In a period of rising threats to constitutional government within countries and among them, it is a crucial time to study the rule of law in transnational context. This framework chapter defines core concepts, analyzes the relation between national and international law and institutions from a rule-of-law perspective, and assesses the extent to which rule-of-law practices are shifting at the domestic and international levels in parallel. Part I explains our conceptualization of the rule of law, necessary for the orientation of empirical study and policy responses. Following Martin Krygier, we formulate a teleological conception of the rule of law in terms of goals and practices, which, in turn, calls for an assessment of institutional mechanisms to advance these goals, given varying social conditions and contexts. Part II sets forth the ways in which international law and institutions are important for rule-of-law ends, as well as their pathologies, since power is also exercised beyond the state in an interconnected world. Part III examines empirical indicators of the decline of the rule of law at the national and international levels. It notes factors that could explain such decline, and why such factors appear to be transnationally linked. Part IV discusses what might be done given these shifts in rule-of-law protections. In conclusion, we note the implications of viewing the rule of law in transnational context for conceptual theory, empirical study, and policy response.

A dozen years ago, Jeremy Waldron published an influential article arguing that sovereign states are not entitled to the benefits of the international rule of law. His conclusion follows from his assertions that the purpose of the rule of law is to protect individual liberty, and the purpose of international law is to protect individuals. This chapter critically responds to his position. International law is based on the notion that states are autonomous and equal members of the international society ordered through legal relations. The legal relations of the international community of states, I argue, constitute the horizontal dimension of the rule of law, which Waldron overlooked. Focusing on horizontal rule-of-law functions, I provide descriptive, theoretical, and normative reasons why states are, and should be, entitled to the benefits of the rule of law. In the course of this critical engagement with Waldron’s position, I lay out a broad understanding of the rule of law that applies within states and the international community.

This chapter provides a rough summary of how the United States came to be a federation of states rather than a unitary nation. To that end, it offers a thumbnail sketch of the timeline from the British colonial period to adoption of the US Constitution. The debates at the constitutional convention and the advocacy in both the Federalist and Antifederalist Papers are highlighted, with particular emphasis on the role of state sovereignty and the menu of choices that were open to the framers.

This is the first of two chapters that relate the myriad ways in which state government has impeded true democracy in the United States. In this chapter, the focus is on those counter-majoritarian distortions that are hardwired into the Constitution. These structural barriers to majority rule include equal representation of small states and large states in the US Senate; the Electoral College; the constitutional provision under which a majority of state delegations to the US House of Representatives choose the president when there is no Electoral College majority; and the processes for appointing federal judges and amending the Constitution.

Europe is living its Weimar moment. The historic task of the European Union (EU) today, the book argues, is to articulate and institute a new imaginary of prosperity. Imaginaries of prosperity integrate societies around the shared pursuit of a prosperous future, while rendering “political-economic” questions the main preoccupation of politics. The new imaginary of prosperity today has to be both credible (able to provide answers to contemporary challenges) and appealing (conjuring a world in which people want to live). It has to include not only an alternative macroeconomic framework (a different role for tax, public spending, or welfare provision) but also a different set of microeconomic institutions (a new role for the corporation, technology, industry, finance, and consumption). It is exactly in this latter space that the EU has undertaken the first important steps towards reimagining prosperity. The book analyses several policy fields, showing that the EU has already made significant efforts to foster more caring consumption, circular products and technologies, sustainable industry, and fairer corporate activity. But the EU has to go further and faster – if it intends to respond effectively to the soaring problems, while halting another Europe’s slide into tribalism.

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework for the book. I articulate, first, why it is useful to think in terms of social imaginaries, rather than alternative sociological concepts (such as paradigms or ideologies), for analysing social integration in modern societies. I then explore why, in modernity, it was imaginaries of prosperity that provided the most stable foundations for social integration. These imaginaries can bridge, I argue, the plurality of worldviews and identities, while at the same time play into modernity’s strengths, namely democracy and knowledge governance. However, any particular imaginary of prosperity can provide only a temporary foundation, because it will sooner or later produce too many problems and contradictions to continue fulfilling its integrative role. When such problems mount, imaginaries of prosperity become subject to their own dialectics, having to shift eventually between privatised and collective routes to prosperity. If, however, the pressures for change cannot be institutionalised through democratic channels, we have seen in the past – and are seeing again today – that illiberal and undemocratic tribal imaginaries may take hold, making identity (rather than prosperity) the main vector of politics.

