Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
  • Cited by 26
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
September 2012
Print publication year:
2012
Online ISBN:
9780511783630
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511783630
Subjects:
Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy
Information

Book description

The sensitivity principle is a compelling idea in epistemology and is typically characterized as a necessary condition for knowledge. This collection of thirteen new essays constitutes a state-of-the-art discussion of this important principle. Some of the essays build on and strengthen sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge and offer novel defences of those accounts. Others present original objections to sensitivity-based accounts (objections that must be taken seriously even by those who defend enhanced versions of sensitivity) and offer comprehensive analysis and discussion of sensitivity's virtues and problems. The resulting collection will stimulate new debate about the sensitivity principle and will be of great interest and value to scholars and advanced students of epistemology.

Reviews

'Becker and Black present state-of-the-art thinking about 'sensitivity', a principle typically characterized as a necessary condition for knowledge … strongly recommend[ed] … to anyone who has had an interest in studying the sensitivity principle in epistemology.'

George Lăzăroiu Source: Review of Contemporary Philosophy

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

Contents

Contents
  • Chapter 6 - Methods and how to individuate them
    pp 81-98
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter gives a brief overview of The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, which presents state-of-the-art thinking about a very simple and intuitively compelling idea in epistemology. The book sparks renewed interest in sensitivity, perhaps restoring it to the throne of principles in externalist epistemology. Given the resilience of sensitivity, those who wish to reject sensitivity theories will try to uncover criticisms in addition to the several counterexamples that have been proposed and to the allegation that sensitivity forces us to deny closure. In this book, three prominent epistemologists, Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Jonathan Vogel, and Peter Klein, offer novel criticisms of sensitivity theories or steer extant criticisms in new and different directions. The book comprises essays defending the relative merits of safety over sensitivity. The book also includes a critical commentary by Anthony Brueckner on Sherrilyn Roush's (2005) Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science.
  • Chapter 7 - Truth-tracking and the value of knowledge
    pp 101-121
  • View abstract

    Summary

    Robert Nozick's conception of knowledge has triggered a lot of criticism over the last three decades. This chapter first argues that at least in many cases Nozick is not forced to deny common closure principles. Second, and much more importantly, Nozick does not, despite first and second appearances and despite his own words, deny closure. On the contrary, he is defending a more sophisticated and complex principle of closure. Nozick holds that a true belief constitutes knowledge just in case it stands in a certain modal relation to the fact that makes it true. The chapter explains why closure is not satisfying and proposes a modification. It argues that one can find a more satisfying principle in Nozick's text. This chapter discusses how this principle deals with relevant problem cases. Both Nozick-Knowledge and Nozick-Closure seem to give the wrong, negative verdict about knowledge.
  • Chapter 8 - The enduring trouble with tracking
    pp 122-151
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter shows that explanationist counterfactualism (EC) is not threatened by objections like those leveled by Sosa, Saul Kripke, and Williamson. It is reported that Kripke offers a case like the following: Henry, still out on his drive, believes that there is a red barn before him. Besides handling the cases put forth by Sosa, Kripke, and Williamson, the chapter's proposal has another virtue: it clarifies and helps bring into focus the recent literature on skepticism. One would need to do more in order to determine whether (EC)'s explanatory condition includes demands that concern belief- forming methods and perceptual equivalence. it might very well be that we need to identify and examine other demands of that condition. EC pays real dividends in helping us focus our attention on key elements in the skeptical debate, elements that might help us finally to put an end to that debate.
  • Chapter 9 - What makes knowledge the most highly prized form of true belief?
    pp 152-170
  • View abstract

