2.1 Kant’s Account of Human Dignity

There has been much discussion in recent decades as to whether according to Kant’s practical philosophy human dignity is a matter of basic human rights or an outcome of the fulfilment of the moral law. As Oliver Sensen claimed in a groundbreaking essay (Sensen 2011, passim), Kant does not address dignity as a universal, metaphysical dimension of human existence, but as the result of one’s conduct meeting the requirements of moral autonomy. In line with this dynamic and relational account of human dignity, it is not surprising that Kant does not show, for instance, any enthusiasm for treatments promising to extend human life, as such a prolonging could also result in a life unable to meet the requirement of moral autonomy, as would be the case of someone only able to perform basic animal functions rather than utilize their higher human faculties (CF 7: 114). The problem here is that when existence is reduced to mere ‘animal functions’, this gives rise to an utterly insufficient development of the human mind. In the third part of his writing, The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant seems to be influenced by Latin Antiquity’s account of the value of life as he discusses psychological traits that further his misgivings about compassion and sympathy as drives allegedly able to ground moral life.

The Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (§ 66) observes how the subject tends to minimize the pain of others while exaggerating their own. The following excerpt provides further evidence for Kant’s melancholic view of human nature: ‘it is not exactly the nicest observation about human beings the fact that their enjoyment increases through the comparison with other’s pain, while their own pain is diminished through comparison with similar or even greater sufferings of others’ (Anth § 66, 7: 238).Footnote ⁶ At the same time, however, Kant promptly appends this observation to state that this problematic quality of the human mind needn’t necessarily hinder the moral character of the subject. This minimizing of the pain of others stems from the imagination, a faculty not intended to lead to rational decisions, but rather to relax the mind from higher epistemic functions. Other passages from this writing highlight that attending the theatre teaches the public ‘to suffer through the power of imagination’ (Anth 7: 239). Yet in the ‘theatre’ of daily life, imagination appears as a faculty that compares our own pain with the misfortune of others or with worse evils avoided, so that ‘[t]he misfortune of someone who has broken his leg can be made more bearable if he is shown that he could easily have broken his neck (Anth 7: 239).’ In this context, the imagination, which mainly serves to measure the differences of fortune among human beings, must be overseen by thought, which, as has been said, places the value of life on one’s moral conduct and the goals achieved by the subject,Footnote ⁷ rather than in the affective realm.

Following the empirical comparison of individual fortune or misfortune, a key element of the correct assessment of the luck and suffering of others is whether – as Kant stresses in the Groundwork – ‘an impartial rational spectator’ would be pleased by the prosperity of a subject not provided with ‘a pure and good will’ (G 4: 393), as it is the basic condition to be worthy of happiness. Other passages from the Lectures on Ethics proceed in the opposite direction, as the Lecture on Ethics Vigilantius stresses that ‘to feel a positive joy at the suffering of another’ (Eth-Vigil § 119, 27: 687) makes of the spectator someone ignominious. It must be emphasized that here imagination is seen as unable to develop the moral destiny of the human being, as it primarily considers the external fortune or misfortune that befalls subjects rather than the effort they apply in developing and strengthening their moral character. In other words, the imagination does not consider the moral foundations of a life, sufficing with simply appraising the outward appearance. We must also understand Kant’s suggestion to adopt a perspective that promotes continual action and dissuades accumulating enjoyment within this context. In his remarks on the source of the scourge of boredom, Kant posits that idleness reflects a lack of the feeling of living able to seize the subject, as she does not steer her own will, but rather searches for activities to ‘fill up time’ and thus struggles with the ‘abhorrence, ill-humour and disgust’ (Eth-Collins 27: 381) that results when wasted time meets human subjectivity. This line of reasoning confirms that Kant’s theory of morals requires the subject previously learn to live, as this forms a reliable foundation for moral behaviour, which in turn makes the human being deserving of dignity.

Nonetheless, these observations should not be taken as an indication that Kant views suffering as a phenomenon unfit for philosophical analysis. In this vein, Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue reminds us that the moral vocation of the human being calls to treat oneself and the others according to the duty of self-esteem, which disavows to ‘give himself away for any price’ (DV 6: 462). The duty to maintain and protect one’s own personality and humanity reveals a marked distance between the homo phenomenon and the homo noumenon, which depicts not a horizontal relationship, but rather one of subordination. Thus, one should never act as if he is ‘master over his personality’, or conclude that he might ‘dispose over his own substance’ (Eth-Vigil 27: 601).

