Skip to main content Accessibility help
  • Cited by 18

Book description

According to Bayesian epistemology, rational learning from experience is consistent learning, that is learning should incorporate new information consistently into one's old system of beliefs. Simon M. Huttegger argues that this core idea can be transferred to situations where the learner's informational inputs are much more limited than Bayesianism assumes, thereby significantly expanding the reach of a Bayesian type of epistemology. What results from this is a unified account of probabilistic learning in the tradition of Richard Jeffrey's 'radical probabilism'. Along the way, Huttegger addresses a number of debates in epistemology and the philosophy of science, including the status of prior probabilities, whether Bayes' rule is the only legitimate form of learning from experience, and whether rational agents can have sustained disagreements. His book will be of interest to students and scholars of epistemology, of game and decision theory, and of cognitive, economic, and computer sciences.

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.


Abreu, D., and Rubinstein, A. 1988. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata. Econometrica, 1259–1281.
Acemoglu, D., Chernozhukov, V., and Yildiz, M. 2016 Fragility of Asymptotic Agreement Under Bayesian Learning. Theoretical Economics, 11, 187–225.
Achinstein, P. 1963 Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory. Philosophy of Science, 30, 207–221.
Adams, E. W. 1962 On Rational Betting Systems. Archiv für mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung, 6, 7–29. 112–128.
Aldous, D. J. 1985 Exchangeability and Related Topics. École d’Été de Probabailités de Saint-Fleur XIII – 1983. Lecture Notes in Mathematics, 1117, 1–198.
Alexander, J. M., Skyrms, B., and Zabell, S. L. 2012 Inventing New Signals. Dynamic Games and Applications, 2, 129–145.
Armendt, B. 1993 Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory. Philosophical Topics, 21, 1–20.
Arntzenius, F. 2003 Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection. Journal of Philosophy, 100, 356–370.
Ash, R. B., and Doléans-Dade, C. 2000. Probability andMeasure Theory. SanDiego: Academic Press.
Aumann, R. J. 1974 Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 67–96.
Aumann, R. J. 1976 Agreeing to Disagree. The Annals of Statistics, 4, 1236–1239.
Aumann, R. J. 1987 Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality. Econometrica, 55, 1–18.
Aumann, R. J. 1997 Rationality an Bounded Rationality. Games and Economic Behavior, 21, 2–14.
Aumann, R. J., and Brandenburger, A. 1995 Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium. Econometrica, 63, 1161–1180.
Bacchus, F., Kyburg, H. E., and Thalos, M. 1990 Against Conditionalization. Synthese, 85, 475–506.
Banerjee, A., Guo, X., andWang, H. 2005 On theOptimality of Conditional Expectation as a Bregman Predictor. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 51, 2664–2669.
Bayes, T. 1763 An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 53, 370–418.
Beggs, A. W. 2005 On the Convergence of Reinforcement Learning. Journal of Economic Theory, 122, 1–36.
Belot, G. 2013 Bayesian Orgulity. Philosophy of Science, 80, 483–503.
Benaïm, M., andHirsch, M. 1999.Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play. Games and Economic Behavior, 29, 36–72.
Bernstein, S. N. 1917 An Essay on the Axiomatic Foundations of Probability Theory (in Russian). Communications de la Société mathémathique de Kharkov, 15, 209–274.
Berry, D. A., and Fristedt, B. 1985. Bandit Problems: Sequential Allocation of Experiments. London: Chapman & Hall.
Binmore, K. 2009. Rational Decisions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Binmore, K., and Samuelson, L. 1992 Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata. Journal of Economic Theory, 57, 278–305.
Blackwell, D., and Dubins, L. 1962 Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 33, 882–886.
Block, H. D., and Marschak, J. 1960 Random Orderings and Stochastic Theories of Responses. Pages 97–132 of: Olkin, I., Ghurye, S., Hoeffding, W., Madow, W., and Mann, H. (eds.). Contributions to Probability and Statistics. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Börgers, T., and Sarin, R. 1997 Learning Through Reinforcement and the Replicator Dynamics. Journal of Economic Theory, 74, 235–265.
