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  3. Practical Rationality and Preference
  • Cited by 9
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      January 2010
      July 2001
      ISBN:
      9780511570803
      9780521781848
      9780521038843
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570803
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.54kg, 248 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.384kg, 248 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Logic, Philosophy
    You may already have access via personal or institutional login
    • Selected: Digital
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    Subjects:
    Logic, Philosophy
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    Book description

    What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers working in this field explore the controversies surrounding Gauthier's position. Several essays argue against influential conceptions of preference, while others suggest that received conceptions of rational action misidentify the normative significance of rules and practices. This collection will be of particular interest to philosophers of social theory and to reflective social scientists in such fields as economics, political science and psychology.

    Reviews

    "...a very nice collection of papers." Philosophy in Review

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