This article explores the extent to which the right to basic education of learners with disabilities in South Africa was guaranteed during the COVID-19 pandemic. It uses the Centre for Child Law v Minister of Basic Education (Centre for Child Law) as the main canvas for discussion. It argues that, notwithstanding its normative compliance with the international regime of the right to an inclusive basic education, the government has failed learners with disabilities during COVID-19. An examination of Centre for Child Law reveals that, not only did the government's directions for the phased return to school exclude learners with disabilities, they also required the closure of special schools where compliance with social distancing rules was impossible. This violated the right to inclusive education and substantive equality of learners with disabilities and highlighted the need to advance these rights through reasonable accommodation initiatives.

Since its formation, the GATT/WTO system has facilitated a worldwide reduction of trade barriers. We return to a founding moment of the regime, the GATT 1947 (GATT47), and look closely at the liberalization process, analyzing exactly what concessions were granted to whom and in return for what. With these data, we evaluate three prominent explanations for the operation of the early GATT. First, we ask whether or not US negotiators granted asymmetric access to the US market to spur post-war recovery. Second, we look at how the rules adopted in GATT47 balanced the interests of import sensitive producers with those of the more nascent exporter interests. Third, we examine specific US concessions and ask whether or not the US used the domestic market to either increase the productive capacity of nations damaged during the war and/or to bolster unstable regimes. Our most general finding is that the US, at least in this first Round of the trade regime, was less a liberal warrior and more a seeker of stability, and that tariff setting was significantly constrained by the institutions governing global tariff negotiations.

In England, Parliament introduced the ‘necessary interest rule’ through the enactment of section 115 of the Charities Act 2011 (England and Wales), allowing ‘any person interested’ in a charitable trust to initiate charity proceedings against defaulting trustees in their administration of charitable assets. Nevertheless, insufficient attention has been paid to this rule despite it being initially enacted in 1853. Parliament has refrained from clearly defining the rule, and the courts have long been grappling with its meaning in determining whether a person is eligible to sue. This paper studies the necessary interest rule by exploring the way in which the courts have interpreted it and the uncertainties surrounding its operation. It is shown that, in the context of charitable trusts, the concern of securing the due administration and execution of the trust lies at the heart of the rule. The final section of this paper discusses the significant theoretical implications of the necessary interest rule. It considers the beneficiary-enforcer debate concerning the conceptual nature of express trusts and highlights the insights that analysis of the rule can provide into this debate.

In this paper, I take George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's thesis that metaphors shape our reality to approach the judicial imagery of the new criminal justice system in Mexico (in effect since 2016). Based on twenty-nine in-depth interviews with judges and other members of the judiciary, I study what I call the ‘dirty minds’ metaphor, showing its presence in everyday judicial practice and analysing both its cognitive basis as well as its effects in how criminal judges understand their job. I argue that the such a metaphor, together with the ‘fear of contamination’ it raises as a result, is misleading and goes to the detriment of the judicial virtues that should populate the new system. The conclusions I offer are relevant beyond the national context, inter alia, because they concern a far-reaching paradigm of judgment.

This article explores Japanese transactional lawyers’ attempts to transplant American legal practice concerning corporate acquisition contracts into Japan. Despite their extensive efforts to disseminate legal concepts originating from the common law into the Japanese legal community, their transplantation attempts produced somewhat unexpected results by the promoters of the transplant. Faced with unfamiliar drafting styles and legal concepts, Japanese courts interpreted American-style corporate acquisition contracts in accordance with traditional Japanese-style contract interpretation. As a result, attempts by Japanese practitioners at transplantation were incomplete. This incompleteness is attributable to their inattention to the differences in approaches to contract interpretation between Japanese and New York courts. New York's approach is much more formalistic and literal than Japan's. If fully aware, however, they could have filled the gap by using functional substitutes for American techniques of controlling adjudicators’ contract interpretation which would effectively operate under Japanese law. Japan's experience confirms that a widely supported view in comparative law scholarship that transplanted law does not necessarily operate in the recipient jurisdiction as it did in its host jurisdiction is applicable to the transplantation of contract drafting practices.

The rise in defamation claims in Malaysia has placed an onerous workload on the courts to deal with such matters. Against this backdrop, Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JC (as his Lordship then was) (Hamid Sultan JC) suggested in two separate High Court decisions that to alleviate the courts’ burden, matters pertaining to libel and slander ought to be constrained to the criminal courts through appropriate statutory amendments, including to the Criminal Procedure Code (Malaysia). In this paper, the author cautions against the learned Hamid Sultan JC's recommendations and proffers an alternative proposal in the form of media arbitration schemes to handle the growing influx of defamation claims. In particular, the salient features of the IMPRESS and IPSO Schemes from the United Kingdom are scrutinized in detail and measured in terms of suitability for a potential arbitration scheme in the Malaysian jurisdiction.