Bovens, L. 1995 “P and I Will Believe that Not-P”: Diachronic Constraints on Rational Belief. Mind, 104, 737–760.
Bradley, R. 2006 Taking Advantage of Difference in Opinion. Episteme, 3, 141–155.
Bradley, R. 2007 Reaching a Consensus. Social Choice and Welfare, 29, 609–632.
Bradley, R. 2015. Learning from Others. Working Paper.
Briggs, R. 2009 Distorted Reflection. Philosophical Review, 118, 59–85.
Brighton, H., and Gigerenzer, G. 2012. Are Rational Actor Models “Rational” Outside SmallWorlds. Pages 84–109 of: Okasha, S., and Binmore, K. (eds.), Evolution and Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, G. W. 1951 Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play. Pages 374–376 of: Koopmans, T. C. (ed.). Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. New York: Wiley.
Buchak, L. 2013. Risk and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bush, R., and Mosteller, F. 1955. Stochastic Models for Learning. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Camerer, C., and Ho, T. 1999 Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games. Econometrica, 67, 827–874.
Carnap, R. 1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Carnap, R. 1952. The Continuum of Inductive Methods. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Carnap, R. 1971 A Basic System of Inductive Logic, Part 1. Pages 33–165 of: Carnap, R.. and Jeffrey, R. C. (eds.). Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability I. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Carnap, R. 1980 A Basic System of Inductive Logic, Part 2. Pages 7–155 of: Jeffrey, R. C. (ed.). Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability II. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Cesa-Bianchi, N., and Lugosi, G. 2006. Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chen, R. 1977 On Almost Sure Convergence in a Finitely Additive Setting. Zeitschrift für Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und verwandte Gebiete, 37, 341–356.
Christensen, D. 1991 Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs. Philosophical Review, 100, 229–247.
Christensen, D. 1996 Dutch Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers. The Journal of Philosophy, 93, 450–479.
Christensen, D. 2004. Putting Logic in Its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Christensen, D. 2007 Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. Philosophical Review, 116, 187–217.
Christensen, D. 2009. Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass, 4/5, 756–767.
Christensen, D. 2011 Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self- Criticism. Philosopher's Imprint, 11, 1–22.
de Finetti, B. 1931 Sul significato soggettivo della probabilià. Fundamenta Mathematicae, 17, 298–329.
de Finetti, B. 1937 La prevision: ses lois logiques ses sources subjectives. Annales d l'institut Henri Poincaré, 7, 1–68. Translated in Kyburg, H. E., and Smokler, H. E. (eds.), Studies in Subjective Probability, pages 93–158,Wiley, New York, 1964.
de Finetti, B. 1938. Sur la condition d'equivalence partielle. Pages 5–18 of: Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles No. 739: Colloques consacré à la théorie des probabilités, VIième partie. Translated in Jeffrey, R. C. (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability II, pages 193–205, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1980.
de Finetti, B. 1959. La probabilita e la statistica nei raporti con l'induzione, secondo i dwersi punti di vista. In: Corso C.I.M.E su Induzione e Statistica. Rome: Cremones. Translated in de Finetti, B., Probability, Induction and Statistics, chapter 9,Wiley, New York, 1974.
de Finetti, B. 1972. Probability, Induction, and Statistics. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
de Finetti, B. 1974. Theory of Probability. Vol. 1. London: JohnWiley & Sons.
de Morgan, A. 1838. An Essay on Probabilities, and on Their Application to Life Contingencies and Insurance Offices. London: Longman et al.
Debreu, G. 1960. Review of “Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis.” American Economic Review, 50, 186–188.
DeGroot, M. 1974 Reaching a Consensus. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 69, 118–121.
Diaconis, P. 1977 Finite Forms of de Finetti's Theorem on Exchangeability. Synthese, 36, 271–281.
Diaconis, P., and Freedman, D. 1980a De Finetti's Generalizations of Exchangeability. Pages 233–249 of: Jeffrey, R. C. (ed.). Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability II. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Diaconis, P., and Freedman, D. 1980b De Finetti's Theorem for Markov Chains. Annals of Probability, 8, 115–130.
