In this chapter we review some of the prominent arguments regarding the relationship between political institutions and democracy. In keeping with the theme of this volume we use data from the Varieties of Democracy Project to (re)evaluate these arguments. Specifically, we focus on two primary outcomes of interest – the durability of the democracy/likelihood of breakdown, and the quality or level of democracy. We review the theoretical reasoning connecting state capacity, executive regime type, and the party system to democratic outcomes.We re-evaluate the strength of these theories based on data from V-Dem. We find strong support for the role of state capacity, but mixed or no support for executive regime type or party system variables. Finally, we conclude by discussing the important role of electoral experience in many of our models.

In this chapter we address structural (long-term) factors that may affect the fate of regimes across the world in the modern era. This includes geography (e.g., climate, soil, topography, and waterways), Islam, European influence (via colonialism, religion, language, and demography), population, and diversity (ethnic, linguistic, or religious).

New social forces that emerge as part of the process of development turn structural change into political change. Their struggles for representation and incorporation occupy a prominent place in our understanding of regime change. Even elite-driven democratic transitions necessitate moments of mass mobilization that push liberalization into regime change. Many scholars also contend that an active citizenry leads to democratic stability via more effective government. In contrast, others warn that a mobilized and polarized civil society can undermine democracy – particularly if the demands of social forces outstrip the capacity of institutions to process them. In this chapter, we explore the effects of social organization and mobilization on democracy. Using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) and Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data, we gauge the extent to which organized and mobilized social forces are responsible for levels and changes in democracy. We find that civil society participation and nonviolent protest positively affect democracy and that rightwing anti-system movements constitute the largest threat to democracy.

This chapter develops and tests hypotheses about possible influences that lie outside national borders. There are many good reasons to expect that domestic factors are not the sole determinants. We lay out a theoretical framework that systematically catalogues most of the possible international hypotheses: exogenous shocks and endogenous networks such as those linking neighbors, allies, and colonizers and colonies. We then test selected hypotheses about exogenous shocks and contagion – the spread of democracy outcomes from country to country through various international networks. Surprisingly, contagion at first appears to be real but so small that it could be ignored when studying domestic influences. However, for some kinds of contagion our analysis implies that the long-run effects grow quite large and must be taken into account if we want to understand how democracies develop and decline. This paradox leads us to conclude that international influences are a hidden dimension of democratization.

Several prominent debates on causes of democratization or democratic decline, concern different features of the economy. Yet, many of these debates lack in robust, conclusive evidence. We revisit the links between various economic factors and (electoral) democracy, drawing on global data extending from 1789 to 2018. First, we consider how economic development influences democracy, and democratic upturns and downturns more specifically. Second, we consider structural features of the economy related to types of production and assets as potential determinants of democracy. Third, we assess indicators of short-term economic performance. Fourth, we consider different economic inequalities. Our analysis shows several null-results or non-robust results, for instance, between income inequality and democracy (both upturns and downturns), or between (various aspects of) economic development and democratic upturns. We also find several robust relationships. For example, a high share of agricultural production in the economy mitigates democratization, whereas strong short-term economic performance and high income levels hinders democratic decline.