Element contents
Series: Elements in Austrian Economics
Defense, Peace, and War Economics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2020
Summary
This Element surveys the field of defense, peace, and war economics with particular emphasis on the contributions made by Austrian economists. I first review treatments of defense, peace, and war by the classical economists. I then discuss the rise of a distinct and systematic defense, peace, and war economics field of study starting in the 1960s. Next, I consider the contributions by Austrian economists to the field. This includes the economic analysis of the nature of the war economy, problems with the public good justification for the state-provision of defense, the seen and unseen costs of war, the idea of the liberal peace, and the realities and limitations of foreign intervention. I conclude with a discussion of some open areas for future research.
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Series: Elements in Austrian EconomicsOnline ISBN: 9781108668873Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 02 April 2020
References
Abadie, Alberto. 2006. “Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism,” American Economic Review 96(2): 50–6.Google Scholar
Acemoglu, Daron, and Robinson, James. 2001. “A Theory of Political Transitions,” American Economic Review 91(4): 938–63.Google Scholar
Acemoglu, Daron, and Robinson, James 2006. Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Adam, Antonis, and Tsarsitalidou, Sofia. 2019. “Do Sanctions Lead to a Decline in Civil Liberties?,” Public Choice 180(3/4): 191–215.Google Scholar
Adams, Walter. 1968. “The Military-Industrial Complex and the New Industrial State,” American Economic Review 58(2): 652–65.Google Scholar
Alesina, Alberto, Baqir, Reza, and Easterly, William. 1999. “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4): 1243–84.Google Scholar
Alesina, Alberto, and La Ferrara, Eliana. 2000. “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 847–904.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Allen, Susan Hannah. 2005. “The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure,” International Interactions 31(2): 117–38.Google Scholar
Allen, Susan Hannah. 2008. “The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(6): 916–44.Google Scholar
Allen, Susan Hannah, and Lektzian, David J.. 2013. “Economic Sanctions: A Blunt Instrument?,” Journal of Peace Research 50(1): 121–35.Google Scholar
Anderson, , Mary, B. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Google Scholar
Anderson, William L., Kjar, Scott A., and Yohe, James D.. 2012. “War and the Austrian School: Modern Austrian Economists Take on Aggressive Wars,” The Economics of Peace and Security Journal 7(1): 30–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderton, Charles H. 1986. “Optimality and the Ineffectiveness of the Strategic Defense Initiative,” Conflict Management and Peace Studies 9(2): 31–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderton, Charles H. 1989. “Arms Race Modeling: Problems and Prospects,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33(2): 346–67.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H. 1990a. “The Inherent Propensity toward Peace or War Embodied in Weaponry,” Defence Economics 1(3): 197–219.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H. 1990b. “Teaching Arms-Race Concepts in Intermediate Economics,” Journal of Economic Education 21(2): 148–67.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H. 1992. “A New Look at the Relationship Among Arms Races, Disarmament, and the Probability of War,” in Chatterji, Manas and Rennie Forcey, Linda (eds.), Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace. New York: Praeger, pp.75–87.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H. 1995. “Economics of Arms Trade,” in Hartley, Keith and Sandler, Todd (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 1. New York: Elsevier Science B. V., pp.523–62.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H. 2010. “Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives on the Disturbing Rationality of Race Murder,” Defence and Peace Economics 21(5–6): 459–86.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H. 2014. “A Research Agenda for the Economic Study of Genocide: Signposts from the Field of Conflict Economics,” Journal of Genocide Research 16(1): 113–38.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H. 2015. “The Social Evolution of Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory,” The Economics of Peace and Security Journal 10(2): 5–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderton, Charles H., and Brauer, Jurgen (eds.). 2016. Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Prevention. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderton, Charles H., and Carter, John R.. 2005. “On Rational Choice Theory and the Study of Terrorism,” Defence and Peace Economics 16(4): 275–82.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H., and Carter, John R. 2009. Principles of Conflict Economics: A Primer for Social Scientists. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H., and Carter, John R. 2015. “A New Look at Weak State Conditions and Genocide risk,” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 21(1): 1–36.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H., and Fogarty, Thomas. 1990. “Consequential Damage and Nuclear Deterrence,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 11(1): 1–15.Google Scholar
Anderton, Charles H., and Ryan, Edward V.. 2016. “Habituation to Atrocity: Low-Level Violence against Civilians as a Predictor of High-Level Attacks,” Journal of Genocide Research 18(6): 539–62.Google Scholar
Arce, Daniel G., and Sandler, Todd. 2005. “Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(2): 183–200.Google Scholar
Arce, Daniel G., and Sandler, Todd 2007. “Terrorist Signaling and the Value of Intelligence,” British Journal of Political Science 37(4): 573–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arce, Daniel G., and Sandler, Todd 2009. “Fitting In: Group Effects and the Evolution of Fundamentalism,” Journal of Policy Modeling 31(5): 739–57.Google Scholar
Arce, Daniel G., and Sandler, Todd 2010. “Terrorist Spectaculars: Backlash Attacks and the Focus of Intelligence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(2): 354–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Atkinson, Scott E., Sandler, Todd, and Tschirhart, John. 1987. “Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework,” Journal of Law and Economics 30(1): 1–21.Google Scholar
Ayres, Ron. 1983. “Arms Production as a Form of Import-Substituting Industrialization: The Turkish Case,” World Development 11(9): 813–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Azam, Jean-Paul. 2005. “Suicide-Bombing as Inter-Generational Investment,” Public Choice 122(1–2): 177–98.Google Scholar
Baek, Kwang-Il, McLaurin, Ronald D., and Moon, Chung-in (eds.). 1989. The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries: Supplier Control or Recipient Autonomy? Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Baliga, Sandeep, and Tomas, Sjöström. 2004. “Arms Races and Negotiations,” Review of Economic Studies 71(2): 351–69.Google Scholar
Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu, and Sandler, Todd. 2011, “The Interplay between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two-Stage Game,” Economica 78(3): 546–64.Google Scholar
Baran, Paul A., and Sweezy, Paul M.. 1966. Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order. New York: Monthly Review Press.Google Scholar
Basedau, Matthias, Fox, Jonathan, Pierskalla, Jan H., Strüver, Georg, and Vüllers, Johannes. 2017. “Does Discrimination Breed Grievances – and Do Grievances Breed Violence? New Evidence from an Analysis of Religious Minorities in Developing Countries,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 34(3): 217–39.Google Scholar
Bastiat, Frédéric. 1850. [2016]. Economic Sophisms and “What is Seen and Unseen.” Carmel, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.Google Scholar