Furthermore, the respect towards a human being seems to depend on her effective capacity to subordinate her will to the moral law. Sensen has highlighted this key nuance of Kant’s account of human dignity in sundry papers, stressing that ‘[w]hat one should respect in others is their freedom. As freedom entails the moral law, one should respect others who are under the moral law and capable of morality.’ (Sensen 2011: 133). Put differently, respect as a moral feeling does not result from the attitude that a subordinate – a child or a pupil – has towards his superior, as the former compares his own role with the role of his senior, and morality never results from comparison of civil conditions or social positions. On the contrary, the subject must assume, as a maxim, the limiting of his self-esteem out of respect for the dignity of humanity in others (DV 6: 449).

I follow Sensen in his claim that Kant’s conception of dignity differs from contemporary approaches, insofar as he affirms that ‘[b]y itself dignity does not play a foundational role for Kant’ (Sensen 2011: 203), as dignity does not reveal why morality, understood as acting in accordance with respect to the moral law, should take priority over acting following one’s own inclinations. As Sensen upholds, Kant’s conception of dignity should not be viewed as a disavowal of contemporary accounts of the value of human life, but rather as a path able to lay a foundation for a rational sense of human existence. Perhaps Kant’s confession of his indebtedness to Rousseau might shed further light on the distance between our contemporary perspective on human dignity and Kant’s arguments.Footnote ⁸ Kant admits that it was Rousseau who showed him which capacities express the sense of humanity, the ultimate value of human beings, and thus urge safeguarding the ‘rights of humanity’ (OFBS 20: 44). Even if Kant affirms, in the Groundwork, that ‘dignity [has] an unconditional, incomparable worth’ (G 4: 436), Sensen (2011: 160–165) reminds us that Kant never grounds morality on this inner worth, but rather on our use of our own freedom (Refl 18: 181).

Other writings, and particularly Kant’s lectures on natural right, show Kant’s claims that the condition of a human being as an end in itself presupposes that he has no equivalent. Equivalency can only be seen in the case of things with external value. Thus, the value assigned to persons impedes their oppression or domination as if they were mere means, for ‘[t]his limitation is based on the condition of universal consent with the will of others as far as possible. There is nothing except a human being that can be posited as more worthy of respect than the right of human beings’ (L-NR 27: 1319). Passages such as this highlight the obligation of every human being to engage in a dialogue with the will of others in serving the ideal of humanity they are intended to achieve. Again, this is not the case of things, as they are used according to their price and the external value they assume based on supply and demand.

A similar rationale determines that human beings are unable to dispose of their own lives, as the body is neither a contingent feature of human life nor merely one state of life among others, but rather its organic and material condition. Kant draws a powerful image illustrating this in the Lecture on Ethics Collins, when he writes that ‘if we could slip out of one body and enter another, like a country, then we could dispose over the body’ (Eth-Collins 27: 369). On the contrary, however, the human body is the material condition indispensable for exercising freedom, which consequently cannot seek to destroy or abolish it. Kant stresses later in this passage that freedom is embodied in us through the body, which thus ‘constitutes a part of the self’ (Eth-Collins 27: 369).Footnote ⁹ In this sense, to use one’s will to take one’s own life would imply a self-destructive action worthy of condemnation. Another Lecture on Ethics – focusing on the metaphysics of morals: Vigilantius – underlines the strict duty to preserve one’s own life, stemming from the respect for one’s own personhood as a rational being. Hence, even the most unbearable suffering and pain could not legitimate committing suicide, as classical morals argued (Eth-Vigil § 92, 27: 628). Even if Kant was deeply influenced by classical Stoicism, he has plain misgivings about the ideal of existence ensuing from it – as shown, Kant argues that even the cruellest suffering could be compatible with a worthy life. Yet he also admits that, despite the value of moral ideals, the human being needs certain external, physical conditions to be met so as not to falter in his moral development.

Thus, Kant’s account of human dignity gives rise to a duty to take care of one’s body, nurturing ‘its vigour, activity, strength and courage’ (Eth-Collins 27: 380), controlling its impulses, and satisfying its basic needs. Yet, such a duty to provide the body with all it might require does not address the emotional health and wellness of the subject. Put differently, Kant’s theory of virtue seems to urge that the body is maintained in good health as the material side of the will, without further attention to the emotional needs of the human being. Moreover, the subject is invited to take care of his bodily dimension as a human animal, without neglecting his dignity as a rational human being. Consequently, the body appears as a structural feature underpinning any use of freedom, which must be conserved in order to guarantee the moral life of the subject.