Automated facial recognition (AFR) is perhaps the most controversial policing tool of the twenty-first century. Police forces in England and Wales, and beyond, are using facial recognition in various contexts, from evidence gathering to the identification and monitoring of criminal suspects. Despite uncertainty regarding its accuracy, and widespread concerns about its impact on human rights and broader social consequences, the rise of police facial recognition continues unabated by law. Both the Government and the domestic courts were satisfied that police use of this technology is regulated adequately by existing statutory provisions regulating the processing of data and police surveillance generally. That is, until the recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Others [2020] EWCA Civ 1058, where it was held that the respondent's use of AFR was unlawful. This paper provides an analysis of AFR, reflecting on the outcome of that case and evaluates its nuanced findings. We suggest that the judgment leaves considerable room for police AFR to continue with only minor, piecemeal amendment to the legal framework. Drawing on comparative experience and relevant socio-legal scholarship, we argue that the relatively unfettered rise of police facial recognition in England and Wales illuminates deeper flaws in the domestic framework for fundamental human rights protection and adjudication, which create the conditions for authoritarian policing and surveillance to expand.

Against the context of pending judicial proceedings between the State of Palestine and the United States of America (US) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this article critically examines the United Nations (UN) commitment to the international rule of law through an examination of its consideration of Palestine’s 2011 application for membership in the organization. The universality of membership of the UN is a foundation upon which the organization rests. The international law governing UN admission has accordingly been marked by a liberal, flexible and permissive interpretation of the test for membership contained in the UN Charter. In contrast, an assessment of the UN’s consideration of Palestine’s application for membership demonstrates that it was subjected to an unduly narrow, strict and resultantly flawed application of the membership criteria. An examination of the contemporaneous debates of the Council demonstrates that the main driver of this was the US, which used its legal authority as a permanent member of the Council to block Palestine’s membership. The principle argument used against membership was the US’s view that Palestine does not qualify as a state under international law. Notwithstanding, the State of Palestine has been recognized by 139 member states of the UN and has acceded to a number of treaties that furnish it with access to the ICJ. While a number of articles have been written about Palestine’s statehood, little has been written on the UN’s consideration of Palestine’s 2011 application for membership. Palestine v. USA provides a renewed opportunity to do so.

This article presents a theoretical framework by which to understand how disasters are reconciled with a state’s existing obligations under international law. This ‘reactive’ model of disaster regulation hinges on two regulatory techniques, ‘disapplication’ and ‘exculpation’, both of which involve a deviation from the ordinary application of a norm owing to the occurrence of a disaster or to measures adopted by a state in relation to it. It proceeds to outline the various doctrines and mechanisms across different subfields of international law, including international human rights law, investment law and trade law, which may operationalize these techniques in disaster situations. Finally, it argues that the applicability of certain disapplication and exculpation mechanisms to disasters relies on an anachronistic view of such disasters as rare and episodic occurrences beyond human control. This puts these mechanisms at odds with the central objectives of international disaster law and their underlying sociological and scientific premises, which emphasize the need for an ‘adaptive’ model of comprehensive and prevention-oriented disaster regulation. Accordingly, this analysis exposes the conceptual limitations of the reactive model for disaster regulation and explains and validates the inclination toward an adaptive model within international disaster law. It also indicates how mechanisms within the reactive model could be recalibrated to better regulate disasters.

Humanity's challenges have become more acute in recent decades. The international environment has been characterised by rapid change, uncertainty, increased complexity and new trends. Despite the seeming unanimity of the international community in accepting human dignity and human rights as the foundation of a just society, the gap between systems and reality is widening around the world, exacerbated at the same time by globalisation and a liberal, individualistic and consumerist model of democracy. This article seeks to identify a new humanism that can be seen in UNESCO's work in the multifaceted field of culture, with culture as an enabler of sustainable development, peace and economic progress. On the one hand, it examines the confrontation between the politics of recognition and the politics of resentment in dealing with the management of diversity in increasingly complex societies. On the other hand, it analyses the relevance of religion, and particularly the work of the Holy See and successive popes, in culture, public ethics and social cohesion.

The Terrorism Act 2000 recognises that religion may be a force for bad in its definition of ‘terrorism’: ‘The use or threat of action … designed to influence a government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public … for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.’ ‘Radicalisation’ is the process by which an individual becomes involved in terrorism, and it is the statutory Prevent Duty, introduced under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, that is the UK's current means of tackling radicalisation. Under the duty, specified authorities (such as schools, police, etc) must have due regard to preventing people from being ‘drawn into terrorism’. This article addresses an often-neglected area in the ongoing legal debate surrounding the statutory Prevent Duty: the religious dimension. It suggests that religion is at the centre of the Prevent Duty and that the formulation of the duty was stimulated by religion – namely, Islamist extremism and radicalisation. It will discuss the ways in which the Prevent Duty can be criticised; that it has an impact on human rights that it is potentially discriminatory towards Muslims; and that it does not clearly distinguish between permissible radical religion and impermissible harmful religion. The article concludes by suggesting that religion plays an important part in the understanding of extremism and radicalisation.