Diaconis, P., and Freedman, D. 1986. On the Consistency of Bayes Estimates. Annals of Statistics, 14, 1–26.
Diaconis, P., and Zabell, S. L. 1982 Updating Subjective Probability. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 77, 822–830.
Dietrich, F., and List, C. 2015. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling. Forthcoming in Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy.
Döring, F. 1999.Why Bayesian Psychology Is Incomplete. Philosophy of Science, 66, 379–389.
Dubins, L. 1975 Finitely Additive Conditional Probabilities, Conglomerability, and Disintegration. Annals of Probability, 3, 89–99.
Durrett, R. 1996. Probability: Theory and Examples. Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press.
Earman, J. 1992. Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Easwaran, K. 2013 Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection. Philosophy of Science, 80, 119–142.
Easwaran, K., Fenton-Glynn, L., Hitchcock, C., and Velasco, J. 2015 Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy. Philosopher's Imprint, 16, 1–39.
Elga, A. 2007 Reflection and Disagreement. Noûs, 41, 478–502.
Elga, A. 2010. How to Disagree About How to Disagree. Pages 175–186 of: Feldman, R., and Warfield, T. (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Erev, I., and Roth, A. E. 1998 Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria. American Economic Review, 88, 848–880.
Field, H. 1978 A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization. Philosophy of Science, 45, 361–367.
Fisher, R. A., Corbet, A. S., and Williams, C. B. 1943 The Relation Between the Number of Species and the Number of Individuals in a Random Sample of an Animal Population. Journal of Animal Ecology, 12, 237–264.
Fortini, S., Ladelli, L., Petris, G., and Regazzini, E. 2002 On Mixtures of Distributions of Markov Chains. Stochastic Processes and Their Applications, 100, 147–165.
Foster, D. P., and Young, H. P. 2001. On the Impossibility of Predicting the Behavior of Rational Agent. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 98, 12848–12853.
Freedman, D. 1962 Mixtures of Markov Processes. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 33, 114–118.
Fudenberg, D., and Levine, D. K. 1998. The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gaifman, H., and Snir, M. 1982. Probabilities over Rich Languages, Testing and Randomness. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 47, 495–548. Gaunersdorfer, A., and Hofbauer, J. 1995. Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation. Games and Economic Behavior, 11, 279–303.
Geanakoplos, J. D., and Polemarchakis, H. M. 1982 We Can't Disagree Forever. Journal of Economic Theory, 28, 192–200.
Genest, C., and Schervish, M. J. 1985 Modeling Expert Judgments for Bayesian Updating. The Annals of Statistics, 13, 1198–1212.
Genest, C., and Zidek, J. V. 1986. Combining Probability Distributions: A Critique and an Annotated Bibliography. Statistical Science, 114–135.
Gigerenzer, G., and Gaissmaier, W. 2011 Heuristic Decision Making. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 451–482.
Gilboa, I., and Schmeidler, D. 2001. A Theory of Case-Based Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gilboa, I., and Schmeidler, D. 2003 Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach. Econometrica, 71, 1–26.
Gilboa, I., Samuelson, L., and Schmeidler, D. 2013 Dynamics of Inductive Inference in a Unified Framework. Journal of Economic Theory, 148, 1399–1432.
Gittins, J. C. 1979. Bandit Processes and Dynamic Allocation Indices. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 148–177.
Goldstein, M. 1983 The Prevision of a Prevision. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 78, 817–819.
Good, I. J. 1950. Probability and theWeighing of Evidence. London: Charles Griffin.
Good, I. J. 1967 On the Principle of Total Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17, 319–321.
Good, I. J. 1983. Good Thinking. The Foundations of Probability and Its Applications. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Goodman, N. 1955. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.
Greaves, H., and Wallace, D. 2006 Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind, 115, 607–632.
Gutting, G. 1982. Religious Belief and Religious Scepticism. Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press.
