a couple of pieces of paperwork.