Beber, Bernd, and Blattman, Christopher. 2013. “The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion,” International Organization 67(1): 65–104.Google Scholar
Benson, Bruce J. 1998. To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute.Google Scholar
Benson, Bruce J. 2011. The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute.Google Scholar
Blattman, Christopher, and Miguel, Edward. 2010. “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature 48(1): 3–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bloch, Francis, Sánchez-Pagés, Sántiago, and Soubeyran, Raphael. 2006. “When Does Universal Peace Prevail? Secession and Group Formation in Conflict,” Economics of Governance 7(1): 3–29.Google Scholar
Boettke, Peter J. 1998. “Economic Calculation: The Austrian Contribution to Political Economy,” Advances in Austrian Economics 5: 131–58.Google Scholar
Boettke, Peter J. 2001. Calculation and Coordination: Essays on Socialism and Transitional Political Economy. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Boettke, Peter J. 2002. “Information and Knowledge: Austrian Economics in Search of its Uniqueness,” The Review of Austrian Economics 15(4): 263–74.Google Scholar
Boettke, Peter J. 2007. “Liberty vs. Power in Economic Policy in the 20th and 21st Centuries,” Journal of Private Enterprise 12(2): 7–36.Google Scholar
Boettke, Peter J. 2014. “Entrepreneurship, and the Entrepreneurial Market Process: Israel M. Kirzner and the Two Levels of Analysis in Spontaneous Order Studies,” The Review of Austrian Economics 27(3): 233–47.Google Scholar
Boettke, Peter J. 2018. F.A. Hayek: Economics, Political Economy, and Social Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Boettke, Peter J., and Coyne, Christopher J.. 2009. Context Matters: Entrepreneurship and Institutions. Hanover, MA: Now Publishers.Google Scholar
Boettke, Peter J., Coyne, Christopher J., and Leeson, Peter T.. 2008. “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67(2): 331–58.Google Scholar
Boettke, Peter J., Coyne, Christopher J., and Leeson, Peter T. 2014. “Hayek vs. the Neoclassicists: Lessons from the Socialist Calculation Debate,” in Garrison, Roger and Norman, Barry (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Hayekian Economics. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp.278–93.Google Scholar
Böhm-Bawerk, Eugen von. 1884 [1959]. Capital and Interest (three vols. in one). George D. Huncke and Hans F. Sennholz (translators). South Holland, IL: Libertarian Press.Google Scholar
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1962. Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper & Bros.Google Scholar
Braddon, Derek L., and Hartley, Keith (eds.). 2013. Handbook on the Economics of Conflict. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd.Google Scholar
BradleyJr., Robert L. 2006. “A Typology of Interventionist Dynamics,” in High, Jack (ed.), Humane Economics: Essays in Honor of Don Lavoie. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp. 64–88.Google Scholar
Brauer, Jurgen. 1991. “Arms Production in Developing Nations: The Relation to Industrial Structure, Industrial Diversification, and Human Capital Formation,” Defence Economics 2(2): 165–75.Google Scholar
Brauer, Jurgen 1993. “Defense, Growth, and Arms Production in Developing Nations,” in Brauer, Jurgen and Chatterji, Manas (eds.), Economic Issues of Disarmament. New York: New York University Press, pp. 229–42.Google Scholar
Brauer, Jurgen 2002. “The Arms Industry in Developing Nations: History and Post-Cold War Assessment,” in Brauer, Jurgen and Dunne, J. P. (eds.), Arming the South: The Economics of Military Expenditures, Arms Production and Trade in Developing Countries. New York; London: Palgrave, pp. 101–27.Google Scholar
Brauer, Jurgen 2007. “Arms Industries, Arms Trade, and Developing Countries,” in Sandler, Todd and Hartley, Keith (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 2. New York: Elsevier Science B. V., pp.973–1016.Google Scholar
Brauer, Jurgen 2017. “‘Of the Expence of Defence’: What Has Changed Since Adam Smith?,” Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy 23(2): 1–14.Google Scholar
Brauer, Jurgen, and Anderton, Charles H.. 2014. “Economics and Genocide: Choices and Consequences,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 15(2): 65–78.Google Scholar
Brauer, Jurgen, and Dunne, J. P.. (eds.). 2002. Arming the South: The Economics of Military Expenditures, Arms Production and Trade in Developing Countries. New York: Palgrave.Google Scholar
Brauer, Jurgen, and Dunne, J. P. 2004. Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets. New York: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brauer, Jurgen, and Dunne, J. P. 2011. “Arms Trade Offsets: What Do We Know?,” in Coyne, Christopher J. and Mathers, Rachel L. (eds.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp.243–68.Google Scholar
Breton, Albert. 1998. Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Brick Murtazashvili, Jennifer. 2016a. “Afghanistan: A Vicious Circle of State Failure,” Governance 29(2): 163–6.Google Scholar
Brick Murtazashvili, Jennifer. 2016b. Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Brito, Dagobert L., and Intriligator, Michael D.. 1974. “Uncertainty and the Stability of the Armament Race,” Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 3(1): 279–92.Google Scholar
Brito, Dagobert L., and Intriligator, Michael D. 1977. “Nuclear Proliferation and the Armaments Race,” Journal of Peace Science 2(1): 231–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brubaker, Rogers, and Laitin, David D.. 1998. “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Review of Sociology 24(1): 423–52.Google Scholar
Brzoska, Michael. 1989. “The Impact of Arms Production in the Third World,” Armed Forces and Society 15(4): 507–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, James M. 1949. “The Pure Theory of Public Finance: A Suggested Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 57(6): 496–505.Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. 1980. “Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking,” in Buchanan, James M., Tollison, Robert, and Tullock, Gordon (eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. College Park:Texas A&M Press, pp. 3–15Google Scholar
Buchanan, James M. 1982. “Order Defined in the Process of Its Emergence,” Literature of Liberty 5(4): 5.Google Scholar
Burton, James G. 1993. The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.Google Scholar
Calhoun, Craig Jackson. 1988. “The Radicalism of Tradition and the Question of Class Struggle,” in Taylor, Michael (ed.), Rationality and Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 129–75.Google Scholar
Caplan, Bryan. 2006. “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” Public Choice 128(1–2): 91–107.Google Scholar
Carson, Byron, and Coyne, Christopher J.. 2019. “Knowledge and Power: Hayek’s Dual Problems with Planning,” In Candela, Rosolino, (ed). A Companion to Friedrich von Hayek. Guatemala: Universidad Francisco Maroquin, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Caruso, Raul. 2003. “The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis,” Peace Economics. Peace Science and Public Policy 9(2): n.p.Google Scholar
Chassang, Sylvain, and Padró I Miquel, Gerard. 2009. “Economic Shocks and Civil War,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 4(3): 211–28Google Scholar
Chassang, Sylvain, and Padró I Miquel, Gerard 2010. “Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4): 1821–58.Google Scholar
Chong, Dennis. 1991. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. 1990. “Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model,” The Economic Journal 100(403): 1109–21.Google Scholar
Collier, Paul. 2000. “Rebellion as a Quasi-criminal Activity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(6): 839–53.Google Scholar
Collier, Paul, and Hoeffler, Anke. 1998. “On the Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50(4): 563–73.Google Scholar