Hacking, I. 1967 SlightlyMore Realistic Personal Probability. Philosophy of Science, 34, 311–325.
Hájek, A. 2010. Staying Regular. Unpublished manuscript.
Hammond, P. J. 1988 Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility. Theory and Decision, 25, 25–78.
Harman, G. 2002. Reflections on Knowledge and Its Limits. Philosophical Review, 417–428.
Harman, G., and Kulkarni, S. 2007. Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Harsanyi, J. C. 1967 Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players. Parts 1–3. Management Science, 14, 159–183. 320–334, 486–502.
Hart, S., and Mas-Colell, A. 2000 A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium. Econometrica, 68, 1127–1150.
Hart, S., and Mas-Colell, A. 2003 Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium. American Economic Review, 93, 1830–1836.
Herrnstein, R. J. 1970 On the Law of Effect. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13, 243–266.
Hofbauer, J., and Sandholm, W. H. 2002. On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play. Econometrica, 70, 2265–2294.
Hofbauer, J., and Sigmund, K. 1998. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hopkins, E. 2002 Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games. Econometrica, 70, 2141–2166.
Hopkins, E., and Posch, M. 2005 Attainability of Boundary Points Under Reinforcement Learning. Games and Economic Behavior, 53, 110–125.
Hoppe, F. 1984 Polya-Like Urns and the Ewen Sampling Formula. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 20, 91–94.
Howson, C. 2000. Hume's Problem. Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Howson, C., and Urbach, P. 1993. Scientific Reasoning. The Bayesian Approach. Second edn. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
Hume, D. 1739. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by D. F., Norton and M. J., Norton, 2000.
Hume, D. 1748. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by T. L. Beauchamp, 2006.
Huttegger, S. M. 2013 In Defense of Reflection. Philosophy of Science, 80, 413–433.
Huttegger, S. M. 2014 Learning Experiences and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 171, 279–288.
Huttegger, S. M. 2015a Bayesian Convergence to the Truth and the Metaphysics of PossibleWorlds. Philosophy of Science, 82, 587–601.
Huttegger, S. M. (2017). Inductive Learning in Small and LargeWorlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95, 90–116.
Huttegger, S. M. 2015b Merging of Opinions and Probability Kinematics. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 8, 611–648.
Huttegger, S. M. 2016. Analogical Predictive Probabilities. Forthcoming in Mind.
Huttegger, S. M., Skyrms, B., and Zollman, K. J. S. 2014 Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games. Erkenntnis, 79, 835–853.
Jaynes, E. T. 2003. Probability Theory. The Logic of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1957. Contributions to the Theory of Inductive Probability. PhD dissertation, Princeton University.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1965. The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill. Third revised edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1968 Probable Knowledge. Pages 166–180 of: Lakatos, I. (ed.). The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1975. Carnap's Empiricism.Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, 6, 37–49.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1985 Probability and the Art of Judgment. Pages 95–126 of: Achinstein, P., and Hannaway, O. (eds.), Observation, Experiment. and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science. Cambridge, MA: Bradford-MIT Press.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1988 Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability. Pages 221–255 of: Skyrms, B., and Harper,W. L. (eds.), Causation, Chance. and Credence. Vol. 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Jeffrey, R. C. 1992. Probability and the Art of Judgement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jehle, D., and Fitelson, B. 2009. What Is the “Equal Weight View”? Episteme, 6, 280–293.
Johnson, W. E. 1924. Logic, Part III: The Logical Foundations of Science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, W. E. 1932. Probability: The Deductive and Inductive Problems. Mind, 41, 409–423. Joyce, J. M. 1998. A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65, 575–603.
Joyce, J. M. 1999. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Joyce, J. M. 2004.Williamson on Evidence and Knowledge. Philosophical Books, 45, 296–305.
Joyce, J. M. 2007 Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 107, 187–206.
Joyce, J. M. 2009 Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief. Pages 263–297 of: Huber, F., and Schmdit-Petri, C. (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Joyce, J. M. 2010 The Development of Subjective Bayesianism. Pages 415–476 of: Gabbay, D. M., Hartmann, S., and Woods, J. (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 10: Inductive Logic. Elsevier.
