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Understanding Institutional Weakness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2019

Daniel M. Brinks
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Austin
Steven Levitsky
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Maria Victoria Murillo
Affiliation:
Columbia University, New York

Summary

This Element introduces the concept of institutional weakness, arguing that weakness or strength is a function of the extent to which an institution actually matters to social, economic or political outcomes. It then presents a typology of three forms of institutional weakness: insignificance, in which rules are complied with but do not affect the way actors behave; non-compliance, in which state elites either choose not to enforce the rules or fail to gain societal cooperation with them; and instability, in which the rules are changed at an unusually high rate. The Element then examines the sources of institutional weakness.
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Online ISBN: 9781108772211
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
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© Daniel M. Brinks, Steven Levitsky, and Maria Victoria Murillo 2019

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