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The Axiology of Theism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 September 2021
Summary
Theism is the view that God exists; naturalism is the view that there are no supernatural beings, processes, mechanisms, or forces. This Element explores whether things are better, worse, or neither on theism relative to naturalism. It introduces readers to the central philosophical issues that bear on this question, and it distinguishes a wide range of ways it can be answered. It critically examines four views, three of which hold (in various ways) that things are better on theism than on naturalism, and one of which holds just the opposite.
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- Online ISBN: 9781108592833Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 14 October 2021
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