Collier, Paul, and Hoeffler, Anke 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563–95.Google Scholar
Copeland, Dale C. 2015. Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Cortright, David, and Lopez, George A. (eds.). 2002. Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.Google Scholar
Cortright, David, and Lopez, George A. 2011. “Sanctions as Alternatives to War,” in Coyne, Christopher J. and Mathers, Rachel L. (eds.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp. 534–70.Google Scholar
Cowen, Tyler. 1985. “Public Good Definitions and Their Institutional Context: A Critique of Public Goods Theory,” Review of Social Economy 43(1): 53–63.Google Scholar
Cowen, Tyler 2006. “Terrorism as Theater: Analysis and Policy Implications,” Public Choice 128(1/2): 233–44.Google Scholar
Cowen, Tyler 2014. “The Lack of Major Wars May be Hurting Economic Growth,” The New York Times, June 13. Published online: www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/upshot/the-lack-of-major-wars-may-be-hurting-economic-growth.html?_r=0.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J. 2008a. After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J. 2008b. “The Politics of Bureaucracy and the Failure of Post-War Reconstruction,” Public Choice 135(1–2): 11–22.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J. 2013. Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Action Fails. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J. 2015. “Lobotomizing the Defense Brain,” The Review of Austrian Economics 28(4): 371–96.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J. 2017. “The Law and Economics of Rule Reform,” in Zywicki, Todd and Boettke, Peter J. (eds.), Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp. 92–108.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Bills, Brittany L.. 2018. “Overlooked Costs of War-Related Public Research,” The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy 22(3): 429–34.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Boettke, Peter J.. 2009. “The Problem of Credible Commitment in Reconstruction,” Journal of Institutional Economics 5(1): 1–23.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Bradley, Anne R.. 2019. “Ludwig von Mises on War and the Economy,” Review of Austrian Economics, 32(3): 215–228.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Davies, Steve. 2007. “Nineteen Public Bads of Empire, Nation Building, and the Like,” The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy 12(1): 129–32.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Hall, Abigail R.. 2014a. “The Empire Strikes Back: Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and the Robust Political Economy of Empire,” The Review of Austrian Economics 27(4): 359–85.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Hall, Abigail R. 2014b. “The Case against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly,” Atlantic Economic Journal 42(2): 181–90.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J. and Hall, Abigail R.. 2018. Tyranny Comes Home: The Domestic Fate of U.S. Militarism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Hall, Abigail R. 2019a. “Cronyism: Necessary for the Minimal, Protective State,” The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy 23(2): 399–410.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Hall, Abigail R. 2019b. “State-provided Defense as Non-Comprehensive Planning,” Journal of Private Enterprise, 34(1): 75–109.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Lucas, David S.. 2016. “Economists Have No Defense: A Critical Review of National Defense in Economics Textbooks,” Journal of Private Enterprise 31(4): 65–83.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Mathers, Rachel L.. 2010. “The Fatal Conceit of Foreign Intervention,” Advances in Austrian Economics 14: 227–52.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Mathers, Rachel L. (eds.). 2011. The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Pellillo, Adam. 2011. “Economic Reconstruction amidst Conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Defence and Peace Economics 22(6): 627–43.Google Scholar
Coyne, Christopher J., and Pellillo, Adam 2013. “The Political Economy of War and Peace,” in Reksulak, Michael, Razzolini, Laura, and Shughart II, William F. (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, 2nd edition. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp. 469–93.Google Scholar
Cramer, C. 2002. Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War. World Development, 30(11): 1845–1864.Google Scholar
Dal Bó, Ernesto, and Powell, Robert. 2009. “A Model of Spoils Politics,” American Journal of Political Science 53(1): 207–22.Google Scholar
Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Davis, Patricia, and Radcliff, Benjamin. 1997. On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science 41(2): 608–18.Google Scholar
Davies, James C. 1962. “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review 27(1): 5–19.Google Scholar
DeNardo, James. 1985. Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
de Soto, Jesus Huerta. 2010. Socialism, Economic Calculation, and Entrepreneurship. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd.Google Scholar
Dorussen, Han. 2006. “Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(1): 87–107.Google Scholar
Dorussen, Han, and Mo., Jongryn 2001. “Ending economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent Seeking as Commitment Strategies,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(4): 395–426.Google Scholar
Dorussen, Han, and Ward, H. 2010. “Trade Networks and the Kantian Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 47(1): 29–42.Google Scholar
Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57(3): 643–59.Google Scholar
Drury, A. Cooper. 1998. “Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,” Journal of PeaceResearch 35(4): 497–509.Google Scholar
Duncan, Thomas K., and Coyne, Christopher J.. 2013a. “The Origins of the Permanent War Economy,” The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy 18(2): 219–40.Google Scholar
Duncan, Thomas K., and Coyne, Christopher J. 2013b. “The Overlooked Costs of the Permanent War Economy: A Market Process Approach,” The Review of Austrian Economics 26(4): 413–31.Google Scholar
Duncan, Thomas K., and Coyne, Christopher J. 2015. “The Political Economy of Foreign Intervention,” in Boettke, Peter J. and Coyne, Christopher J. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 678–97.Google Scholar
Dunne, J. Paul. 1995. “The Defense Industrial Base,” in Hartley, Keith and Sandler, Todd (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 1. New York: Elsevier Science B. V., pp.399–430.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dunne, J. Paul, and Sköns, Elisabeth. 2010. “The Military Industrial Complex,” in Tan, Andrew T. H. (ed.), The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook. New York: Routledge, pp. 281–92.Google Scholar
Dunne, J. Paul, and Tian, Nan. 2013. “Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Survey,” The Economics of Peace and Security Journal 18(1): 5–11.Google Scholar
Dunne, J. Paul, and Tian, Nan 2015. “Military Expenditure, Economic Growth and Heterogeneity,” Defence and Peace Economics 26(1): 15–31.Google Scholar
Dunne, J. Paul, and Uye, Mehmat. 2010. “Military Spending and Development,” in Andrew, T. H. Tan (ed.), The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook. New York: Routledge, pp.293–305.Google Scholar
Early, Bryan R. 2012. “Alliances and Trade with Sanctioned States: A Study of U.S. Economic Sanctions, 1950–2000,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(3): 547–72.Google Scholar
Easterly, William. 2001. “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 49(4): 687–706.Google Scholar
Easterly, William, and Levine, Ross. 1997. “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4): 1203–50.Google Scholar
