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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2024

Danièle Moyal-Sharrock  and
Duncan Pritchard
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Affiliation:
University of Hertfordshire
Duncan Pritchard
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine

Summary

An overview is offered of Wittgenstein's groundbreaking discussion of knowledge and certainty, especially in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. The main interpretative readings of On Certainty are discussed, especially a non-propositional/non-epistemic interpretation and a variety of propositional and/or epistemic interpretations. Surveys are offered of the readings of On Certainty presented by such figures as Annalisa Coliva, John Greco, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Duncan Pritchard, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, P. F. Strawson, MichaelWilliams, and CrispinWright. This Element demonstrates how On Certainty has been especially groundbreaking for epistemology with regard to its treatment of the problem of radical scepticism.
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Keywords

Ludwig Wittgensteinknowledgecertaintyepistemologyscepticism

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Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
Online ISBN: 9781108946599
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 09 January 2025

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