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Bargaining Theory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 February 2023
Summary
The Nash bargaining problem provides a framework for analyzing problems where parties have imperfectly aligned interests. This Element reviews the parts of bargaining theory most important in philosophical applications, and to social contract theory in particular. It discusses rational choice analyses of bargaining problems that focus on axiomatic analysis, according to which a solution of a given bargaining problem satisfies certain formal criteria, and strategic bargaining, according to which a solution results from the moves of ideally rational and knowledgeable claimants. Next, it discusses the conventionalist analyses of bargaining problems that focus on how members of a society can settle into bargaining conventions via learning and focal points. In the concluding section this Element discusses how philosophers use bargaining theory to analyze the social contract.
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- Online ISBN: 9781108588638Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 09 March 2023
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