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro. 1915a. On the Relations of Political Economy to War. London: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro. 1915b. The Cost of War and Ways of Reducing It Suggested by Economic Theory. London: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro. 1918. Currency and Finance in Time of War. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Elliot, Kimberly Ann. 1998. “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty,” International Security 23(1): 50–65.Google Scholar
Elster, Jon. 1988. “Marx, Revolution and Rational Choice,” in Taylor, Michael (ed.), Rationality and Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 206–28.Google Scholar
Enders, Walter, and Sandler, Todd. 1993. “The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: A Vector-Autroregression-Intervention Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87(4): 829–44.Google Scholar
Enders, Walter, and Sandler, Todd 1995. “Terrorism: Theory and Applications,” in Hartley, Keith and Sandler, Todd (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 1. New York: Elsevier Science B. V., pp. 213–50.Google Scholar
Enders, Walter, and Sandler, Todd 2005. “After 9/11: Is It All Different Now?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(2): 549–77.Google Scholar
Enders, Walter, and Sandler, Todd 2012. The Political Economy of Terrorism, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Escribà-Folch, Abel. 2010. “Economic sanctions and the duration of civil conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research, 47(2): 129–141.Google Scholar
Estaban, Joan, and Ray, Debraj. 1999. “Conflict and Distribution,” Journal of Economic Theory 87(2): 379–415.Google Scholar
Estaban, Joan, and Ray, Debraj 2001. “Social Decision Rules Are Not Immune to Conflict,” Economics of Governance 2(1): 59–67.Google Scholar
Estaban, Joan, and Ray, Debraj 2008. “On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict,” American Economic Review 98(5): 2185–202.Google Scholar
Estaban, Joan, Morelli, Massimo, and Rohner, Dominic. 2015. “Strategic Mass Killings,” Journal of Political Economy 123(5): 1087–132.Google Scholar
Evera, Stephen van. 1998. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22(4): 5–43.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88(3): 577–92.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49(3): 379–414.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?,” Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 275–301.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D., and Laitin, David D.. 1996. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 90(4): 715–35.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D., and Laitin, David D. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90.Google Scholar
Finkel, Steven E., Muller, Edward N., and Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1989. “Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action,” American Political Science Review 83(3): 885–903.Google Scholar
Fisher, Dietrich. 1984. “Weapons Technology and the Intensity of Arms Races,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 8(1): 49–70.Google Scholar
Fitzgerald, A. Earnest. 1972. The High Priests of Waste. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.Google Scholar
Fitzgerald, A. Earnest. 1989. The Pentagonists: An Insider’s View of Waste, Management, and Fraud in Defense Spending. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Fontanel, Jacques. 1994. “The Economics of Disarmament: A Survey,” Defence and Peace Economics 5(2): 87–120.Google Scholar
Fontanel, Jacques 1995. “Economics of Disarmament,” in Hartley, Keith and Sandler, Todd (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 1. New York: Elsevier Science B. V., pp. 563–90.Google Scholar
Frohlich, Norman, and Oppenheimer, Joe A.. 1970. “I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends,” World Politics 23(1): 104–20.Google Scholar
Frohlich, Norman, Oppenheimer, Joe A., and Young, Oran R.. 1971. Political Leadership and Collective Goods. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Garfinkel, Michelle R. 1990. “Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium,” American Economic Review 80(1): 50–68.Google Scholar
Garfinkel, Michelle R. 2004. “On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 21(1): 43–68.Google Scholar
Garfinkel, Michelle R., and Skaperdas, Stergios. 2000. “Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(6): 793–807.Google Scholar
Garfinkel, Michelle R., and Skaperdas, Stergios (eds.). 2012. The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Garoupa, Nuno R., and Gata, João E. 2002. “A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning,” Public Choice 110(1–2): 41–65.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik 2005. “Freedom and Peace,” in Gwartney, James D. and Lawson, Robert A. (eds.), Economic Freedom in the World, Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute, pp. 29–44.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik 2007. “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 166–91.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik 2009. “Production, Prosperity, Preferences, and Peace,” in Graeff, Peter and Mehlkhop, Guideo (eds.), Capitalism, Democracy, and the Prevention of War and Poverty. London: Routledge, pp. 31–60.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, and Li, Q. 2003. “Measure for Measure: Concept Operationalization and the Trade Interdependence – Conflict Debate,” Journal of Peace Research 40(3): 553–71.Google Scholar
Gates, Scott. 2002. “Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1): 111–30.Google Scholar
Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Goldstone, Jack A. 1994. “Is Revolution Individually Rational?,” Rationality and Society 6(1): 139–66.Google Scholar
Gordon, Joy. 2012. Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Grossman, Herschel. 1991. “A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections,” American Economic Review 81(4): 912–21.Google Scholar
Grossman, Herschel 1999. “Kleptocracy and Revolutions,” Oxford Economic Papers 51(2): 267–83.Google Scholar
Gruber, Jonathan. 2011. Public Finance and Public Policy, 3rd edition. New York: Worth Publishers.Google Scholar
Haavelmo, Trygve. 1954. A Study in the Theory of Economic Evolution, Amsterdam: North Holland.Google Scholar
Hartley, Keith. 1993. Economic Aspects of Disarmament: Disarmament as an Investment Process. New York: United Nations.Google Scholar
Hartley, Keith 1994. “The Economics of Disarmament: An Introduction,” Defence and Peace Economics 5(2): 83–6.Google Scholar
Hartley, Keith 2007. “The Arms Industry, Procurement and Industrial Policies,” in Sandler, Todd and Hartley, Keith (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 2. New York: Elsevier Science B. V., pp. 1139–76.Google Scholar
Hartley, Keith, and Sandler, Todd (eds.). 1995. Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 1. New York: Elsevier Science B. V.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. (ed.). 1935. Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35(4): 519–30.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. 1978. “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Ideas. Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp.179–90.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. 1988. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Hensel, Nayantara D. 2015. The Defense Industrial Base: Strategies for a Changing World. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Hettich, Walter, and Winer, Stanley L.. 2005. “Rules, Politics, and the Normative Analysis of Taxation,” in Backhouse, Jurgen G. and Wagner, Richard E. (eds.), Handbook of Public Finance. New York: Springer Science+ Business Media, pp. 109–38.Google Scholar
Higgs, Robert. 1987. Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Higgs, Robert 2004. Against Leviathan: Government Power and a Free Society. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute.Google Scholar
Higgs, Robert 2005. Resurgence of the Warfare State: The Crises since 9/11. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute.Google Scholar