    Summary

    The sensitivity condition on knowledge emerges out of a simple but highly attractive idea: whether S's belief that p amounts to knowledge depends on whether S would have so believed had it been false that p. This chapter describes a belief that makes true the sensitivity conditional in SEN, the conditional that if p were false, then S would not believe that p via M, as classically sensitive, or c-sensitive for short. It is helpful to start the discussion by assuming that the sensitivity condition on knowledge requires classic-sensitivity, that is, by assuming that c-sensitivity is a necessary condition on knowledge. The chapter assumes a sensitivity account that consists in a conjunction of three claims: SEN, the Sufficiency Thesis, and the claim that M (TGEN) is the proper way to individuate the belief-forming method involved in testimony cases. Such an account entails what it calls the testimony/classicalsensitivity biconditional, or TCS-biconditional.
  • Chapter 10 - In defence of modest anti-luck epistemology
    pp 173-192
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter tries to resolve the tension allegedly inherent in Nozick's approach to methods of belief formation. First, it motivates sensitivity, independently of concerns about how to individuate these methods. The chapter then focuses on a few common problems for sensitivity. The chapter suggests that sensitivity must be relativized to methods and explains how the method should be read into the sensitivity principle. Nozick himself noticed, in the original presentation of his tracking epistemology, that sensitivity must be indexed to the actual method used by the agent in forming belief, or the theory will be a non-starter. Some commentators, including Williamson, have suggested that Nozick's own preferred characterization of methods undermines his generally externalist epistemology. Finally, the chapter uses the conception of methods in applying the sensitivity principle to the putative Kripke and Williamson counterexamples.
  • Chapter 12 - False negatives
    pp 207-226
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter highlights the central importance of modal dimensions of the nature of knowledge. It focuses on several value problems regarding knowledge, describing the logical landscape of value issues and identifying a special value problem that concerns the relationship between knowledge and its parts. The chapter uses this problem to motivate taking seriously probabilistic accounts of truth-tracking and sensitivity over standard counterfactual approaches. This approaches described here rely on the three-place relation, since they offer stories that are at least initially plausible concerning the nature of knowledge. The probabilistic approach to truth-tracking shows significant promise, and can be used as well to address the original Meno problem concerning the value of knowledge over true opinion. The conclusion to draw from the discussion is that theories of knowledge that rely on sensitivity and truth-tracking conditions can go some distance toward explaining the value of knowledge, but not the entire distance.
  • Chapter 13 - Roush on knowledge:
    pp 229-241
  • Tracking redux?
  • View abstract

    Summary

    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons for concluding that it cannot adequately account for epistemic luck. The chapter then explores the reasons view and shows how it can account for some of the cases that are troublesome for the etiology view. There are many well-discussed and widely accepted counterexamples in the literature for each of the etiology views, with the exception of the virtue-views because those views are still relatively new.
  • Bibliography
    pp 269-277
  • View abstract

    Summary

    There are two competing ways of understanding the anti-luck condition in the contemporary literature. Call the safety principle the claim that knowledge entails safe belief, and call the sensitivity principle the claim that knowledge entails sensitive belief. Modest anti-luck epistemology merely endorses the safety principle and hence argues that safety is a key necessary condition for knowledge. A range of putative counterexamples have been put forward to the idea that knowledge entails safety, and thus to the view that we are here characterizing as modest anti-luck epistemology. This chapter argues for three main claims. First, that safety offers the best rendering of the anti-luck condition. Second, that safety is merely necessary, and not sufficient for knowledge. Third, that the main counterexamples offered to the necessity of safety and thus to modest anti-luck epistemology, do not hit their target.
References

