Element contents
Series: Elements in Philosophy and Logic
Nonmonotonic Logic
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 October 2025
Summary
Nonmonotonic logics serve as formal models of defeasible reasoning, a type of reasoning where conclusions are drawn absent absolute certainty. Defeasible reasoning takes place when scientists interpret experiments, in medical diagnosis, and in practical everyday situations. Given its wide range of applications, nonmonotonic logic is of interest to philosophy, psychology, and artificial intelligence. This Element provides a systematic introduction to the multifaceted world of nonmonotonic logics. Part I familiarizes the reader with basic concepts and three central methodologies: formal argumentation, consistent accumulation, and semantic methods. Parts II–IV provide a deeper understanding of each of these methods by introducing prominent logics within each paradigm. Despite the apparent lack of unification in the domain of nonmonotonic logics, this Element reveals connections between the three paradigms by demonstrating translations among them. Whether you're a novice or an experienced traveler, this Element provides a reliable map for navigating the landscape of nonmonotonic logic.
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- Series: Elements in Philosophy and LogicOnline ISBN: 9781108981699Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 13 November 2025
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Content Navigation
Table of contents navigation
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Allows you to navigate directly to chapters, sections, or non‐text items through a linked table of contents, reducing the need for extensive scrolling.
Reading Order & Textual Equivalents
Single logical reading order
You will encounter all content (including footnotes, captions, etc.) in a clear, sequential flow, making it easier to follow with assistive tools like screen readers.
You will encounter all content (including footnotes, captions, etc.) in a clear, sequential flow, making it easier to follow with assistive tools like screen readers.
Short alternative textual descriptions
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You get concise descriptions (for images, charts, or media clips), ensuring you do not miss crucial information when visual or audio elements are not accessible.
Visual Accessibility
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You will still understand key ideas or prompts without relying solely on colour, which is especially helpful if you have colour vision deficiencies.
Structural and Technical Features
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