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Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory
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Book description

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Reviews

'There are several features of this book that make it very well suited both for the classroom and for self-study … if your interest is in understanding how game theory, economics and computer science are cross-pollinating to address challenges of the design of online strategic interactions, this is the book to start with. It is clear, well-organized and makes a compelling introduction to a vibrant field.'

David Burke Source: MAA Reviews

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