Rules and Reason: Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy

doi:10.1017/CBO9781139175166

Polarization in Western democracies and the collapse of centrally planned economies have led to calls for a redefinition of the state's core functions. This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy anchoring the state from the viewpoints of theory, systems, and applications. It suggests why changes may be desirable and how these might be implemented. Part I addresses the writing of constitutions, the dynamic between constitutional order and civil society, the struggle between competitive and protectionist interests, the conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution, and the role of cultural explanations of constitutional development patterns. Part II explores the interplay between electoral systems and constitutional engineering, the internal costs of political coalitions, and campaigns in pluralistic elections. Part III investigates the quest for stable, dynamic federal states with particular attention to opportunities and pitfalls in Europe. With a foreword and contributions from Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan.

‘Undoubtedly the book is a valuable tool for researchers who strive to deepen their understanding of constitutional political economy. It should also be very useful for policymakers who are currently debating these important constitutional issues in Europe and elsewhere.’

Source: Public Choice

‘… a significant scholarly contribution …’.

Source: Political Studies Review

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Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-vi
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Contents
pp vii-viii
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Foreword
pp ix-x
- By James M. Buchanan, George Mason University
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Preface and Acknowledgments
pp xi-xii
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List of Contributors
pp xiii-xiv
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1 - Constitutional Issues in Modern Democracies
pp 1-6
- By Ram Mudambi, University of Reading, UK, and Temple University, USA, Pietro Navarra, University of Messina, Italy, Giuseppe Sobbrio, University of Messina, Italy
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PART I - CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
pp 7-8
Introductory Note
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2 - On Writing a Constitution
pp 9-32
- By Dennis C. Mueller, University of Vienna, Austria
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3 - Constitutional Order and Economic Evolution: Competitive and Protectionist Interests in Democratic Society
pp 33-55
- By Viktor Vanberg, Albert-Ludwigs University, Germany
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4 - The Efficacy of Arbitrary Rules
pp 56-68
- By James M. Buchanan, George Mason University, USA, Yong J. Yoon, George Mason University, USA
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5 - Constitutional Political Economy and Civil Society
pp 69-96
- By Charles K. Rowley, George Mason University, USA
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6 - The Constitutional Conflict between Protecting Expectations and Moral Evolution
pp 97-106
- By Nicolaus Tideman, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA
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7 - Ideological Competition and Institutions: Why “Cultural” Explanations of Development Patterns Are Not Nonsense
pp 107-122
- By Michael J. Ensley, Duke University, USA, Michael C. Munger, Duke University, USA
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PART II - ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS
pp 123-124
Introductory Note
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8 - Electoral Systems and the Art of Constitutional Engineering: An Inventory of the Main Findings
pp 125-164
- By Bernard N. Grofman, University of California, Andrew Reynolds, University of Notre Dame, USA
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9 - Ordinary Elections and Constitutional Arrangements
pp 165-180
- By Pierre Salmon, University of Burgundy, France
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10 - The Cost Imposed on Political Coalitions by Constituent Parties: The Case of Italian National Elections
pp 181-191
- By Ram Mudambi, University of Reading, UK, Pietro Navarra, University of Messina, Italy, Giuseppe Sobbrio, University of Messina, Italy
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11 - A Model of Two-Party Campaigns in Pluralistic Elections with Evidence
pp 192-204
- By Chris W. Paul II, Georgia Southern University, Allen W. Wilhite, University of Alabama
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PART III - CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR A FEDERAL STATE
pp 205-206
Introductory Note
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12 - Ensuring a Stable Federal State: Economics or Political Institutional Design
pp 207-236
- By Mikhail Filippov, California Institute of Technology, USA, Peter C. Ordeshook, California Institute of Technology, USA, Olga V. Shvetsova, Washington University-St. Louis, USA
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13 - A Proposal for Dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ
pp 237-257
- By Bruno S. Frey, University of Zurich, Switzerland, Reiner Eichenberger, University of Zurich, Switzerland
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14 - The Maastricht “Excessive Deficit” Rules and Creative Accounting
pp 258-288
- By Francesco Forte, University of Rome, La Sapienza, Italy
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15 - Subsidiarity, Federalism, and Direct Democracy as Basic Elements of a Federal European Constitution: Some Ideas Using Constitutional Economics
pp 289-312
- By Friedrich Schneider, Johannes Kepler University, Austria, Alexander F. Wagner, Johannes Kepler University, Austria
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Index
pp 313-320
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Rules and Reason

Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy

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Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-vi

Contents
pp vii-viii

Foreword
pp ix-x

Preface and Acknowledgments
pp xi-xii

List of Contributors
pp xiii-xiv

1 - Constitutional Issues in Modern Democracies
pp 1-6

PART I - CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
pp 7-8

2 - On Writing a Constitution
pp 9-32

3 - Constitutional Order and Economic Evolution: Competitive and Protectionist Interests in Democratic Society
pp 33-55

4 - The Efficacy of Arbitrary Rules
pp 56-68

5 - Constitutional Political Economy and Civil Society
pp 69-96

6 - The Constitutional Conflict between Protecting Expectations and Moral Evolution
pp 97-106

7 - Ideological Competition and Institutions: Why “Cultural” Explanations of Development Patterns Are Not Nonsense
pp 107-122

PART II - ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS
pp 123-124

8 - Electoral Systems and the Art of Constitutional Engineering: An Inventory of the Main Findings
pp 125-164

9 - Ordinary Elections and Constitutional Arrangements
pp 165-180

10 - The Cost Imposed on Political Coalitions by Constituent Parties: The Case of Italian National Elections
pp 181-191

11 - A Model of Two-Party Campaigns in Pluralistic Elections with Evidence
pp 192-204

PART III - CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR A FEDERAL STATE
pp 205-206

12 - Ensuring a Stable Federal State: Economics or Political Institutional Design
pp 207-236

13 - A Proposal for Dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ
pp 237-257

14 - The Maastricht “Excessive Deficit” Rules and Creative Accounting
pp 258-288

15 - Subsidiarity, Federalism, and Direct Democracy as Basic Elements of a Federal European Constitution: Some Ideas Using Constitutional Economics
pp 289-312

Index
pp 313-320

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Rules and Reason

Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy

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