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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Religion

The Design Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2018

Elliott Sober
Elliott Sober
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Summary

This Element analyzes the various forms that design arguments for the existence of God can take, but the main focus is on two such arguments. The first concerns the complex adaptive features that organisms have. Creationists who advance this argument contend that evolution by natural selection cannot be the right explanation. The second design argument - the argument from fine-tuning - begins with the fact that life could not exist in our universe if the constants found in the laws of physics had values that differed more than a little from their actual values. Since probability is the main analytical tool used, the Element provides a primer on probability theory.
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Keywords

designevolutionfine-tuningprobability

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Type
Element
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Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Religion
Online ISBN: 9781108558068
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 29 November 2018

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The Design Argument
  • Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Online ISBN: 9781108558068
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The Design Argument
  • Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Online ISBN: 9781108558068
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The Design Argument
  • Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison
  • Online ISBN: 9781108558068
Available formats
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