Kadane, J. B., Schervish, M. J., and Seidenfeld, T. 1996 Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 91, 1228–1236.
Kadane, J. B., Schervish, M. J., and Seidenfeld, T. J. 2008. Is Ignorance Bliss? The Journal of Philosophy, 105, 5–36.
Kalai, E., and Lehrer, E. 1993. Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium. Econometrica, 1019–1045.
Kalai, E., and Lehrer, E. 1994 Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 23, 73–86.
Kelly, K. T. 1996. Logic of Reliable Inquiry. Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. 2005 The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1, 167–196.
Kelly, T. 2008 Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization. Journal of Philosophy, 105, 611–633.
Kelly, T. 2010 Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence. Pages 111–174 of: Feldman, R., and Warfield, T. (eds.). Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kemeny, J. G. 1955 Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 20, 263–273.
Kennedy, R., and Chihara, C. S. 1979 The Dutch Book Argument: Its Logical Flaws, Its Subjective Sources. Philosophical Studies, 36, 19–33.
Keynes, J. M. 1921. A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan.
Kingman, J. F. C. 1975 Random Discrete Distributions. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B, 37, 1–22.
Kingman, J. F. C. 1978a The Representation of Partition Structures. Journal of the London Mathematical Society, 18, 374–380.
Kingman, J. F. C. 1978b Random Partitions in Population Genetics. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A, 361, 1–20.
Kingman, J. F. C. 1980. The Mathematics of Genetic Diversity. Vol. 34. SIAM.
Kolmogorov, A. N. 1933. Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Berlin: Springer.
Krantz, D. H., Luce, R. D., Suppes, P., and Tversky, A. 1971. Foundations of Measurement, Vol. I. Additive and Polynomial Representations. San Diego: Academic Press. Reprinted by Dover 2007.
Kuipers, T. A. F. 1978. Studies in Inductive Probability and Rational Expectation. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Kuipers, T. A. F. 1988 Inductive Analogy by Similarity and Proximity. In: Helman, D. H. (ed.). Analogical Reasoning. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Lam, B. 2011 On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement. Philosophical Review, 120, 207–245.
Lane, D. A., and Sudderth,W. D. 1984. Coherent Predictive Inference. Sankhy¯a: The Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A, 166–185.
Lange, M. 2000 Is Jeffrey Conditionalization Defective in Virtue of Being Non- Commutative? Remarks on the Sameness of Sensory Experiences. Synthese, 93, 393–403.
Laplace, P. S. 1774 Mémoire sur la probabilité des causes par led évènemens. Mémoires de Mathématique et Physique, Presentés à l'Académie Royale des Sciences, par divers Savans & lûs dans ses Assemblées, Tome Sixiéme, 66, 621–656. Translated with commentary by Stephen M. Stigler (1986) Statistical Science 1: 359–378.
Laslier, J.-F., Topol, R., and Walliser, B. 2001 A Behavioral Learning Process in Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 340–366.
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2013 Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation. Noûs, 47, 767–794.
Lehrer, K., and Wagner, C. G. 1981. Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Leitgeb, H. 2017. The Stability of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leitgeb, H., and Pettigrew, R. 2010a An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77, 201–235.
Leitgeb, H., and Pettigrew, R. 2010b An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77, 236–272.
Levi, I. 1980. The Enterprise of Knowledge. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Levi, I. 1987 The Demons of Decision. The Monist, 70, 193–211. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levi, I. 1997. The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought.
Lewis, D. K. 1986 Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. The Philosophical Review, 95, 581–589.
Lewis, D. K. 1999. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Link, G. 1980 Representation Theorems of the de Finetti Type for (Partially) Symmetric Probability Measures. Pages 207–231 of: Jeffrey, R. C. (ed.). Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability II. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
List, C. 2012 The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review. Synthese, 187, 179–207.
Luce, R. D. 1959. Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Wiley.
