Resistance to Evidence

Mona Simion

doi:10.1017/9781009298537

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This Book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.

Simion, Mona 2024. Disinformation, Politically Motivated Reasoning, and Knowledge Resistance. European Review, Vol. 32, Issue. 4, p. 321.

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Jarczewski, Dominik 2024. Exempting Oneself from Knowing Better. Epistemic Laziness and Conspiracy Theories. Social Epistemology, p. 1.

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Patrizio, Ross F. 2024. Testimonial liberalism and the balance of epistemic goals. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 181, Issue. 11, p. 2997.

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Hughes, Nick 2024. Non‐ideal epistemic rationality. Philosophical Issues, Vol. 34, Issue. 1, p. 72.

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Goldberg, Sanford C. 2024. Unpossessed evidence revisited: our options are limited. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 181, Issue. 11, p. 3017.

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Mace, Lilith and Simion, Mona 2024. What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’. Philosophical Studies,

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Adam Carter, J. Kelp, Christoph and Simion, Mona 2025. Brown on group evidence, group justification, and group responsibility. Inquiry, p. 1.

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Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin and Spectre, Levi 2025. Where is the Motivation in Motivated Numeracy?. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 16, Issue. 2, p. 481.

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Simion, Mona 2025. McKenna on Non-Ideal Epistemology. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, p. 1.

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Matsumoto, Shohei 2025. Strong social anti-reductionism reexamined. Synthese, Vol. 205, Issue. 5,

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Flores, Carolina 2025. Identity-protective reasoning: an epistemic and political defense. Episteme, p. 1.

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Kallestrup, Jesper 2025. When do groups have evidence?. Inquiry, p. 1.

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Field, Claire and Sylvan, Kurt 2025. Neurodiversity and attentional normativity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,

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Faulkner, Paul 2025. Trust and Cooperation.

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Simion, Mona 2025. Knowledge-First Epistemology.

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Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando 2025. Knowledge-first summativism about group evidence. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 182, Issue. 5-6, p. 1275.

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Schmidt, Sebastian 2025. Should we respond correctly to our reasons?. Episteme, p. 1.

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Piedrahita, Oscar A. 2025. Pointless facts and the normativity of ignorance. Philosophical Studies,

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Mona Simion, University of Glasgow

Publisher:: Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:: February 2024
Print publication year:: 2024
Online ISBN:: 9781009298537
DOI:: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009298537
Creative Commons:: This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/creativelicenses

Subjects:: Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
Series:: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

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We have increasingly sophisticated ways of acquiring and communicating knowledge, but efforts to spread this knowledge often encounter resistance to evidence. The phenomenon of resistance to evidence, while subject to thorough investigation in social psychology, is acutely under-theorised in the philosophical literature. Mona Simion's book is concerned with positive epistemology: it argues that we have epistemic obligations to update and form beliefs on available and undefeated evidence. In turn, our resistance to easily available evidence is unpacked as an instance of epistemic malfunctioning. Simion develops a full positive, integrated epistemological picture in conjunction with novel accounts of evidence, defeat, norms of inquiry, permissible suspension, and disinformation. Her book is relevant for anyone with an interest in the nature of evidence and justified belief and in the best ways to avoid the high-stakes practical consequences of evidence resistance in policy and practice. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

‘People who deny well established truths are an obtrusive feature of the contemporary world. Mona Simion argues that such denial manifests a breach of our epistemic obligation to respond to easily available evidence. As well as shedding light on an important phenomenon, she develops new accounts of evidence, defeat, disinformation and our obligations as inquirers. This rich and wide-ranging book will be essential reading for all epistemologists, as well as anyone interested in the root causes of so much contemporary political dysfunction.'

Neil Levy - University of Oxford

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Resistance to Evidence

This Book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.

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Contents

Resistance to Evidence
pp i-i

Cambridge Studies in Philosophy - Series page
pp ii-iv

Resistance to Evidence - Title page
pp v-v

Copyright page
pp vi-vi

Dedication
pp vii-viii

Contents
pp ix-xi

Acknowledgements
pp xii-xiv

Introduction
pp 1-6

Part I - The Epistemology and Psychology of Resistance to Evidence
pp 7-92

Chapter 1 - Resistance to Evidence
pp 9-22

Chapter 2 - Evidence One Has and the Impermissibility of Resistance
pp 23-35

Chapter 3 - Evidence You Should Have Had and Resistance
pp 36-47

Chapter 4 - Permissible Suspension and Evidence Resistance
pp 48-67

Chapter 5 - Resistance to Evidence, Epistemic Responsibility, and Epistemic Vice
pp 68-92

Part II - Resistance to Evidence and Epistemic Proper Function
pp 93-148

Chapter 6 - Resistance to Evidence as Epistemic Malfunction
pp 95-110

Chapter 7 - Evidence as Knowledge Indicators
pp 111-123

Chapter 8 - Defeaters as Ignorance Indicators
pp 124-137

Chapter 9 - Inquiry and Permissible Suspension
pp 138-148

Part III - Theoretical Upshots
pp 149-191

Chapter 10 - Epistemic Oughts and Epistemic Dilemmas
pp 151-164

Chapter 11 - Scepticism as Resistance to Evidence
pp 165-177

Chapter 12 - Knowledge and Disinformation
pp 178-191

Concluding Remarks
pp 192-196

Bibliography
pp 197-214

Index
pp 215-216

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Resistance to Evidence

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