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  1. Home
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  3. The Dimensions of Consequentialism
  • Cited by 40
  • Martin Peterson, Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands; Texas A & M University
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
March 2013
Print publication year:
2013
Online ISBN:
9781139519243
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139519243
Subjects:
Economics, Economic Thought, Philosophy and Methodology, Ethics, Philosophy
Information

Book description

Consequentialism, one of the major theories of normative ethics, maintains that the moral rightness of an act is determined solely by the act's consequences. The traditional form of consequentialism is one-dimensional, in that the rightness of an act is a function of a single moral aspect, such as the sum total of wellbeing it produces. In this book Martin Peterson introduces a new type of consequentialist theory: multidimensional consequentialism. According to this theory, an act's moral rightness depends on several separate dimensions, including individual wellbeing, equality and risk. Peterson's novel approach shows that moral views about equality and risk that were previously thought to be mutually incompatible can be rendered compatible, and his precise theoretical discussion helps the reader to understand better the distinction between consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories. His book will interest a wide range of readers in ethics.

Reviews

'… full of mathematical proofs and engages with related literature and selected intuitions …'

S. E. Forschler Source: Choice

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Contents

Contents
References

References

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