Luce, R. D. 1964 Some One-Parameter Families of Commutative Learning Operators. Pages 380–398 of: Atkinson, R. C. (ed.). Studies inMathematical Psychology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Luce, R. D. 1977 The Choice Axiom After Twenty Years. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 15, 215–233.
Luce, R. D., and Raiffa, H. 1957. Games and Decisions. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Luce, R. D., and Suppes, P. 1965 Preference, Utility, and Subjective Probability. Pages 249–410 of: Luce, R. D., Bush, R. R., and Galanter, E. (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology. Vol. 3. New York:Wiley.
Maher, P. 1992 Diachronic Rationality. Philosophy of Science, 59, 120–141.
Mahtani, A. 2012 Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments. Philosophical Review, 121, 443–450.
Marden, J. R., Young, H. P., Arslan, G., and Shamma, J. S. 2009 Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games. Siam Journal of Control and Optimization, 48, 373–396.
Marley, A. A. J. 1967 Abstract One-Parameter Families of Commutative Learning Operators. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 4, 414–429.
McFadden, D. 1974 Conditional Logit Analysis of Quantitative Choice Behavior. Pages 105–142 of: Zarembka, P. (ed.). Frontiers in Econometrics. New York: Academic Press.
Miller, R. I., and Sanchirico, C. W. 1999. The Role of Absolute Continuity in “Merging of Opinions” and “Rational Learning.” Games and Economic Behavior, 29, 170–190.
Moss, S. 2015 Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 5, 172–94.
Nachbar, J. H. 1997. Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games. Econometrica, 275–309.
Narens, L. 2003 A Theory of Belief. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 47, 1–31.
Narens, L. 2007. Theories of Probability: An Examination of Logical and Qualitative Foundations. Singapore:World Scientific Publishing.
Paris, J., and Vencovská, A. 2015. Pure Inductive Logic. Cambridge University Press.
Paul, L. A. 2014. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pedersen, A. P. 2014 Comparative Expectations. Studia Logica, 102, 811–848.
Pettigrew, R. 2016. Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Press, W. H. 2009. Bandit Solutions Provide Unified Ethical Models for Randomized Clinical Trials and Comparative Effectiveness Research. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 22387–22392.
Purves, R. A., and Sudderth, W. D. 1976 Some Finitely Additive Probability. The Annals of Probability, 4, 259–276.
Putnam, H. 1963 Degree of Confirmation and Inductive Logic. Pages 761–783 of: Schilpp, P. A. (ed.). The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Lasalle, IL: Open Court.
Rabinowicz, W. 2002. Does Practical Deliberation Crowd Out Self-Prediction? Erkenntnis, 57, 91–122.
Ramsey, F. P. 1931 Truth and Probability. Pages 156–198 of: Braithwaite, R. B. (ed.). Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays. New York: Harcourt Brace. Also in Philosophical Papers, ed., D. H. Mellor (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Ramsey, F. P. 1990 Weight or the Value of Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 41, 1–4.
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Regazzini, E. 2013 The Origins of de Finetti's Critique of Countable Additivity. Pages 63–82 of: Jones, G., and Shen, X. (ed.), Advances in Modern Statistical Theory and Applications: A Festschrift in Honor of Morris L. Eaton. Institute of Mathematical Statistics.
Rescorla, R. A., and Wagner, A. R. 1972 A Theory of Pavlovian Conditioning: Variations in The Effectiveness of Reinforcement and Nonreinforcement. Pages 64–99 of: Black, A. H.. and Prokasy, W. F. (eds.), Classical Conditioning II: Current Research and Theory. New York.
Robbins, H. E. 1952. Some Aspects of the Sequential Design of Experiments. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 527–535.
Romeijn, J.-W. 2004. Hypotheses and Inductive Predictions. Synthese, 141 (3), 333–364.
Romeijn, J.-W. 2015. Opinion Pooling as a Bayesian Update. Working Paper.
Rosenkrantz, R. 1981. Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press.
Roth, A., and Erev, I. 1995 Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term. Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164–212.
Rothschild, M. 1974 A Two-Armed Bandit Theory of Market Pricing. Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 185–202.