A prologue that introduces Deutsche Wohnen & Co. Enteignen and narrates its story in the context of other radical democratic movements, most prominently the Polish Solidarność, a mass democratic movement that led to overthrowing of authoritarian communism in Poland.

The chapter discusses the history of the Berlin housing system, the Kantian roots of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) and the events leading to the emergence of Deutsche Wohnen & Co. enteignen (DWE). It explains the origins of the liberal notion of property and how corporate property is premised on ‘blasting the atom of property open’, that is, destroying the links between person and a thing that constitute classical liberal understanding of property.

Compared to other graduate students, law students are less fulfilled, and they handle the culture of intense competition by binge-drinking and using more marijuana, than other graduate students. The culture of law practice is not an improvement, due to the steep billable hour requirements and responsibility for client outcomes. Lawyers suffer from anxiety and depression at higher rates than the general population, and they are at the greatest risk of suicide among professionals behind only those in the medical field. Alcohol misuse is a significant problem, with one study finding that 20 percent of lawyers are problem drinkers and another revealing that 46 percent of male and 60 percent of female attorneys abuse alcohol. Lawyers in the first 10 years of their career have the most problematic drinking habits. The lawyering culture, featuring extreme stress, intense competition, and overwork, can drive lawyers to succumb to mental and physical health problems. International Bar Association research indicates there is a global crisis in lawyer well-being. Young, minority-identifying, and female-identifying lawyers, and lawyers with disabilities, all fall below the WHO Mental Wellbeing Index threshold requiring a mental health assessment, and suggesting a connection between well-being and issues with diversity, equity, and inclusion.

Research indicates that a segment of the lawyer population is impaired by mental illness, such as anxiety, depression, substance misuse, or suicide risk. A much higher number of lawyers likely fall on the languishing end of the mental health spectrum. If you are languishing, you may be at a higher risk of sliding into impairment. Mental health is assessed on a continuum, ranging from languishing to flourishing. Languishing has been described as feeling uninspired, joyless, and lacking the power to function at full capacity. And languishing may increase your risk of mental illness, such as major depressive episode, generalized anxiety, panic attacks, or substance use disorder. Lawyers may suffer from several obstacles to mental strength, including lack of self-awareness, perfectionism, imposter syndrome, social comparisons, trained pessimism, inability to regulate emotions, and inauthenticity from a failure to understand or leverage their temperament and personality strengths. Features of the lawyering culture may augment these obstacles and lead to lawyer languishing.

Introduces the concept of freedom of speech and the legal and social constraints on speech. Free speech is often framed as absolute, but in practice our speech is limited by laws – bans on obscenity, threats, even entire languages. Other social forces hedge our speech as well: parents and teachers attempt to steer our speech; employers tell us what to say and what not to say; and groups of friends set norms and exact punishments for speech behavior in social settings. In all, as speakers and writers we contend with explicit and implicit rules about what we can and cannot say.

There are several types of law degrees in Greater China but no simple way to compare them or work out whether a single law school will provide you with a good (moral) legal education. We explain what makes a law school morally good and what questions to ask your preferred law school. We discuss how to manage your mental health as a law student and lawyer, and how this is connected to Confucius’ teaching about the ‘superior man understanding what is right’. We discuss Davd Luban’s insight that lawyers’ careful moral thinking is critical to the future of law and legal practice. Because professional conduct rules can only rarely be applied without reference to context and circumstances, there will always be a need for lawyers to use an underlying moral framework or methodology, when they encounter new or challenging decisions. Four global approaches to ethical decision-making are introduced – consequentialism (similar to utilitarianism), Kantian ethics, virtue ethics and Confucian teaching. At the heart of each of these approaches is a commitment to integrity and, in those circumstances when it is required, to open candour and frankness, irrespective of self-interest or embarrassment.

The common types of poor lawyering include bribery, receiving private fees, forgery, theft of clients’ money and obtaining property by deception, all with themes of greed and laziness. But there are also failures of lawyers’ regulation not just of lawyers’ character, with little discipline of the largest law firms involved in corporate scandals. Choosing a ‘good’ law firm is therefore important for all law students’ futures, and it is important to ask firms about many issues, including their attitude to pro bono work and whether they have a written policy on handling ethical issues. More fundamentally, if the public interest in ‘good’ lawyering is to be supported across Greater China, then better legal ethics education is central to change and social stability. This chapter examines key procedural rules about investigating lawyer misconduct in each of the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and provides the different definitions of what is misconduct, lists of penalties, details of complaints processes, reviews and appeals. Finally, we set out a table of key ethical rules affecting legal professional conduct in each of the Pthree jurisdictions, including those related to fees and costs.