Higgs, Robert 2006. Depression, War, and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Higgs, Robert 2007. Neither Liberty nor Safety: Fear, Ideology, and the Growth of Government. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute.Google Scholar
Higgs, Robert 2012. Delusions of Power: New Explorations of State, War, and Economy. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute.Google Scholar
Hirshleifer, Jack. 1988. “The Analytics of Continuing Conflict,” Synthese 76(2): 201–33.Google Scholar
Hirshleifer, Jack 1989. “Conflict and Rent-Seeking Functions: Ratio versus Difference Models of Relative Success,” Public Choice 63(2): 101–12.Google Scholar
Hirshleifer, Jack 1995. “Theorizing about Conflict,” in Hartley, Keith and Sandler, Todd (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 165–89.Google Scholar
Hirshleifer, Jack 2001. The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hitch, Charles, and Ronald, McKean. 1960. The Economics of Defense in a Nuclear Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Hoffmann, Fredrik. 1967. “The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Peace Research 4(2): 140–59.Google Scholar
Hogan, Michael J. 1998. A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the National Security State 1945–1954. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Holcombe, Randall G. 2018. Political Capitalism: How Economic and Political Power is Made and Maintained. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Horwitz, Steven. 1996. “Money, Money Prices, and the Socialist Calculation Debate,” Advances in Austrian Economics 3: 59–77.Google Scholar
Horwitz, Steven 1998. “Monetary Calculation and Mises’s Critique of Planning,” History of Political Economy 30(3): 427–50.Google Scholar
Hossein-Zadeh, Ismael. 2006. The Political Economy of U.S. Militarism. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.Google Scholar
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffrey J., and Elliott, Kimberly Ann. 1990. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd edition. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute.Google Scholar
Hultman, Lisa, and Peksen, Dursun. 2017. “Successful or Counterproductive Coercion? The Effect of International Sanctions on Conflict Intensity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(6): 1315–39.Google Scholar
Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers. 1990. “National Goods versus Public Goods: Defense, Disarmament, and Free Riders,” Review of Austrian Economics 4: 88–122.Google Scholar
Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers and Lavoie, Don. 1994. “National Defense and the Public-good Problem,” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 5(2/3): 353–377.Google Scholar
Ikeda, Sanford. 1996. Dynamics of the Mixed Economy: Toward a Theory of Interventionism. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D. 1975. “Strategic Considerations in the Richardson Model of Arms Races,” Journal of Political Economy 83(2): 339–53.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D. 1982. “Research on Conflict Theory,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26(2): 307–27.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D. 1994. “Economic Aspects of Disarmament: Arms Race and Arms Control Issues,” Defence and Peace Economics 5(2): 121–9.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D., and Brito, Dagobert L.. 1976. “Formal Models of Arms Races,” Journal of Peace Sciences 2(1): 77–88.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D., and Brito, Dagobert L. 1978. “Nuclear Proliferation and Stability,” Journal of Peace Science 3(1): 173–83.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D., and Brito, Dagobert L. 1984. “Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(1): 63–84.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D., and Brito, Dagobert L. 1986. “Arms Races and Instability,” Journal of Strategic Studies 9(4): 113–31.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D., and Brito, Dagobert L. 1987. “The Stability of Mutual Deterrence,” in Kugler, Jacek and Zagare, Frank (eds.), Exploring the Stability of Mutual Deterrence. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 13–19.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D., and Brito, Dagobert L. 1989a. “Arms Race Modeling: A Reconsideration,” in Gleditsch, Nils Peter and Njolstad, Olav (eds.), Arms Races: Technological and Political Dynamics. London: Sage, pp.58–77.Google Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D., and Brito, Dagobert L. 1989b. “A Possible Future for the Arms Race,” in Gleditsch, Nils Peter and Njolstad, Olav (eds.), Arms Races: Technological and Political Dynamics. London: Sage, pp.376–83.Google Scholar
Jackson, Matthew O., and Morelli, Massimo. 2011. “The Reasons for War: An Updated Survey,” in Coyne, Christopher J. and Mathers, Rachel L. (eds.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp. 34–57.Google Scholar
Jeong, Jin Mun, and Peksen, Durson. 2019. “Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanctions Effectiveness,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(1): 194–217.Google Scholar
Kaempfer, William H., and Lowenberg, Anton D.. 1988. “The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach,” American Economic Review 78(4): 786–93.Google Scholar
Kaempfer, William H., and Lowenberg, Anton D. 2007. “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions,” in Sandler, Todd and Hartley, Keith (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 2. New York: Elsevier Science B. V., pp. 867–912.Google Scholar
Kapás, Judit, and Pál, Czeglédi. 2018. “Social Orders, and a Weak Form of the Hayek Friedman Hypothesis,” International Review of Economics 65(3): 291–328Google Scholar
Kaufmann, Chaim. 2004. “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security 29(1): 5–48.Google Scholar
Keynes, John Maynard. 1920. The Economic Consequences of the Peace. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Keynes, John Maynard. 1922. A Revision of the Treaty: Being a Sequel to The Economic Consequences of the Peace. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Kinsella, David. 2011. “The Arms Trade,” in Coyne, Christopher J. and Mathers, Rachel L. (eds.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp. 217–42.Google Scholar
Kirzner, Israel M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kirzner, Israel M. 1979. “The Perils of Regulation: A Market Process Approach,” Occasional Paper of the Law and Economics Center, University of Miami School of Law, February.Google Scholar
Kirzner, Israel M. 1992. The Meaning of the Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Kirzner, Israel M. 1997. “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach,” Journal of Economic Literature 35(1): 60–85.Google Scholar
Kjar, Scott A., and Anderson, William L.. 2010. “War and the Austrian School: Applying the Economics of the Founders,” The Economics of Peace and Security Journal 5(1): 6–11.Google Scholar
Kreps, Sarah. 2018. Taxing Wars: The American Way of War Finance and the Decline of Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Krueger, Alan B., and Maleckova, Jitka. 2003. “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4): 119–44.Google Scholar
Kuran, Timur. 1989. “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution,” Public Choice 61(1): 41–74.Google Scholar
Kuran, Timur 1991. “The East European Revolution of 1989: Is It Surprising that We Were Surprised? American Economic Review 81(2): 121–5.Google Scholar
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter. 1997. Rational Choice, Collective Action and the Paradox of Rebellion. Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science and Political Studies Press.Google Scholar
Lachmann, Ludwig. 1956. Capital and its Structure. Kansas City, MO: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel.Google Scholar
Landes., William M. 1978. “An Economic Study of US Aircraft Hijackings, 1961–1976,” Journal of Law and Economics 21(1): 1–31.Google Scholar