Bibliography

Adams, F., Barker, J., and Figurelli, J. 2011. “Towards Closure on Closure,” Synthese DOI: 10.1007/s11229–011–9922–8 (Online First).
Adams, F. and Clarke, M. 2005. “Resurrecting the Tracking Theories,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:2, 207–21.
Alfano, M. 2009. “Sensitivity Theory and the Individuation of Belief Formation Methods,” Erkenntnis 70:2, 271–81.
Alonso-Ovalle, L. 2009. “Counterfactuals, Correlatives, and Disjunction,” Linguistics and Philosophy 32:2, 207–44.
Alspector-Kelly, M. 2011. “Why Safety Doesn’t Save Closure,” Synthese 183:2, 127–42.
Aquinas, T. 1955. Summa contra Gentiles, trans. Anton Pegis (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co.).
Arregui, A. Unpublished manuscript. “Layering Modalities: The Case of Backtracking Conditionals.”
Ayer, A. 1956. The Problem of Knowledge (London: Macmillan).
Bach, K. 1985. “A Rationale for Reliabilism,” The Monist 68:2, 246–63.
Barke, A. 2002. The Closure of Knowledge in Context (Paderborn: Mentis).
Barker, S. F. 1987. “Conditionals and Skepticism,” in S. Luper-Foy, ed. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield), 282–96.
Baumann, P. 2009. “Reliabilism – Modal, Probabilistic or Contextualist,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 79:1, 77–89.
Becker, K. 2006. “Is Counterfactual Reliabilism Compatible with Higher-Level Knowledge?” Dialectica 60:1, 79–84.
Becker, K. 2007. Epistemology Modalized (New York: Routledge).
Becker, K. 2009. “Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said,” Acta Analytica 24:1, 17–31.
Bennett, J. 2003. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals (Oxford University Press).
Bird, A. 1998. “Dispositions and Antidotes,” Philosophical Quarterly 48:191, 227–35.
Bird, A. 2000. “Further Antidotes: A Reply to Gundersen,” Philosophical Quarterly 50:199, 229–33.
Black, T. 2002. “A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Skepticism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80:2, 148–63.
Black, T. 2008. “Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism,” in V. F. Hendricks and D. H. Pritchard, eds. New Waves in Epistemology (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 8–27.
Black, T. and Murphy, P. 2007. “In Defense of Sensitivity,” Synthese 154:1, 53–71.
Brueckner, A. 1991. “Unfair to Nozick,” Analysis 51:1, 61–64.
Brueckner, A. 1994. “The Structure of the Skeptical Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:4, 827–35.
Carrier, L. S. 1971. “An Analysis of Empirical Knowledge,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 9:1, 3–11.
Chisholm, R. 1957. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
Chisholm, R. 1977. Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edn. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall).
Choi, S. 2003. “Improving Bird’s Antidotes,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81:4, 573–80.
Choi, S. 2008. “Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals,” Mind 117:468, 795–841.
Church, I. 2010. “Getting ‘Lucky’ with Gettier,” European Journal of Philosophy DOI: 10.1111/j.1468–0378.2010.00433.x (Online First).
Coffman, E. J. 2007. “Thinking about Luck,” Synthese, 158:3, 385–98.
Cohen, S. 1988. “How to Be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives 2, 91–123.
Cohen, S. 1998. “Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:1, 143–59.
Cohen, S. 1999. “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons,” Philosophical Perspectives 13, 57–89.
Cohen, S. 2002. “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65:2, 309–29.
Comesaña, J. 2005. “Unsafe Knowledge,” Synthese 146:3, 393–402.
Craig, E. 1990. Knowledge and the State of Nature (Oxford University Press).
Cross, T. 2010. “Skeptical Success,” in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. iii (Oxford University Press), 35–62.
David, M. and Warfield, T. A. 2008. “Knowledge-Closure and Scepticism,” in Q. Smith, ed. Epistemology: New Essays (Oxford University Press), 137–87.
Davies, M. 1998. “Externalism, Architecturalism and Epistemic Warrant,” in C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald, eds. Knowing Our Own Minds (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 321–61.
Davies, M. 2000. “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge,” in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke, eds. New Essays on the Apriori (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 384–414.
DeRose, K. 1995. “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” Philosophical Review 104:1, 1–52. Reprinted in K. DeRose and T. Warfield, eds. (1999) Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford University Press), 183–219.
