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  3. Philosophy, Bullshit, and Peer Review
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    • Open access
  • Cited by 4
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
December 2023
Print publication year:
2024
Online ISBN:
9781009256315
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009256315
Creative Commons:
Creative Common License - CC Creative Common License - BY
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/creativelicenses
Subjects:
Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
Series:
Elements in Epistemology
Information

Book description

Peer review is supposed to ensure that published work, in philosophy and in other disciplines, meets high standards of rigor and interest. But many people fear that it no longer is fit to play this role. This Element examines some of their concerns. It uses evidence that critics of peer review sometimes cite to show its failures, as well as empirical literature on the reception of bullshit, to advance positive claims about how the assessment of scholarly work is appropriately influenced by features of the context in which it appears: for example, by readers' knowledge of authorship or of publication venue. Reader attitude makes an appropriate and sometimes decisive difference to perceptions of argument quality. This Element finishes by considering the difference that author attitudes to their own arguments can appropriately make to their reception. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

References

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