Lange, Oskar. 1936. “On the Economic Theory of Socialism I,” The Review of Economic Studies 4(1): 53–71.Google Scholar
Lange, Oskar 1937. “On the Economic Theory of Socialism II,” The Review of Economic Studies 4(2): 123–42.Google Scholar
Lavoie, Don. 1985a. Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Lavoie, Don 1985b. National Economic Planning: What is Left? Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Lavoie, Don 1986. “The Market as a Procedure for Discovery and Conveyance of Inarticulate Knowledge,” Comparative Economic Studies 28: 1–19.Google Scholar
Lawson, Robert A., and Clark, J. R.. 2010. “Examining the Hayek–Friedman Hypothesis on Economic and Political Freedom,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 74(3): 230–9.Google Scholar
Leeson, Peter T. 2005. “Endogenizing Fractionalization,” Journal of Institutional Economics 1(1): 75–98.Google Scholar
Leeson, Peter T. 2006. “Cooperation and Conflict: Evidence on Self-Enforcing Arrangements and Heterogeneous Groups,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 65(4): 891–907.Google Scholar
Leeson, Peter T. 2008. “Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange,” Journal of Legal Studies 37(1): 161–88.Google Scholar
Leeson, Peter T. 2010. “Rational Choice, Round Robin, and Rebellion: An Institutional Solution to the Problems of Revolution,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 73(3): 297–307.Google Scholar
Leeson, Peter T., and Boettke, Peter T.. 2009. “Two-Tiered Entrepreneurship and Economic Development,” International Review of Law and Economics 29(3): 252–9.Google Scholar
Lektzian, David, and Regan, Patrick M.. 2016. “Economic Sanctions, Military Interventions, and Civil Conflict Outcomes,” Journal of Peace Research 53(4): 554–68.Google Scholar
Lektzian, David, and Souva, Mark. 2003. “The Economic Peace between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and Domestic Institutions,” Journal of Peace Research 40(6): 641–60.Google Scholar
Lektzian, David, and Souva, Mark 2007. “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(6): 848–71.Google Scholar
Levine, Paul, Smith, Ron, Reichlin, Lucrezia, and Rey, Patrick. 1997. “The Arms Trade,” Economic Policy 12(25): 335–70.Google Scholar
Lewin, Peter. 1998. Capital in Disequilibrium: The Role of Capital in a Changing World. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Lichbach, Marl I. 1994. “Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion: Theories of Collective Action and Problems of Collective Dissent,” Rationality and Society 6(1): 8–39.Google Scholar
Lichbach, Marl I. 1995. The Rebel’s Dilemma: Collective Action and Collective Dissent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Lichbach, Marl I. 1996. The Cooperator’s Dilemma: Social Order and Collective Action. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Liff, Adam P. 2012. “Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of Cyberwar Capabilities and Interstate War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35(3): 401–28.Google Scholar
Major, Solomon, and McGann, Anthony J.. 2005. “Caught in the Crossfire: ‘Innocent Bystanders’ as Optimal Targets of Economic Sanctions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(3): 337–59.Google Scholar
Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?,” American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 564–76.Google Scholar
Martin, Adam, and Thomas, Diana. 2013. “Two-Tiered Political Entrepreneurship and the Congressional Committee System,” Public Choice 154(1–2): 21–37.Google Scholar
Mason, T. David. 1984. “Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Synthesis,” American Political Science Review 78(4): 1040–56.Google Scholar
Mayer, Thomas F. 1986. “Arms Races and War Initiation: Some Alternatives to the Intriligator Brito Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30(1): 3–28.Google Scholar
McBride, Michael, and Skaperdas, Stergios. 2007. “Explaining Conflict in Low-Income Countries: Incomplete Contracting in the Shadow of the Future,” in Andreas Konrad, Kai and Gradstein, Mark (eds.), Institutions and Norms in Economic Development, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 141–62.Google Scholar
McCartney, James. 2015. America’s War Machine: Vested Interests, Endless Conflicts. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.Google Scholar
McChesney, Fred S. 1987. “Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation,” The Journal of Legal Studies 16(1): 101–18.Google Scholar
McChesney, Fred S. 1989. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McCloskey, Deirdre M. 2006. The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
McDonald, Patrick. 2009. The Invisible Hand of Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McGillivray, Fiona, and Stam, Allan C.. 2004. “Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(2): 154–72.Google Scholar
Melman, Seymour. 1970. Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Melman, Seymour 1974. The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline. New York: Simon & Schuster.Google Scholar
Melman, Seymour 1997. “From Private to State Capitalism: How the Permanent War Economy Transformed the Institutions of American Capitalism,” Journal of Economic Issues 31(2): 311–30.Google Scholar
Mill, John Stuart. 1848. “Principles of Political Economy,” in Robson, John M. (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume III – Principles of Political Economy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
Mill, John Stuart. 1861 [1948]. On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government. Oxford:Basil Blackwell. Available online: www.gutenberg.org/files/5669/5669-h/5669-h.htm.Google Scholar
Mill, John Stuart. 1863. “Letter to John Elliot Cairnes,” in Robson, John M. (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XV – The Later Letters: 1849–1873. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
Mill, John Stuart. 1867. “East India Revenue,” in Robson, John M. (ed.), The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXVIII – Public and Parliamentary Speeches Part I: November 1850–November 1868. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
Mill, John Stuart. 1874. Dissentions and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical, volume 3. Available online: www.thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/readings/mill.html.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig von. 1912 [1981]. The Theory of Money and Credit. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig 1919 [2006]. Nation, State, and Economy: Contributions to the Politics and History of Our Time. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig 1920 [1935]. “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” in Hayek, F. A. (ed.), Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 87–130.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig 1922 [1981]. Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig 1940 [2011]. Interventionism: An Economic Analysis. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig 1949 [1996]. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig 1962 [1996]. Liberalism: The Classical Tradition. Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc.Google Scholar
Mkandawire, Thandika. 2002. “The Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial ‘Rebel Movements’ in Africa: Towards an Explanation of the Violence against the Peasantry,” Journal of Modern African Studies 40(2): 181–215.Google Scholar
Moore, Will H. 1995. “Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-rider Problem,” Political Research Quarterly 48(2): 417–54.Google Scholar
Mousseau, Michael. 2000. “Market Prosperity, Democratic Consolidation, and Democratic Peace,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(4): 472–507.Google Scholar
Mousseau, Michael 2002. “An Economic Limitation to the Zone of Democratic Peace and Cooperation,” International Interactions 28: 137–64.Google Scholar
Mousseau, Michael 2003. “The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence,” International Studies Quarterly 47(4): 483–510.Google Scholar