As is well known, the principle guiding Kant’s treatment of human dignity draws on the imperative of treating others not only as means, but at the same time as ends in themselves according to the self-respect that drives the subject to meet the requirements of his moral destiny (DV § 11, 6: 435). As another passage from the Doctrine of Virtue affirms: ‘[i]t is just in this [to be used not merely as a means, but also as an end] that his dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all things’ (DV § 38, 6: 462). In contrast with this, behaviours such as seeking to curry the favour of another through hypocrisy and flattery entail a degradation of one’s personality, and should be prevented so as to foster the development of morality. As Kant advises, ‘[our] insignificance as a human animal may not infringe upon [our] consciousness of his dignity as a rational human being’ (DV § 11, 6: 435), indicating the means and attitudes that the subject is recommended to adopt to preserve his status as an ‘intelligible being’. Put differently, to boast of one’s own moral worth by comparing oneself to others is seen as a deplorable conduct. Such behaviours demonstrate both the polarity, and as well as the propinquity, of humility and ambition. These traits, common in any social space, hinder the development of a culture of a social interaction by undermining its commitment to the preservation of human dignity as a common goal.

As the arguments above seek to show, Kant mistrusts in the emotions as a way to analyse the suffering affecting the subject and others. Far from an emotional approach to social suffering, Kant prefers to distinguish between the empirical value of human existence and the moral status all human beings are intended to achieve. Even if all human beings dread becoming subjects of suffering, and feel comparatively lucky upon realizing that others are suffering more than them, the development of moral life must overcome such a standpoint to adopt a moral commitment towards one’s own autonomy. Furthermore, moral development involves, in Kant’s view, a transformation of the subject’s attitude towards his own physical suffering, leading to increased resilience in difficult situations. Even if the human being cannot aspire to moral sainthood, he must improve his perception of affliction and discomfort so as to be able to tolerate them. Naturally, Kant is aware of the role of external aids such as the emotion of hope, and their importance for the human not to falter in the fulfilment of their moral duties. Nevertheless, the emotional spectacle of the suffering of others shows a limited role in determining practical subjectivity in Kant’s theory of morals. That said, this does not dispense with the task of examining the function of human pain within the moral pedagogy of his theories.

2.2 The Moral Economy of Kant’s Social Emotions: Gender and Class Biases

This subsection addresses Kant’s proposal to control the emotions when interacting with others. Kant holds that to make compassion and solidarity the primary reaction to the suffering of others is to contribute to overindulgence and immoderation, attitudes that compromise our morality. Moreover, I seek to show how Kant tends to describe women’s perspectives as immature or impractical when reacting to misfortune or injustice affecting other people, as he considers that women are less prepared to develop the disposition to personality due to their ‘biological tasks’ and natural civil passive character. Furthermore, I will also spotlight some biases in moral perception Kant sees as inherent to privileged social classes, which, in Kant’s view hinder the adoption of an impartial and objective standpoint in the face of one’s own misfortune. In this way, I aim to shed light on the influence of gender and class on common moral judgements.

While Kant’s foundations of morals furnish a universal account of moral autonomy and duty, it is also evident that he addresses human emotions differently along gender lines. In this vein, analysing what Kant views as the appropriate emotional reaction to the suffering and distress of others may prove valuable. For example, weeping in solidarity with the mourning of others (which he openly disclaims as ‘disgusting music’ (Anth § 76, 7: 255–256)) is rebuked by Kant as ‘feminine’ or ‘effeminate’ in men. By contrast, the masculine character should limit itself to displaying a ‘powerless sympathy with others’ suffering’ (Anth § 76, 7: 255–256). While this might manifest as being ‘moved to tears’ (Anth § 76, 7: 255–256), it is not considered behaving in a shameful manner. Kant is not suggesting that his audience and readers react insensitively towards the hardship of a friend, an acquaintance or even a stranger, but rather avoid crying even when the subject cannot help but moved by the story he is hearing. Despite this gendered view, this does not necessarily mean that women are seen as reprehensible, as Kant also asserts that they have been educated to assume every misfortune with the utmost patience, able ‘to make suffering (enduring) imperceptible through habit’ (Anth § 77, 7: 257). Indeed, to a certain extent, Kant even favours cultivating ‘feminine’ emotional traits, such as a duty to maintain ‘a constantly cheerful heart’.Footnote ¹⁰ Remarks like this one highlight the central role of inner joy in the development of moral character: ‘undeserved sufferings’ such as betrayal, ingratitude, or love spurned have the potential to make the subject lose any desire for social interaction, while a light-hearted point of view fosters social participation.

