Contents

pp vii-viii

List of Maps

pp ix-x

Acknowledgments

pp xi-xii

List of Abbreviations

pp xiii-xiv

Foreword

pp xv-xviii

Preface: A Test Case of Collective Security

pp xix-xxii

Introduction: The Nature of the Problem

pp 1-26

Part One - Background of the Munich Crisis

pp 27-27

1 - The Shaky Foundations of Collective Security: Moscow, Paris, London

pp 28-52

2 - Soviet–Romanian Relations I: 1934–1938

pp 53-75

3 - Soviet–Romanian Relations II: Summer 1938

pp 76-92

Part Two - Foreground: Climax of the Crisis

pp 93-93

4 - East Awaiting West: Berchtesgaden to Godesberg

pp 94-110

5 - The Red Army Mobilizes

pp 111-126

6 - Dénouement

pp 127-138

Part Three - Conclusion

pp 139-139

7 - What the Red Army Actually Did

pp 140-148

8 - What the Red Army Might Feasibly Have Done

pp 149-167

9 - Epilogue

pp 168-181

10 - Assessment of Soviet Intentions

pp 182-192

Appendices

pp 193-206

Index

pp 207-212