Mousseau, Michael 2005. “Comparing New Theory with Prior Beliefs. Market Civilization and the Liberal Peace,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 22(1): 63–77.Google Scholar
Mousseau, Michael 2009. “The Social Market Roots of the Democratic Peace,” International Security 33(4): 52–86.Google Scholar
Mousseau, Michael 2013. “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy,” International Studies Quarterly 57(1): 186–97.Google Scholar
Mueller, John, and Stewart, Mark G.. 2011. Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Muller, Edward N., and Karl-Dieter, Opp. 1986. “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action,” American Political Science Review 80(2): 471–88.Google Scholar
Muller, Edward N., and Karl-Dieter, Opp 1987. “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action Revisited,” American Political Science Review 81(2): 561–4.Google Scholar
Murrell, Peter. 1983. “Did the Theory of Market Socialism Answer the Challenge of Ludwig von Mises? A Reinterpretation of the Socialist Controversy,” History of Political Economy 15(1): 92–105.Google Scholar
Murtazashvili, Ilia, and Murtazashvili, Jennifer. 2015. “Anarchy, Self-governance, and Land Titling,” Public Choice 162(3–4): 287–305.Google Scholar
Murtazashvili, Ilia, and Murtazashvili, Jennifer 2016. “The Origins of Property Rights: States or Customary Organizations?,” Journal of Institutional Economics 12(1): 105–28.Google Scholar
Murtazashvili, Jennifer. 2019. “Red Tape: How Centralized Bureaucratic Legacies Undermine Liberal State Building.” Published online: http://jen.murtazashvili.org/wp-content/uploads/Murtazashvili-2018-Red-Tape.pdf.Google Scholar
Myerson, Roger. 2009. “Learning from Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict,” Journal of Economic Literature 47(4): 1109–25.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur, and Zeckhauser, Richard. 1966. “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48(3): 266–79.Google Scholar
Oneal, John R. 2003. “Measuring Interdependence and Its Pacific Benefits,” Journal of Peace Research 40(4): 721–5.Google Scholar
Oneal, John R., Russett, B, and Berbaum, M. L.. 2004. “Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992,” International Studies Quarterly 47(3): 371–93.Google Scholar
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1989. The Rationality of Political Protest: A Comparative Analysis of Rational Choice Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Opp, Karl-Dieter 1994. “Repression and Revolutionary Action: East Germany in 1989,” Rationality and Society 6(1): 101–38.Google Scholar
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Ostrom, Vincent, Tiebout, Charles M., and Warren, Robert. 1961. “The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry,” The American Political Science Review 55(4): 831–42.Google Scholar
Paganelli, Maria Pia, and Schumacher, Reinhard. 2019. “Do Not Take Peace for Granted: Adam Smith’s Warning on the Relation between Commerce and War,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 43(3): 785–97.Google Scholar
Paige, Jeffery M. 1975. Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Palagashvili, Liya, Piano, Ennio, and Skarbek, David. 2017. The Decline and Rise of Institutions: A Modern Survey of the Austrian Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Pape, Robert. 1997. “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22(2): 90–136.Google Scholar
Pape, Robert 1998. “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work,” International Security 23(1): 66–77.Google Scholar
Peck, Merton J., and Scherer, Frederic M.. 1962. The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration.Google Scholar
Peksen, Dursan. 2009. “Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights,” Journal of Peace Research 46(1): 59–77.Google Scholar
Peksen, Dursan, and Cooper Drury, A. 2009. “Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy,” International Interactions 36(3): 240–64.Google Scholar
Petersen, Roger D. 2001. Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Polachek, Solomon W. 1980. “Conflict and Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24(1): 57–78.Google Scholar
Polachek, Solomon W. 1992. “Conflict and Trade: An Economics Approach to Political International Interactions,” in Isard, Walter and Anderton, Charles (eds.), Economics of Arms Reduction and the Peace Process. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp.89–120.Google Scholar
Polachek, Solomon W. 1999. “Conflict and Trade: An Economics Approach to Political International Interactions,” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 5(2): 1–32.Google Scholar
Polachek, Solomon W., and McDonald, Judith A.. 1992. “Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation,” in Chatterji, Manans and Forcey, Linda R. (eds.), Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace. Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 273–84.Google Scholar
Popkin, Samuel L. 1979. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Popkin, Samuel L. 1988. “Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam,” in Taylor, Michael (ed.), Rationality and Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.9–62.Google Scholar
Powell, Benjamin. 2019. “Solving the Misesian Migration Conundrum,” The Review of Austrian Economics, 32(3): 205–213.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 1993. “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy,” American Political Science Review 87(1): 115–32.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert 2002. “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual Review of Political Science 5(1): 1–30.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert 2004. “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting,” American Journal of Political Science 48(2): 344–61.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert 2006. “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60(1): 169–203.Google Scholar
Ram, Rati. 1995. “Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth,” in Hartley, Keith and Sandler, Todd (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 1. New York: Elsevier Science B. V., pp. 251–74.Google Scholar
Rapoport, Anatol. 1960. Fights, Games, and Debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Ricardo, David. 1817 [2004]. The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Volume 1: On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc.Google Scholar
Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War. Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood Press.Google Scholar
Roberts, Paul Craig, and Stephenson, Matthew. 1983. Marx’s Theory of Exchange, Alienation and Crisis. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.Google Scholar
Rothbard, Murray N. 1962 [2009]. Man, Economy, and State with Power and Market. Auburn, AL: Mises Institute.Google Scholar
Rothbard, Murray N. 1970. Power and Market: Government and the Economy. Menlo Park, CA: Institute for Humane Studies.Google Scholar
Russett, Bruce M., and Oneal, John R.. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton.Google Scholar
Ruttan, Vernon W. 2006. Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and Technology Development. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Salerno, Joseph. 1999. “War and the Money Machine: Concealing the Costs of War beneath the Veil of Inflation,” in Denson, John V. (ed.), The Costs of War: America’s Pyrrhic Victories. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 433–53.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Paul A. 1954. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 36(4): 387–9.Google Scholar
Samuelson, Paul A. 1955. “Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 37(4): 350–6.Google Scholar
Sandler, Todd. 1977. “Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances,” Kyklos 30(3): 443–60.Google Scholar
Sandler, Todd 2005. “Collective versus Unilateral Responses to Terrorism,” Public Choice 124(1–2): 75–93.Google Scholar