Kant also references the case of virtuous individuals who descend into misanthropy as a result of their focus on virtue: ‘here are those who from an exaggerated principle of virtue remove themselves from social life, because their days are embittered by many undeserved sufferings’ (Eth-Vigil § 115, 27: 672). Such a pathological cultivation of moral virtue would not coincide with the case of the ‘negative misanthrope’ (anthropophobus), who does not display a tendency towards social coexistence. In contrast with misanthropy stemming from a pathological cultivation of moral virtue, ‘the negative misanthrope anthropophobus, i.e., one who withdraws himself from everyone, because he is unable to love them’ is completely devoid of love for others and thus considers that ‘everyone is oblivious to all the respect due to himself’ (Eth-Vigil § 115, 27: 672). Consequently, in this account of the emotions fostering universal love for all human beings and peaceful social interaction (whose normative status is not clarified by Kant) passions such as revenge are not seen as legitimate, as these involve ‘an immediate pleasure at the suffering of the offender’ (Eth-Vigil § 119, 27: 689), and thus reveal a hatred for humanity. Another passage from the Lecture on Ethics Vigilantius illustrates the emotional discipline required by morality, discussing feelings and affects traditionally assigned to women:

Such an account hints at Kant’s stoic influence, which he mostly views as a male behaviour, while also highlighting the vulnerability of human nature in its struggle against the powerful threats to morality inherent in society. However, it is also indisputable that in Kant’s view, ‘even personal slavery, or the harshest bodily suffering, can be compatible with a man’s freedom’ (Eth-Vigil § 92, 27: 628). Kant’s moral theory urges engaging in a thoughtful exchange with fellow members of society, and he accurately analyses the ideas of ‘taking something to heart’ and ‘bearing something consciously in mind’. In Kant’s view, the latter degrades our humanity insofar as it leaves us bereft of self-esteem, which every human being deserves as a result of their personhood. Moreover, Kant focuses on human beings, who, unlike animals, are able to develop an intellectual experience of distress and pain by translating sensory impressions and perceptions into mental representations, and redefining those sensations in terms of fortune and misfortune (Anth-Fried 25: 567–568). It is noteworthy that class biases are also mentioned in Kant’s account of unrecommended practical reactions to personal setbacks, as being accustomed to economic prosperity prevents a full-fledged development of one’s own moral character. Furthermore, Kant associates the evaluation of luck or the lack thereof to one’s contingent lifespan, in which some become accustomed to wealth and luxury while others consistently face adversity. The well off, for instance, appear less capable of impartially assessing setbacks they may encounter, insofar as they are not accustomed to taking into account the misfortune of others, or to examining their own relative fortune across the arc of their lives. Here, it seems privileged subjects are “making a mountain out of a molehill”, as their elitist socialization undermines not only their insertion into society, but also their subjection to the rules of interdependence and legal equality.

Kant’s mature moral theory confirms his reluctance to make compassion for suffering an appropriate source of moral motivation. According to the universal duty to love all human beings and to respect the universal justice that must rule society, all subjects must strive to improve the living conditions of other members of their own community. The imagination, however, continues to be blamed as a faculty allowing the subject to ‘be infected by … pain’ (DV § 34 6: 457), increasing the number of those suffering, even if only by one person. As Kant adds later in this passage, ‘there cannot possibly be a duty to increase the ills in the world and so to do good from compassion’ (DV § 34 6: 457). Such a behaviour, in Kant’s view, would also degrade human dignity, as it stems from the pity the subject feels towards others, without considering the worthiness for happiness the sufferer might display.

The role of sheer determination in responding adequately to misfortune is mostly tackled in Anthropology writings, which focus on the construction of a sound reflective subjectivity. In this vein, in the Lecture of Anthropology Friedländer, Kant further examines the distance between a sensory and a rational satisfaction resulting from the spectacle of the fortune or misfortune of others (Anth-Fried 25: 610). While rational satisfaction arises from rational sympathy, the judgement of the senses merely triggers a sensory satisfaction.Footnote ¹¹ Moreover, in judging our private lives, we lack the ability to observe our circumstances with the distance necessary for rational evaluation. Finally, while rational sympathy interprets the distress, pain, or misfortune of others as evils that must be removed from the world through practical effort, the impassioned pleas of those seeking to stir our conscience to action will dampen our trust in their testimony, until we ultimately lose the willingness to provide help. In Kant’s view, these disparate reactions demonstrate the emotions and passions as unreliable guides for the moral development of the subject, justifying the unwavering attitude that the moral subject should show towards them:

In this excerpt, Kant aims to describe a key psychological trait of the human mind, associating intense displays of emotion (wailing, sobbing) with the narration of personal tragedy. The contribution to the happiness of others as ends does not contradict with the wider moral duty that the subject must pursue according to Kant’s view of human societal coexistence. Certain temperaments, (particularly the sanguine – which I will address later –), are overly sensitive to the suffering of others. Individuals with these temperaments are soft-hearted and easily affected by others’ pain and lamentations, which impairs them from impartially judging controversial issues, as they are unacquainted with the conditions of justice, (OFBS 2: 222) and threatens transforming them into ‘a tender-hearted idler’ (OFBS 2: 216). As seen in this section, Kant prioritizes action over passivity in the formation of moral personality, a distinction that can be also explored through the aforementioned difference between ‘taking the suffering of friends to heart’ and ‘bearing them in mind’. While the former implies consciousness of the pain suffered by others, the latter makes the subject herself feel unhappy, as she assumes the pain of others as a personal affliction. The upshot of this analysis is that ‘no external ill can make us so unhappy, that we no longer merit being alive, as solely the actions contrary to morality [can do]’ (Anth-Fried 25: 597). In this way, Kant’s approach to the pain and suffering of others consistently views these phenomena through the lens of moral perfection, a universal aim which human beings should strive for and one that reciprocally favours the satisfaction of their material needs.

