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Renegotiating the World Order
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    Renegotiating the World Order
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Book description

Rising powers often seek to reshape the world order, triggering confrontations with those who seek to defend the status quo. In recent years, as international institutions have grown in prevalence and influence, they have increasingly become central arenas for international contestation. Phillip Y. Lipscy examines how international institutions evolve as countries seek to renegotiate the international order. He offers a new theory of institutional change and explains why some institutions change flexibly while others successfully resist or fall to the wayside. The book uses a wealth of empirical evidence - quantitative and qualitative - to evaluate the theory from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union, League of Nations, United Nations, the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. The book will be of particular interest to scholars interested in the historical and contemporary diplomacy of the United States, Japan, and China.


‘Phillip Y. Lipscy shows, using rationalist theory, that variation in competition among international institutions explains variation in their willingness to undergo fundamental institutional change. Renegotiating the World Order is a theoretically innovative and empirically impressive book on an important topic.'

Robert O. Keohane - Princeton University, New Jersey

‘Why is it that some international institutional arrangements respond in flexible ways to changes in the distribution of power whereas others do not? Lipscy offers an original and persuasive answer to this question that troubles both policymakers and theorists. This book is a must read for anyone interested in understanding the past and future of international organizations.'

Eric Voeten - Georgetown University, Washington DC

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