Rubinstein, A. 1998. Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Rustichini, A. 1999 Optimal Properties of Stimulus Response Learning Models. Games and Economic Behavior, 29, 244–273.
Saari, D. G. 2005 The Profile Structure of Luce's Choice Axiom. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 49, 226–253.
Samuelson, L. 1997. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sato, Y., Akiyama, E., and Farmer, J. D. 2002 Chaos in Learning a Simple Two- Person Game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99, 4748–4751.
Savage, J. E. 1998. Models of Computation. Boston: AddisonWesley.
Savage, L. J. 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Dover Publications.
Savage, L. J. 1967 Implications of Personal Probability for Induction. The Journal of Philosophy, 64, 593–607.
Savage, L. J. 1971 Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 66, 783–801.
Schervish, M. J., and Seidenfeld, T. 1990 An Approach to Consensus and Certainty with Increasing Information. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 25, 401–414.
Schoenfield, M. (forthcoming). Conditionalization Does Not (in General) Maximize Expected Accuracy. Forthcoming in Mind.
Seidenfeld, T. 1979 Why I Am Not an Objective Bayesian: Some Reflections Prompted by Rosenkrantz. Theory and Decision, 11, 413–440.
Seidenfeld, T. 1988. Decision TheoryWithout “Independence” orWithout “Ordering.” Economics and Philosophy, 4, 267–290.
Seidenfeld, T., Schervish, M. J., and Kadane, J. B. 1990.When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1, 517–524.
Seidenfeld, T., Schervish, M. J., and Kadane, J. B. 2014 Non-Conglomerability for Countably Additive Measures that Are Not κ-Additive. Manuscript CMU. Selten, R. 1998. Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule. Experimental Economics, 1, 43–61.
Selten, R. 2001. What Is Bounded Rationality? Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, 13–36.
Shamma, J. S., and Arslan, G. 2005 Dynamic Fictitious Play, Dynamic Gradient Play, and Distributed Convergence to Nash Equilibria. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 50, 312–327.
Shapley, L. S. 1964 Some Topics in Two-Person Games. Pages 1–28 of: Dresher, M., Shapley, L. S., and Tucker, A. W. (eds). Advances in Game Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Shimony, A. 1955 Coherence and the Axioms of Confirmation. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 20, 1–28.
Simon, H. A. 1955 A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69, 99–118.
Simon, H. A. 1956 Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment. Psychological Review, 63, 129–138.
Simon, H. A. 1957. Models of Man. New York: Wiley.
Simon, H. A. 1976 From Substantial to Procedural Rationality. Pages 65–86 of: Kastelein, T. J. Kuipers, S. K., Nijenhueis, W. A., and Wagenaar, G. R. (eds.), 25 Years of Economic Theory. Springer.
Simon, H. A. 1986 Rationality in Economics and Psychology. The Journal of Business, 59, 209–224.
Skyrms, B. 1986. Choice and Chance. An Introduction to Inductive Logic. Third edn. Belmont, CA:Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Skyrms, B. 1987a Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics. Philosophy of Science, 54, 1–20.
Skyrms, B. 1987b. Coherence. Pages 225–342 of: Rescher, Nicholas N. (ed.), Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective. Pittsburgh: University Press of America.
Skyrms, B. 1990. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.
Skyrms, B. 1991 Inductive Logic for Markov Chains. Erkenntnis, 35, 439–460.
Skyrms, B. 1993 Carnapian Inductive Logic for a Value Continuum. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18, 78–89.
Skyrms, B. 1997 The Structure of Radical Probabilism. Erkenntnis, 45, 285–297.
Skyrms, B. 2010. Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Skyrms, B. 2012 Learning to Signal with Probe and Adjust. Episteme, 9, 139–150.
Smith, D. E. 1984. A Source Book inMathematics. New York: Dover Publications.
Spohn, W. 1977 Where Luce and Krantz Do Really Generalize Savage's Decision Model. Erkenntnis, 11, 113–134.
Spohn, W. 1978. Grundlagen der Entscheidungstheorie. Kronberg/Ts.: Scriptor- Verlag.
