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Element contents
Series: Elements in Epistemology
Shifty Epistemology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 June 2026
Summary
Can practical factors affect our epistemic standings or their ascriptions? This Element critically examines shifty epistemology, a cluster of views that answer yes to this question. It investigates three prominent types of shifty epistemology: on knowledge, justification and rational credence. It assesses key arguments for each of these views, and argues for pragmatic encroachment on rational credence.
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- Series: Elements in EpistemologyOnline ISBN: 9781009472951Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 06 August 2026
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