DeRose, K. 1996. “Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:4, 568–80.
DeRose, K. 2000. “How Can We Know that We’re Not Brains in Vats?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 38:supplement, 121–48.
DeRose, K. 2010. “Insensitivity Is Back, Baby!” Philosophical Perspectives 24:1, 161–87.
Dretske, F. 1970. “Epistemic Operators,” Journal of Philosophy 67:24, 1007–23.
Dretske, F. 1971. “Conclusive Reasons,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49:1, 1–22.
Dretske, F. 1975. “Review of Armstrong’s Belief, Truth and Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 72, 793–802.
Feldman, R. 1985. “Reliability and Justification,” The Monist 68:2, 159–74.
von Fintel, K. 2001. “Counterfactuals in a Dynamic Context,” in M. Kenstowicz, ed. Ken Hale: A Life in Language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Frankfurt, H. 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 66:23, 829–39.
Fumerton, R. 1987. “Nozick’s Epistemology,” in S. Luper-Foy, ed. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield), 163–81.
Garrett, B. J. 1999. “A Sceptical Tension,” Analysis 59:3, 205–6.
Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. 2005. “The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for your Epistemic Enemies,” Philosophical Studies 124:3, 331–52.
Gettier, E. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23:6, 121–23.
Goldberg, S. 2007. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification (Cambridge University Press).
Goldberg, S. 2010. Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology (Oxford University Press).
Goldman, Alvin. 1967. “A Causal Theory of Knowing,” Journal of Philosophy 64:12, 357–72.
Goldman, A. 1976. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 73:20, 771–91.
Goldman, A. 1979. “What Is Justified Belief?” in G. Pappas, ed. Justification and Knowledge (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), 1–23. Reprinted in E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl, and M. McGrath, eds. (2008) Epistemology: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 333–47.
Goldman, A. 1983. “Review of Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations,” Philosophical Review 92:1, 81–88.
Goldman, A. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Goldman, Alan H. 1987. “Nozick on Knowledge: Finding the Right Connection,” in S. Luper-Foy, ed. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield), 182–96.
Graham, P. 2000. “Transferring Knowledge,” Noûs 34:1, 131–52.
Greco, J. 2003a. “Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise,” Metaphilosophy 34:3, 353–66.
Greco, J. 2003b. “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,” in M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski, eds. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (Oxford University Press), 111–34.
Greco, J. 2007. “Worries about Pritchard’s Safety,” Synthese 158:3, 299–302.
Greco, J. Unpublished manuscript. “Knowledge, Virtue and Safety.”
Greco, J. and Henderson, D. eds. (forthcoming) Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology (Oxford University Press).
Grobler, A. 2001. “Truth, Knowledge, and Presupposition,” Logique et Analyse 44:173–75, 291–305.
Gundersen, L. 2002. “In Defence of the Conditional Account of Dispositions,” Synthese 130:3, 389–411.
Gundersen, L. 2003. Dispositional Theories of Knowledge: A Defence of Aetiological Foundationalism (Aldershot: Ashgate).
Gundersen, L. 2004. “Outline of a New Semantics for Counterfactuals,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85:1, 1–20.
Gundersen, L. 2010. “Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis,” Erkenntnis 72:3, 353–64.
Harman, G. 1973. Thought (Princeton University Press).
Harman, G. 1986. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Hawthorne, J. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Hawthorne, J. 2005. “The Case for Closure,” in M. Steup and E. Sosa, eds. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing), 26–41.
Hawthorne, J. 2007. “A Priority and Externalism,” in S. Goldberg, ed. Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (Oxford University Press), 201–18.
Heil, J. 2003. From an Ontological Point of View (Oxford University Press).
Hetherington, S. 1998. “Actually Knowing,” Philosophical Quarterly 48:193, 453–69.
Hetherington, S. 2002. Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology (Oxford University Press).
Hetherington, S. in press. “There Can Be Lucky Knowledge,” in M. Steup and J. Turri, eds. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing).
Hiller, A. and Neta, R. 2007. “Safety and Epistemic Luck,” Synthese 158:3, 303–14.