Sandler, Todd, and Arce, Daniel G.. 2007. “Terrorism: A Game-Theoretic Approach,” in Sandler, Todd and Hartley, Keith (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 2. New York: Elsevier Science B. V., pp.775–814.Google Scholar
Sandler, Todd, and Hartley, Keith. 1995. The Economics of Defense. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sandler, Todd, and Hartley, Keith (eds.). 2007. Handbook of Defense Economics, volume 2. New York: Elsevier Science B. V.Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schweizer, Peter. 2013. Extortion: How Politicians Extract Your Money, Buy Votes, and Line their Own Pockets. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.Google Scholar
Scott, James C. 1976. Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Sharp, Gene. 1973. The Politics of Nonviolent Action, three parts.Boston: Porter Sargent.Google Scholar
Sharp, Gene 1985. Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian Based Deterrence and Defense. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.Google Scholar
Sharp, Gene 1990. Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-military Weapons System. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Sharp, Gene 1994. From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. Cambridge, MA: Albert Einstein Institute.Google Scholar
Sharp, Gene 2005. Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential. Boston: Porter Sargent.Google Scholar
Sharp, Gene 2013. How Nonviolent Struggle Works. Cambridge, MA: Albert Einstein Institute.Google Scholar
Shughart II, William F. 2006. “An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945–2000,” Public Choice 128(1/2): 7–39.Google Scholar
Shughart II, William F. 2011. “Terrorism in Rational Choice Perspective,” in Coyne, Christopher J. and Mathers, Rachel L. (eds.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp. 126–53.Google Scholar
Silver, Morris. 1974. “Political Revolution and Repression,” Public Choice 17(1): 63–71.Google Scholar
Skaperdas, Stergios. 1992. “Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights,” American Economic Review, American Economic Association, 82(4): 720–739.Google Scholar
Skarbek, David B., and Leeson, Peter T.. 2009. “What Can Aid Do?,” Cato Journal 29(3): 391–7.Google Scholar
Sköns, Elizabeth, and Wulf, Herbert. 1994. “The Internationalization of the Arms Industry,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 535: 43–57.Google Scholar
Smith, Adam. 1776. [1937]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Cannan, Edwin (ed.). New York: The Modern Library.Google Scholar
Smith, Ron, Humm, Anthony, and Fontanel, Jacques. 1985. “The Economics of Exporting Arms,” Journal of Peace Research 2(3): 239–47.Google Scholar
Souva, Mark, and Prins, B. 2006. ‘The Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role of Democracy, Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1950–1999,” International Interactions 32(2): 183–200.Google Scholar
Spaniel, William, and Bils, Peter. 2016. “Slow to Learn: Bargaining, Uncertainty, and the Calculus of Conquest,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(4): 1–23.Google Scholar
Spindler, Zane A. 1995. “The Public Choice of ‘Superior’ Sanctions,” Public Choice 85(3/4): 205–26.Google Scholar
Stewart, Dugald. 1793 [1858]. “Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith LL.D,” in Bart, Sir William Hamilton (ed.), The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, volume X, pp.5–100. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Co.Google Scholar
Storr, Virgil Henry. 2010. “The Facts of the Social Sciences Are What People Know and Think,” in Boettke, Peter J. (ed.), Handbook on Contemporary Austrian Economics. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp. 30–42.Google Scholar
Stringham, Edward P. (ed.) 2007. Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice. Oakland, CA: Independent Institute.Google Scholar
Stringham, Edward P. 2015. Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taylor, Michael. 1988. “Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action,” in Taylor, Michael (ed.), Rationality and Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.63–97.Google Scholar
Thomsen, Esteban F. 1992. Prices and Knowledge: A Market-Process Perspective. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Thrall, A. Trevor, and Cramer, Jane K. (eds.). 2009. American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Tsebelis, George. 1990. “Are Sanctions Effective? A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 34(1): 3–28.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. 1967. “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft,” Western Economic Journal 5(3): 224–32.Google Scholar
US Government Accountability Office. 2006. “Defense acquisitions: DOD wastes billions of dollars through poorly structured incentives,” GAO-06-409T. Available online: www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-409T.Google Scholar
Vance, T. N. 1951a. “The Permanent War Economy Part I: Its Basic Characteristics,” New International 17(1): 29–44.Google Scholar
Vance, T. N. 1951b. “The Permanent War Economy Part II: Declining Standards of Living,” New International 17(2): 67–92.Google Scholar
Vance, T. N. 1951c. “The Permanent War Economy Part III: Increasing State Intervention,” New International 17(3): 131–59.Google Scholar
Vance, T. N. 1951d. “The Permanent War Economy Part IV: Military-Economic Imperialism,” New International 17(4): 232–48.Google Scholar
Vance, T. N. 1951e. “The Permanent War Economy Part V: Some Significant Trends,” New International 17(5): 251–66.Google Scholar
Vance, T. N. 1951f. “The Permanent War Economy Part VI: Taxation and Class Struggle,” New International 17(6): 251–66.Google Scholar
Vaughn, Karen I. 1980. “Economic Calculation Under Socialism: The Austrian Contribution,” Economic Inquiry XVIII: 535–54.Google Scholar
Vaughn, Karen I. 1994. Austrian Economics in America: The Migration of a Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Veblen, Thorstein 1915. Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution. New York: Huebsch.Google Scholar
Veblen, Thorstein 1917. An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. “Bargaining and War,” American Journal of Political Science 44(3): 469–84.Google Scholar
Wallensteen, Peter. 1968. “Characteristics of Economic Sanctions,” Journal of Peace Research 5(3): 248–67.Google Scholar
Walter, Barbara F. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51(3): 335–364.Google Scholar
Weede, Erich. 2004. “The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace by Globalization,” The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy 9(2):165–86.Google Scholar
Weede, Erich 2011. “The Capitalist Peace,” in Coyne, Christopher J. and Mathers, Rachel L. (eds.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., pp. 269–80.Google Scholar
Weiss, Thomas G. 1999. “Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses,” Journal of Peace Research 36(5): 499–509.Google Scholar
Westley, Christopher, Anderson, William L., and Kjar, Scott A.. 2011. “War and the Austrian School: Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek,” The Economics of Peace and Security Journal 6(1): 28–33.Google Scholar
Williamson, Claudia. 2010. “Exploring the Failure of Foreign Aid: The Role of Incentives and Information,” The Review of Austrian Economics 23(1): 17–33.Google Scholar
Wolfson, Murray. 1992. “Do Zones of deterrence Exist?,” in Wolfson, Murray (ed.), Essays on the Cold War. London: Macmillan, pp. 99–104.Google Scholar
Wood, Garrett. 2018. “The Enemy Votes: Weapons Improvisation and Bargaining Failure,” The Economics of Peace & Security Journal 13(1): 35–42.Google Scholar
Xiang, Jun, Xu, X, and Keteku, G. 2007. “Power: The Missing Link in the Trade Conflict Relationship,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(4): 646–63.Google Scholar
Ypersele de Strihou, Jacques van. 1967. “Sharing the Defense Burden among Western Allies,” Review of Economics and Statistics 49(4): 527–36.Google Scholar
- 9
- Cited by