In a nutshell, Kant claims that often, the moral attitude that the subject shows towards the suffering of others depends on sensitive, emotional drives resulting from gender and/or social class, characteristics clouding moral perception, which stems from the respect for the moral law, rather than from feelings or emotions of sympathy and pity. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that in Kant’s view, the true value of life could never be derived from passive feelings and sensations, but rather from the actions the subject undertakes by decisions following moral – and not natural or mechanical – maxims (CJ § 83 5: 434f.).

2.3 Cultivating the Art of Sympathy: Taming Egoism and Averting Misanthropy

Kant’s moral philosophy accurately analyses the responses to the suffering of others that meet the condition of respect for the humanity embodied in all human beings. Nevertheless, it is significant that the pedagogical examples of sound moral character that Kant makes use of in his moral writings are expected to leave a deep impact on the human mind, at times more vivid than the grief ensuing from blatant injustice and institutional disrepair. Notably, the development of morality involves a dimension of assumed suffering, insofar as moral progress often demands renouncing the allure of satisfying human inclinations. Put slightly differently, to embrace moral maxims for guiding our actions requires foregoing much happiness arising from social interaction, as the ultimate meaning of human action must be viewed from a moral standpoint. In this vein, it is helpful to remember that the path to virtue is paved with great effort, which nothing demonstrates better, in Kant’s view, than the impressive resistance and suffering of an honest individual. What’s more, this should inspire the highest respect in adolescents, that is, those still unversed in the practical field (KPrR 5: 156). How though, to convey to a teenager that pure morality is a touchstone from which to judge the value of every action? Furthermore, would sacrificing one’s most enjoyable emotions so as to abide by moral principles be experienced as grief, as seen in the aforementioned example of Christ? The following excerpt from the Critique of Practical Reason, in which an individual refuses to join calumniators intending to slander an innocent and powerless person, displays the powerful effect that an honest individual’s resistance to evil should exert over young people:

This exhortation stresses that the subject must be prepared to assume the high costs that morality exacts on seeking one’s own happiness or the expectation of any empirical profit ensuing from such action. Moreover, it encourages displaying morality as untainted by empirical elements as possible, through examples of holiness and virtue that exhibit the suffering that must be accepted to attain those exalted levels of moral perfection. The passage also stresses that the young listener will seek to behave like such an exemplary man, albeit ‘certainly not in such circumstances’. Such an account legitimates the role that suffering might fulfil in the moral self-transformation of the subject, whose inferior appetitive faculty dissuades him from accepting any eventual pain and from renouncing the pleasures of life. In his portrayal of an honest man resisting the pressure to partake in the arraignment of an innocent person, Kant ‘represents him at the moment he wishes that he had never lived to see the day that exposed him to such unutterable pain and yet remains firm in his resolution to be truthful’ (KPrR 5: 156). The excerpt adds that the adolescent listening to this story would pass from mere approval to admiration, until ultimately feeling amazement and being seized by ‘the greatest veneration’ (KPrR 5: 156). Kant closes this pedagogical digression by stating that to exhibit virtue untainted by any consideration to personal well-being and comfort has a deeper influence on the human heart than virtue diluted with these secondary considerations. Moreover, the reasoning ensuing from the higher faculty of desire should not overshadow or annul the effects that the lower faculty of desire brings about in the human mind. As shown by this example, the witnessing of the suffering of others fulfils a key role in fostering moral dispositions aimed at making the human commonwealth a network of effective interdependence and mutual support.

Even if the sacrifice of one’s own comfort is necessary for the moral development of the subject, Kant had acknowledged, since the pre-critical period, the helpful effect of ‘a kindly participation in the fate of other people’ (OFBS 2: 215) to forestall or remove undesirable harms from the social realm. Such a moral disposition towards the misfortune and pain of others leads to developing means that prevent the subject from slipping into melancholy and rendering him unable to positively contribute to the happiness of his commonwealth. Yet the ‘natural’ human reaction towards the suffering of a beloved or an acquaintance does not provide an objective measurement of the proper response to the suffering of others. Hence, determining the proper feedback to hardships suffered by others requires previously understanding the shortcomings of a prompt, supportive emotional response. In this vein, it is noteworthy that Kant traces an inconsistency in the emotional dynamics of sympathy, as this may lead to a melancholic compassion focusing on the misfortune of an individual person, while simultaneously neglecting evils that may affect a larger number of people. In this context, Kant’s uses eloquent examples from warfare to highlight the asymmetry evident when human judgement more easily empathizes with an individual misfortune than collective destruction:

The excerpt effectively demonstrates how the pitfalls of human perception hinder the moral agent’s correct valuation and decision-making when regarding different scales of suffering. This partiality of sympathy also explains the Doctrine of Virtue’s strong misgivings about the benefits of compassion, which functions as a sensitive impulse to share in the sufferings and joys of others. At the same time, however, this writing also highlights the ‘duty to sympathize actively in [the] fate of others’ (DV § 35, 6: 457), which entails cultivating natural feelings of solidarity (a disposition underpinning sympathy) based in moral principles. Thus, Kant opposes avoiding ‘the places where the poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found but rather [recommends] to seek them out, and not to shun sickrooms or debtors’ prisons’ (DV § 35, 6: 457), as he argues that the contemplation of such places of suffering can foster aesthetical support useful in fulfilling moral duty.

Before interpreting this remark, it will be helpful to break down the meaning of two German terms, Mitgefühl and Mitleidenschaft, both similar to the English compassion, but containing a key nuance that stresses the agency and passivity, respectively, contained in them.Footnote ¹² The first term ‘shared feeling’ – Mitgefühl – plays a key role in Kant’s moral theory, as it generally helps the agent to put himself in the place of another person, a moral operation that Scottish and French authors such as Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy had previously discussed as a phenomenon related to sympathy. This feeling clearly differs, in Kant’s view, from ‘compassion’ (Mitleidenschaft; Mitleid), defined as humanitas aesthetica, that is, a mere receptivity to the feeling of joy and sadness of others, opposed to reflexive sympathy, and more akin to the receptivity to warmth or the contagion of illnesses. Hence, in contrast with sympathy through sensitive contagion, the Mitgefühl rather helps to fulfil the moral law, insofar as it reveals the human being’s capacity to share the feelings of others, according to the humanitas practica (DV 6: 456–457), going beyond mere sensitivity to feel morally co-responsible for their fate. Already in the pre-critical period, Kant assessed human temperaments as a significant natural foundation for a subsequent moral character. In this context, Kant asserts that the sanguine temperament would be incapable of attaining a true moral sympathy – given their soft-hearted nature, the sanguine person immediately shares the joyfulness and suffering of others, just as he also receives the other various impressions around him. Thus, Kant discards him the sanguine individual as a mere friend, one who easily changes with the social environment:

The passage clearly discards this psychological profile as a reliable observer of the suffering of others. Other passages from the Observations about the Feeling of Beauty and Sublime also hint to the key difference between aesthetic and practical sympathy: the former appears too weak and temporary to prompt ‘a kindly participation in the fate of other people, to which principles of virtue likewise lead’. (OFBS 2: 215–216). Moreover, the empathy with the feeling of others is fleeting, and does not foster any connection with universal principals, which must guide the maxims of a subject in order for them to behave coherently with a moral conduct consistent with Kant’s total framework of human action. Under further consideration, one finds that however endearing the quality of sympathy may be, it does not contain within it the dignity of virtue. Furthermore, as Timmermann (Reference Timmermann2016: 731–732) has highlighted, the recommendation to visit hospitals, asylums, and other marginalized places does not apply to everyone. In fact, Kant includes an observation in his published Anthropology closely intertwined with the analysis of compassion in § 35 of the Doctrine of Virtue. In § 32 of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, focusing on the power of imagination, he references a report by the physician of Kassel Christian Friedrich MichaelisFootnote ¹³ containing the anecdote of a soldier in North America who ‘fell into a violent frenzy’, stoking similar reactions in some bystanders of the incident. Thus, in the case of hypochondriac persons, Kant decidedly counsels against visiting ‘lunatic asylums out of curiosity’ (Anth § 32, 7: 179), as he considers weak-nerved people unable to impartially judge these experiences, and likely to become victims of mental disorder themselves.

