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Beyond Uncertainty

Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2021

Katie Steele
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra
H. Orri Stefánsson
Affiliation:
Stockholms Universitet

Summary

The main aim of this Element is to introduce the topic of limited awareness, and changes in awareness, to those interested in the philosophy of decision-making and uncertain reasoning. While it has long been of interest to economists and computer scientists, this topic has only recently been subject to philosophical investigation. Indeed, at first sight limited awareness seems to evade any systematic treatment: it is beyond the uncertainty that can be managed. On the one hand, an agent has no control over what contingencies she is and is not aware of at a given time, and any awareness growth takes her by surprise. On the other hand, agents apparently learn to identify the situations in which they are more and less likely to experience limited awareness and subsequent awareness growth. How can these two sides be reconciled? That is the puzzle we confront in this Element.
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Element
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Online ISBN: 9781108582230
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 09 September 2021
Copyright
© Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson 2021

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