Hilpinen, R. 1988. “Knowledge and Conditionals,” Philosophical Perspectives 2, 157–82.
Howard-Snyder, D., Howard-Snyder, F., and Feit, N. (2003). “Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66.2, 304–27.
Hughes, C. 1996. “Giving the Skeptic Her Due?” Epistemologia 19:2, 309–26.
Johnston, M. 1992. “How to Speak of the Colors,” Philosophical Studies 68:3, 221–63.
Kaplan, D. 1989. “Demonstratives,” in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds. Themes from Kaplan (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), 481–563.
Kelp, C. 2009. “Knowledge and Safety,” Journal of Philosophical Research 34, 21–31.
Kelp, C. 2011. “In Defence of Virtue Epistemology,” Synthese 179:3, 409–33.
Klein, P. 1971. “A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 67:16, 471–82.
Klein, P. 1981. Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
Klein, P. 1987. “On Behalf of the Skeptic,” in S. Luper-Foy, ed. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield), 267–81.
Klein, P. 1995. “Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails,” Philosophical Topics 23:1, 213–36.
Klein, P. 2004. “Closure Matters: Skepticism and Easy Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues 14, 165–84.
Klein, P. 2007. “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning,” Philosophical Studies 134:1, 1–17.
Klein, P. 2008. “Useful False Beliefs,” in Q. Smith, ed. Epistemology: New Essays (Oxford University Press), 25–61.
Kratzer, A. 1977. “What ‘Must’ and ‘Can’ Must and Can Mean,” Linguistics and Philosophy 1:3, 337–55.
Kripke, S. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Kripke, S. 2011. “Nozick on Knowledge,” in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, vol. i (New York: Oxford University Press), 162–224.
Kvanvig, J. L. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge University Press).
Kvanvig, J. L. 2004. “Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues 14:1, 201–18.
Kvanvig, J. L. 2006. “Closure Principles,” Philosophy Compass 1:3, 256–67.
Kvanvig, J. L. 2008. “Closure and Alternative Possibilities,” in Greco, J., editor, Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, pages 456–484 (Oxford University Press).
Kvanvig, J. L. 2009a. “Precìs of the The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding,” in D. H. Pritchard, H. and A. Millar, eds. Epistemic Value (Oxford University Press), 309–11.
Kvanvig, J. L. 2009b. “Responses to Critics,” in Pritchard, H. and Millar, editors, Epistemic Value, pages 339–353. (Oxford University Press).
Kvanvig, J. L. 2009c. “The Value of Understanding,” in Pritchard, H. and Millar, editors, Epistemic Value, pages 95–112 (Oxford University Press).
Kvanvig, J. L. 2010. “The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist,” in A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, eds. Social Epistemology (Oxford University Press), 89–112.
Kvanvig, J. L. 2011. Destiny and Decision: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford University Press).
Kvanvig, J. L. 2012. “Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding,” in T. Henning and D. Schweikard, eds. Knowledge, Virtue, and Action (Abingdon: Routledge).
Lackey, J. 2008. “What Luck Is Not,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86:2, 255–67.
Lackey, J. 2009. “Knowledge and Credit,” Philosophical Studies 142:11, 27–42.
Lange, M. 2009. Laws and Lawmakers (Oxford University Press).
Lehrer, K. 1974. Knowledge (Oxford University Press).
Lehrer, K. and Paxson, T. 1969. “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief,” Journal of Philosophy, 66:8, 225–37.
LevyN. 2009. “What, and Where, Luck Is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey,” Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy 87:3, 489–97.
Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing).
Lewis, D. 1977. “Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics: A Rejoinder,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 6:1, 359–63.
Lewis, D. 1979. “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,” Noûs 13:4, 455–76.
Lewis, D. 1980. “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:3, 239–49.
Lewis, D. 1996. “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:4, 549–67.
Lewis, D. 1997. “Finkish Dispositions,” Philosophical Quarterly 47:187, 143–58.
Lipson, M. 1987. “Nozick and the Sceptic,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65:3, 327–34.
Lipton, P. 1990. “Contrastive Explanations,” in D. Knowles, ed. Explanation and Its Limits (Cambridge University Press), 247–66.
Luper, S. 2003. “Indiscernability Skepticism,” in S. Luper, ed. The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Epistemology and Mind Series (Aldershot: Ashgate), 183–202.