Sweden's coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) response, initially based largely on voluntary measures, has evoked strong reactions nationally and internationally. In this study, we describe Sweden's national policy response with regard to the general public, the community and the health care system, with a focus on how the response changed from March 2020 to June 2021. A number of factors contributed to Sweden's choice of policy response, including its existing legal framework, independent expert agencies and its decentralized, multi-level health care governance system. Challenges to the health- and elder care system during the pandemic, such as the need to increase intensive care- and testing capacity, and to ensure the safety of the elderly were addressed largely at the regional and local levels, with national authorities assuming a primarily coordinative role. Although the overall response based on voluntary compliance has persisted, the national government started to take a more prominent role in public messaging, and in enacting legally binding restrictions during subsequent waves of the pandemic. This study illustrates that not only policy responses, but also the fundamental structure of the health- and elder care system and its governance should be considered when evaluating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Australia suffered two waves of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic in 2020: the first lasting from February to July 2020 was mainly caused by transmission from international arrivals, the second lasting from July to November was caused by breaches of hotel quarantine which allowed spreading into the community. From a second wave peak in early August of over 700 new cases a day, by November 2020 Australia had effectively eliminated community transmission. Effective elimination was largely maintained in the first half of 2021 using snap lockdowns, while a slow vaccination programme left Australia lagging behind comparable countries. This paper describes the interventions which led to Australia's relative success up to July 2021, and also some of the failures along the way.

This article argues that State autonomy in setting the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims can be better operationalised in the investment treaty regime. The article draws on comparative insights from WTO law, where it is established that WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims, although significant disciplines are placed on the means used to achieve those aims. It is then argued that investment treaties are, properly interpreted, consistent with the idea that States retain autonomy to determine the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims. Finally, the article proposes removing from the fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation standards proportionality balancing stricto sensu, as this undermines State autonomy in setting the level of protection. Overall, this article argues for a partial reorientation of investment law, in which non-discriminatory measures that pursue a permissible regulatory aim, including at a particular level, should not amount to a breach of a treaty where a State uses the means that involve the least possible restriction of the competing interests protected by relevant investment treaty obligations.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market on compliance with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. In this paper, we first systematically document the coverage of NTPOs across the main tools of EU trade policy: its (association and non-association) trade agreements and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. We then discuss the extent to which the EU can use these tools as a ‘carrot-and-stick’ mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners. We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU has limited scope to extend or restrict tariff preferences to ‘reward good behavior’ or ‘punish bad behavior’ on NTPOs, partly because multilateral rules require members to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, and can thus more easily be extended or limited, depending on compliance with NTPOs. Our analysis also suggests that the commercial interests of the EU inhibit the full pursuit of NTPOs in its trade agreements and GSP programs.

This narrative provides insight into medical education for Black physicians in South Carolina in the 1960s, during the civil rights movement. It also discusses the many rewards and challenges of being a physician of color, describes what has been done to develop programs that benefit minority communities, and argues that more such programs are needed.

The EU has progressively introduced antidiscrimination enforcement measures like the duty to set up Equality Bodies (EBs) that applies to the ground of racial or ethnic origin, among others. Until recently, however, EU law only envisaged vague standards for EBs that allowed a wide range of national configurations. Building on international benchmarks, this paper draws a set of dimensions considered necessary to improve promotion-type EBs responsiveness to discrimination. These dimensions are applied to the British and Spanish EBs to illustrate how the gaps left by EU law may lead to the design of ineffective bodies. The paper argues that EBs can contribute to effectively tackling discrimination if they are designed to be responsive at individual and systemic levels. The 2018 EU Recommendation on Standards for EBs makes a step forward in that direction, but its practical relevance may be limited by its non-binding nature.

The handling of infanticide in late medieval France offers modern audiences an underappreciated paradox: on the one hand infant murder was deplored as grave sin and crime, on the other hand, it was a pardonable offence, even the infanticidal singlemother who had killed to conceal her sin could obtain royal grace. This is far more than the usual story of law differing from practice. Christian ideology of mercy and forgiveness for sin played a central role in shaping the regulation of illegitimate births as well as abortions, stillbirths, and infanticide. Church and secular authorities alike sought to prevent as well as punish the death of infants, but they also created and implemented systems of justice with the explicit purpose of providing mercy to the repentant murderer, even an infanticide.