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Series: Elements in Metaphysics
Ontological Categories
A Methodological Guide
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2024
Summary
Ontology – the study of the most fundamental categories of being – lies at the very heart of metaphysics. The reason why it appears to be so central is because it takes on the following questions: What sorts of entities are there? What features do those entities have? How do they relate to one another? And so on. Section 1 of this Element presents a fast-paced historical overview of some of the notable approaches to these questions. Section 2 tells the story of how one of the oldest, most disputed, but also most developed ontological categories – universals – got introduced. Section 3 builds on the discussion of universals as it considers the desiderata for a promising system of ontological categories. And Section 4 looks at ways in which philosophers might break with tradition and explore some new ontological categories.
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- Series: Elements in MetaphysicsOnline ISBN: 9781108973861Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 29 February 2024
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