Luper-Foy, S. [now “Luper”] 1984. “The Epistemic Predicament: Knowledge, Nozickian Tracking, and Scepticism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62:1, 26–49.
Luper-Foy, S. 1987a. “Introduction,” in S. Luper-Foy, ed. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield), 1–16.
Luper-Foy, S. 1987b. “The Possibility of Skepticism,” in S. Luper-Foy, ed. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield), 219–41.
Luper-Foy, S., ed. 1987c. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield).
Madison, B. J. C. 2011. “Combating Anti-Anti-Luck Epistemology,” Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy 89:1, 47–58.
Manley, D. 2007. “Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 104:8, 403–23.
Manley, D. and Wasserman, R. 2008. “On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals,” Mind 117:465, 59–84.
Martin, C. B. 1994. “Dispositions and Conditionals,” Philosophical Quarterly 44:174, 1–8.
Martin, C. B. 2007. The Mind in Nature (Oxford University Press).
Mazoué, J. G. 1986. “Some Remarks on Luper-Foy’s Criticism of Nozickian Tracking,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64:2, 206–12.
McEvoy, M. 2009. “The Lottery Puzzle and Pritchard’s Safety Analysis of Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophical Research 34, 10–20.
McGinn, C. 1984. “The Concept of Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, 529–54.
McKinsey, M. 1991. “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access,” Analysis 51:1, 9–16.
Molnar, G. 2003. Powers: A Study of Metaphysics (Oxford University Press).
Murphy, P. 2005. “Closure Failures for Safety,” Philosophia 33, 331–34.
Neta, R. and Rohrbaugh, G. 2004. “Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85, 396–406.
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Olsson, E. and Goldman, Alvin. 2009. “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge,” in A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, eds. Epistemic Value (Oxford University Press), 19–41.
Plato, Meno.
Pritchard, D. H. 2002. “Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 283–307.
Pritchard, D. H. 2004. “Epistemic Luck,” Journal of Philosophical Research 29, 193–222.
Pritchard, D. H. 2005a. Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press).
Pritchard, D. H. 2005b. “Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Angst,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:2, 185–206.
Pritchard, D. H. 2007a. “Anti-Luck Epistemology,” Synthese 158:3, 277–97.
Pritchard, D. H. 2007b. “Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries,” in V. F. Hendricks and D. H. Pritchard, eds. New Waves in Epistemology (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 28–51.
Pritchard, D. H. 2007c. “The Value of Knowledge,” in E. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/knowledge-value/. Last accessed June 2011.
Pritchard, D. H. 2008a. “Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value,” Proceedings and Addresses of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.) 82, 19–41.
Pritchard, D. H. 2008b. “Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology,” in J. Greco, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism (Oxford University Press), 437–55.
Pritchard, D. H. 2009a. “Apt Performance and Epistemic Value,” Philosophical Studies 143:3, 407–16.
Pritchard, D. H. 2009b. “Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?” Journal of Philosophical Research 34, 33–45.
Pritchard, D. H. in press-a. “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology,” Journal of Philosophy.
Pritchard, D. H. in press-b. “There Cannot Be Lucky Knowledge,” in M. Steup and J. Turri, eds. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing).
Pritchard, D. H., Millar, A., and Haddock, A. 2010. The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press).
Pritchard, D. H., and Smith, M. 2004. “The Psychology and Philosophy of Luck,” New Ideas inPsychology 22, 1–28.
Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge University Press).
Quine, W. 1969. “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press), 69–90.
Riggs, W. 2007. “Why Epistemologists Are So Down on Their Luck,” Synthese 158:3, 329–44.
Riggs, W. 2009. “Luck, Knowledge and Control,” in A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, eds. Epistemic Value (Oxford University Press), 204–21.
van Rooij, R. 2006. “Free Choice Counterfactual Donkeys,” Journal of Semantics 23:4, 383–402.
van Rooij, R. 2010. “Conjunctive Interpretation of Disjunctions,” Semantics and Pragmatics 3:11, 1–28.
Roush, S. 2005. Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science (Oxford University Press).