After recalling the context and purposes of the research, the chapter introduces the main challenges raised by the legal protection of animals during warfare: the silence of international humanitarian law on the issue, the difficulty in identifying which animals should be safeguarded, the inaptitude of international humanitarian law to adequately protect animals, and the ambivalent nature of the violence inflicted upon animals in wartime. The chapter then introduces the principal paradigms on which the legal protection of animals is grounded: animal species conservation regimes, animal welfare norms and animal rights. It subsequently emphasises three specific difficulties posed for animals by the current state of international law: the animal welfare gap in international law, the tension between species conservation and concern for individual animal welfare, and the fact that notably international trade and financial law has stymied animal welfare and protection efforts. The chapter then explores options to face these challenges while making best use of the legal strategies available within the existing normative framework. Potential new directions for developing international law on armed conflict are finally identified.

This chapter introduces the conceptual foundations of the international law of energy. It characterises ‘energy’ as a legal object, describes the purposes pursued over time by the international law of energy, analyses the overall structure of international energy transactions and presents the main patterns that can be extracted from a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the relevant rules, instruments and institutions.

After seeming to evolve into a constitutional assemblage with wide recognition of its binding jurisdiction and a respectable compliance record, the Inter-American Human-Rights System has been undergoing a lethal crisis. It bore the brunt of the storm during the 2010s and has had to cope with ongoing aftershocks. Throughout, several regimes—most conspicuously the Venezuelan, Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and Nicaraguan or “Bolivarian” faction—fiercely attacked the main organs, namely, the Commission and the Court. They chastised each for overstepping its bounds and questioned its legitimacy.

This chapter is concerned with Germany’s perspective on the foundations and functions of international law. It is structured in two parts: international law in general and sources of international law. The first part deals with the notion of ‘rules-based order’ as brought forward by Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas. The term is understood to be broader than ‘international law’. It is argued that the same is putting at risk the principle of sovereign equality, while ultimately undermining the credibility of international law. Secondly, the first part focuses on Germany’s criticism of the United States’ approach to international law with respect to Israel’s occupation of certain Palestinian territories. The third topic addressed in the first part is Germany’s concept of an ‘Alliance for Multilateralism’, which is assessed as a rather loose and incoherent network of primarily European States. The second part discusses a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning the state of necessity as a general principle of international law. The decision is grounded in the context of Argentina’s debt crisis. It is argued that the German Constitutional Court did not seize the opportunity to offer a substantive contribution to the question of State bankruptcy.

Do you believe that “thinking like a lawyer” is an important professional skill, but by no means all that there is to being a lawyer? Do you think that being a professional calls for the development of a wide range of competencies? Do you seek to understand those competencies better? Do you think that being a professional should involve the exploration of the values, guiding principles, and well-being practices foundational to successful legal practice?1 Are you interested in new and effective ways to build these competencies, values, and guiding principles into a law school’s curriculum? Would you like a framework for improving your own law school’s attention to these competencies, guiding principles, and values along with practical suggestions you can consider? Would you like to help better prepare students for gratifying careers that serve society well?

This opening chapter examines whether international law is relevant to the Arab-Israel conflict. The conclusion reached is that although the dispute is political ideological and territorial; nevertheless, international law has played an important role, and will continue to do so. All parties desire that their positions be seen to be legally legitimate, such legitimacy is a political asset as regards both the other party and vis-à-vis third parties. The international language of international relations is, largely, the language of international law; this is particularly true as regards the United Nations and international organisations. Israel and the Palestinians are engaged in an intensive campaign to persuade world public opinion of the legitimacy of their respective cases. Legal precedents, although not binding, play a highly useful role in assisting the parties to reach agreement. The same is true for dispute settlement mechanisms of international law. Finally, the object of negotiations is to reach agreement. The principle that international agreements are binding is a principle of international law and lawyers, based on international law, will examine their validity and context.

Hard cases raise hard questions. Take, for example, Snyder v. Phelps.1 That case involved picketing by protestors from the Westboro Baptist Church on public grounds near the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who died in Iraq in the line of duty. His father, offended by the demonstrators’ signs, sued Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress and other claims. A jury awarded him millions of dollars in damages, but the Supreme Court found the speech protected and reversed the verdict.