Element contents
Series: Elements in Political Economy
Democratization and the State
Competence, Control, and Performance in Indonesia's Civil Service
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 November 2022
Summary
Does democratization lead to more meritocracy in the civil service? The Element argues that electoral accountability increases the value of competence over personal loyalty in the civil service. While this resembles an application of merit principles, it does not automatically reduce patronage politics or improve public goods provision. Competent civil servants are often used to facilitate the distribution of clientelistic goods at mass scale to win competitive elections. The selection of competent but less loyal civil servants requires the increased use of control mechanisms, like the timing of promotions, to ensure their compliance. The Element tests these claims using novel micro-level data on promotions in Indonesia's civil service before and after democratization in 1999. The Element shows that national- and local-level elections led to increased promotion premiums for educated civil servants, and simultaneously generated electoral cycles in the timing of promotions, but did little to improve public goods provision.
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- Series: Elements in Political EconomyOnline ISBN: 9781009264839Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 15 December 2022
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