Roush, S. 2009. “Précis of Tracking Truth,” and “Replies to Critics,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79:1, 213–22; 240–47.
Roush, S. 2010a. “The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Survival,” Metaphilosophy 41:3, 255–78.
Roush, S. 2010b. “Closure on Skepticism,” Journal of Philosophy 107:5, 243–56.
Roush, S. in press. “Skepticism about Reasoning,” in G. Restall and G. Russell, eds. New Waves in Philosophical Logic (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Russell, B. 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon & Schuster).
Sainsbury, R. M. 1997. “Easy Possibilities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57:4, 907–19.
Schulz, K. 2005. “Minimal Models in Semantics and Pragmatics: Free Choice, Exhaustivity, and Conditionals” (doctoral dissertation, Universiteit van Amsterdam).
Shatz, D. 1987. “Nozick’s Conception of Skepticism,” in S. Luper-Foy, ed. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield), 242–66.
Shope, R. 1978. “The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy,” Journal of Philosophy 75:8, 397–413.
Shope, R. 1983. The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press)
Shope, R. 1984. “Cognitive Abilities, Conditionals, and Knowledge: A Response to Nozick,” Journal of Philosophy 81:1, 29–48.
Skyrms, B. 1967. “The Explication of ‘X Knows That p’,” Journal of Philosophy, 64:12, 373–89.
Smith, A. D. 1977. “Dispositional Properties,” Mind 86:343, 439–45.
Sosa, E. 1999a. “How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?” Philosophical Topics 26:1/2, 373–84.
Sosa, E. 1999b. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives 13, 141–53.
Sosa, E. 2000. “Skepticism and Contextualism,” Philosophical Issues 10:1, 1–18.
Sosa, E. 2002. “Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge,” in P. Moser, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press), 264–86.
Sosa, E. 2003. “Neither Contextualism nor Skepticism,” in S. Luper, ed. The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Epistemology and Mind Series (Aldershot: Ashgate), 165–82.
Sosa, E. 2004. “Replies,” in J. Greco, ed. Sosa and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 275–326.
Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, vol. i (Oxford University Press).
Sosa, E. 2009. Reflective Knowledge. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, vol. ii (Oxford University Press).
Stalnaker, R. 1968. “A Theory of Conditionals,” in N. Rescher, ed. Studies in Logical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), 98–112.
Steinberg, J. 2010. “Dispositions and Subjunctives,” Philosophical Studies 148:3, 223–41.
Sturgeon, S. 1993. “The Gettier Problem,” Analysis, 53:156–64.
Thompson, A. 1986/87. “Counterexamples to Nozick’s Account of Transmission of Knowledge via Proof,” Philosophy Research Archive 12, 261–65.
Unger, P. 1968. “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 65:6, 157–70.
Unger, P. 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism (Oxford University Press).
Vogel, J. 1987. “Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge,” in S. Luper-Foy, ed. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield), 197–215.
Vogel, J. 1990. “Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?” in M. D. Roth and G. Ross, eds. Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 13–27.
Vogel, J. 1999. “The New Relevant Alternatives Theory,” Philosophical Perspectives 13, 155–80.
Vogel, J. 2000. “Reliabilism Leveled,” Journal of Philosophy 97:11, 602–23.
Vogel, J. 2004. “Skeptical Arguments,” Philosophical Issues 14:1, 426–55.
Vogel, J. 2007. “Subjunctivitis,” Philosophical Studies 134:1, 73–88.
Williams, J. R. G. 2008. “Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77:2, 385–420.
Williams, M. 1996. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism (Princeton University Press).
Williams, M. 2002. “Nozick on Knowledge and Skepticism,” in D. Schmidtz, ed. Robert Nozick (Cambridge University Press), 131–54.
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford University Press).
Wright, C. 1985. “Facts and Certainty,” Proceedings of the British Academy 71, 429–72.
Wright, C. 2000. “Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey’s Paradox and Putnam’s Proof,” Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Skepticism), 140–63.
Wright, C. 2003. “Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference,” in S. Nuccetelli, ed. New Essays on Semantic Externalism, Scepticism, and Self-Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 57–77.
Zagzebski, L. 1994. “The Inescapability of the Gettier Problem,” Philosophical Quarterly, 44:174, 65–73.

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.