Steele, K. 2012 Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41, 983–999.
Talbott, W. 1991 Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology. Philosophical Studies, 62, 135–150.
Taylor, P. D., and Jonker, L. 1978 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics. Mathematical Biosciences, 40, 145–156.
Teller, P. 1973 Conditionalization and Observation. Synthese, 26, 218–258.
Thorndike, E. L. 1911. Animal Intelligence. New York: Macmillan.
Thorndike, E. L. 1927. The Law of Effect. American Journal of Psychology, 39, 212–222.
Thurstone, L. L. 1927 A Law of Comparative Judgment. Psychological Review, 34, 266–270.
Titelbaum, M. G. 2012. Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tversky, A. 1972 Choice by Elimination. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 9, 341–367.
Fraassen, B. C. 1980 Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics. Philosophy of Science, 47, 165–187.
van Fraassen, B. C. 1984 Belief and theWill. Journal of Philosophy, 81, 235–256.
van Fraassen, B. C. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Fraassen, B. C. 1995 Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens. Philosophical Studies, 77, 7–37.
van Inwagen, P. 1996 Is It Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence? Pages 137–153 of: Jorand, J., and Howard-Snyder, D. (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
van Vanderschraaf, P., and Skyrms, B. 2003 Learning to Take Turns. Erkenntnis, 59, 311–348.
Venn, J. 1866. Logic of Chance. London: Macmillan.
von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wagner, C. G. 1985 On the Formal Properties ofWeighted Averaging as a Method of Aggregation. Synthese, 62, 97–108.
Wagner, C. G. 2002 Probability Kinematics and Commutativity. Philosophy of Science, 69, 266–278.
Wagner, E. O. 2012 Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution ofMeaning. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 63, 547–575.
Wagner, E. O. 2013 The Explanatory Relevance of Nash Equilibrium: One- Dimensional Chaos in Boundedly Rational Learning. Philosophy of Science, 80, 783–795.
Weatherson, B. 2003 From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 44, 111–123.
Weisberg, J. 2007 Conditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 135, 179–197.
Weyl, H. 1952. Symmetry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
White, R. 2010 Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 3, 161–186.
Williams, D. 1991. Probability with Martingales. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, J. R. G. 2012 Generalized Probabilism: Dutch Books and Accuracy Domination. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41, 811–840.
Williamson, J. 2010. In Defense of Objective Bayesianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. 2002. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Yellott, J. I. 1977 The Relationship Between Luce's Choice Axiom, Thurstone's Theory of Comparative Judgment, and the Double Exponential Distribution. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 15, 109–144.
Young, H. P. 2004. Strategic Learning and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Young, H. P. 2009 Learning by Trial and Error. Games and Economic Behavior, 65, 626–643.
Zabell, S. L. 1982 W. E. Johnson's “Sufficientness” Postulate. The Annals of Statistics, 10, 1091–1099.
Zabell, S. L. 1988 Symmetry and Its Discontents. Pages 155–190 of: Skyrms, B., and Harper, W. L. (eds.), Causation, Chance. and Credence. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Zabell, S. L. 1989 The Rule of Succession. Erkenntnis, 31, 283–321.
Zabell, S. L. 1992. Predicting the Unpredictable. Synthese, 90 (2), 205–232.
Zabell, S. L. 1995 Characterizing Markov Exchangeable Sequences. Journal of Theoretical Probability, 8, 175–178.
Zabell, S. L. 1998 The Continuum of Inductive Methods Revisited. Pages 151–385 of: Earman, J., andNorton, J. (eds.). The Cosmos of Science. Essays of Exploration. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press/Universitätsverlag Konstanz.
Zabell, S. L. 2002 It All Adds Up: The Dynamic Coherence of Radical Probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 69, 98–103.
Zollman, K. J. S. 2007 The Communication Structure of Epistemic Communities. Philosophy of Science, 74, 574–587.
Zollman, K. J. S. 2010 The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity. Erkenntnis, 72, 17–35.


Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.