Despite his awareness of the selfishness ingrained in the human condition, Kant affirms that the human being is destined to develop a moral approach to the suffering of others, resulting from the natural drive to sympathize with the distress and anguish we perceive in others. This moral recommendation to become acquainted with the miserable goes beyond the ‘natural instinct in man to be jealous’ (Eth-Vigil § 121, 27: 698), which, for instance, hinders a healthy person from grasping the sufferings of an ill person (Eth-Vigil § 121, 27: 694). In this vein, Kant quotes La Rochefoucauld, insofar as the French anthropologist avows that ‘in the sufferings of our best friends there is something that does not wholly displease us’ (Eth-Vigil § 121, 27: 697). This also explains why Kant would choose not to ground his moral theory on sensitivity or sympathy but rather in the subjection of the human faculty of desire to the moral law. Kant also stresses the fact that those experiencing suffering such as illness might feel some envy towards those not affected by this misfortune, even wishing that they may also ‘be plunged into [such a situation]’ (Eth-Vigil § 121, 27: 694). Thus, Kant’s psychological analysis posits that every human being desires, to some extent, that even his closest friends do not achieve a state of complete happiness, for this would lead to unbearable jealousy. At the same time, when friends are beset by unfortunate circumstances, the subject has the chance to feel superior to them. This selfish, emotional basis of the human mind, however, must be distinguished from the attitude of a misanthrope, who feels hatred for other human beings, and who Kant views as regrettable elements of social life, insofar as they display a complete lack of respect for humanity and its moral valueFootnote ¹⁴:

This extreme case of misanthropy discloses a clear incapacity to empathize with others, and such individuals renounce protecting and contributing to the thriving of humanity in themselves and other human beings. However, this anthropological pathology must be accurately distinguished from the societal obstacles the subject encounters that inhibit him from impartially grasping the joys and sufferings of his fellow humans. As Kant affirms in his main writing on religion, any time subjects belong to a social space, they are likely to compare themselves and their social status to that of others, substituting self-love, the foundation of a ‘predisposition to humanity’ with ‘the inclination to gain worth in the opinion of others’ (Rel 6: 27). While initially, the subject seeks merely not to be despised when compared to others, he progressively fears that other members of society display more abilities and possessions than he, bringing about a state of constant anxiety. These ‘vices of culture’ (Rel 6: 27) result in maleficent emotional attitudes such as envy, ingratitude, and joy in others’ misfortunes, which should be decidedly criticized by a social theory aware of both the pitfalls of civil society and its possibilities enabled by the duties of the subject.Footnote ¹⁵

3.1 Kant on Animal Suffering

In this subsection, I will aim to grasp some conclusions from Kant’s view of animals able to elaborate on his more general theory of human dignity and of personal perfection as a moral task. In fact, Kant’s practical philosophy addresses the duties that rational human beings must fulfil ‘[w]ith regard to the animate but nonrational part of the creation’ (DV § 17, 6: 443), even though the latter do not meet all the requirements needed to be considered rational beings. In particular, the §§ 16 and 17 of the Doctrine of Virtue, and certain Lectures on Ethics – such as Collins and Vigilantius – contain key remarks on this subject. The Doctrine of Virtue rejects the idea that human beings have any direct duties towards animals, as they do not possess any moral standing. Nevertheless, this account admits that animals perform a helpful service to workers, families, and individuals, which adds important nuance to the recognition they deserve from rational human beings.Footnote ²⁰ The attachment that humans ought to consecrate to animals takes after the dynamics of social sympathy, as an ‘indirect duty’ (DV § 34, 6: 456–457) which ‘does not constitute moral dispositions’ (Eth-Mron 29: 626) – in Kant’s account, animals seem to engage into an emotional dialogue with their owners and other humans, even if they do not belong to this species. Kant’s view of the ethical treatment of animals has sparked much discussion in recent decadesFootnote ²¹, as it adopts a recognizable utilitarian standpoint regarding the ties between human beings and animals that has been largely reproved. In discussing some remarks on the value of animals with regard to human actions, some scholars have considered the ecological bonds linking humans and animals in the context of a natural world that must be preserved, protected, and bequeathed to future generations (Svoboda Reference Svoboda2015; Vereb Reference Vereb2021).

Kant’s account, however, does not make animal beings proper members of society, as their actions merely depend on instinct and thus they are unable to ground moral character on the basis of a disposition to personality. As Kant writes in the Lecture on Anthropology Menschenkunde (Anth-Mensch 25: 1033): ‘If an animal would know to say ‘I’, he would be my fellow’. So far, this is not the case of animals, whose analysis has often entailed salient mistakes in Kant’s view, as would be the case of scholars as Georg Friedrich Meier, author of Versuch eines neuen Lehrgebäudes von den Seelen der Thiere (Reference Meier1749), and Hermann Samuel Reimarus, author of Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Thiere (Reference Reimarus1762). While Kant rebukes physical and philosophical enquiries that blur the boundaries between the animal and the human mind (FS 2: 59), he does not relinquish his view of animal wellness as a societal commitment appropriate to human morality. In Kant’s time, the most common argument for viewing animals as fellow beings pointed to their ability to distinguish objects, persons, and qualities as humans do. Yet in Kant’s view, such a perceptive capacity does not entail an ability to represent these qualities and understand them as characteristics of things. Discussing the mind of an ox in a pre-critical writing on logic, Kant highlights the difference between the animal and human approximation to reality:

Kant adds later in this same text that animals are able ‘to differentiate things from each other’ (FS 2: 59), which nevertheless does not imply a clear recognition of the difference between these two objects. In fact, as seen in the previous excerpt, it is only the power of judgement that endows beings with the capacity for consciousness of the logical difference of qualities, making of this an object of reflection. In contrast with this uniquely human ability, animals are restricted to fulfilling needs of survival both in nature and in society (as workforce or domestic company), without reaching any higher mental status. Even if Kant acknowledges that animal behaviour demonstrates key similarities with human action, he also highlights the limitations of this analogy. For instance, the constructions of beavers mentioned in the Critique of Judgment (CJ 5: 464) might hint to an ‘artistic capacity in animals, designated as instinct’, which may be considered as an analogon of reason. This analogical reasoning allows understanding human behaviour as action based on representations, which groups animals with rational humans and counters arguments made by philosophers such as Descartes that considered animals mere machines.Footnote ²² In my view, this analogical link, which does not require belonging to the same species, should guide the interpretation of various Kantian statements such as the following: ‘all animals are equally free’ (Eth(PP)-Herder 27: 63).Footnote ²³

This distant kinship between humans and animals underpins the remark that ‘a hard-heartedness towards animals is not in accordance with the law of reason.’ (Eth-Vigil 27: 710). This however, should not be interpreted as recognition of a hidden overlap in the practical status of animals and humans. In fact, Kant devotes intense attention to the phenomenon he labels as ‘an amphiboly in … concepts of reflection’ (DV § 16, 6: 442), which may occur when one feels he has a duty to animals or to nature. The correct reasoning would be to view the human relation to animals as a duty ‘with regard to’ beings other than humans, which, ultimately, remains a duty to himself. Even if humans don’t have direct duties towards animals, their duty towards themselves encourages them to cultivate sympathy and gratitude ‘with regard to’ animals, as animals represent an essential element of human labour while also providing pleasant company:

Kant also points out that treating animals with cruelty can lead to cruelty towards other humans, demonstrating the analogous role that non-rational animal beings fulfil in Kant’s theory of morals.Footnote ²⁴ Given that the animal mind is regarded as a analogon of the human mind, a man who, for instance, kills his dog when it is no longer productive for him, ‘is by no means in breach of any duty to the dog, since the latter is incapable of judgement, but he thereby damages the kindly and humane qualities in himself, which he ought to exercise in virtue of his duties to mankind’ (Eth-Collins 27: 459). Humans should perceive animals as helpful cooperators which not only improve productivity but also our well-being, an appreciation which decidedly prohibits slaughtering them with pain, treating them with cruelty, abusing of their capacities, or torturing them in scientific experiments, which, indeed, should only be developed ‘for the sake of speculation’ (DV § 16, 6: 443).Footnote ²⁵ Even if animals are not proper members of the human moral community, which does not admit non-rational animals, they are members of a teleological community, in which they perform helpful tasks on behalf of humans. In Kant’s view, this instrumental contribution to human culture, in the form of animal labour or kinship must be recognized as a commitment that the rational human being adopts out of respect to his own moral principles.Footnote ²⁶ Furthermore, Kant sees a connection between the human treatment of animals and the cultivation of humanity in general, as our approach to animals is indicative of our behaviour towards our fellow humans. Hence, our interactions with animals are a way to train our moral consciousness, which Kant supports with historical examples of condemnation of cruelty to animals, seen as a conduct that demeans the value of the subject who commits such an act:

In similar texts, Kant also references engravings by Williams Hogarth titled ‘The Four Stages of Cruelty’ (1751), which illustrate the progression of violent and cruel behaviour, as a helpful pedagogical tool for educating children to interact properly with humans and non-rational animals. In fact, the respect that humans are expected to show in their pragmatic interactions with animals fulfils the role of educating humans in the attitude they should adopt towards their equals, including animals and nature. In the Lecture on Ethics Collins, Kant discusses animals as ‘an analogue of humanity’, which argues for considering animal cooperation and service as merits deserving a reward comprehensible to the animal mind. Other recommendations regarding animals seem to point to the cultivation of duties to humanity, which not only refer to other humans, but also to other living beings on earth and even the natural resources which enable the survival of the human species.Footnote ²⁷ As the following passage confirms, the legitimate use of analogical reasoning between human and animal actions reduces animal life to a sort of supplement of humanity, insofar as human beings require the cooperation of other living beings:

In this way, the commitment to the moral perfection of human beings is not completely indifferent to their interactions with animals, whose suffering she has a duty to prevent and diminish. Kant also underlines the fact that human beings are able to recognize when animals feel pain or distress. Put differently, because the human mind is able to empathize with the pain of animals, he is also committed to the lifelong maintenance of the animals he may have profited from. Even if the bonds between humans and animals are mostly pragmatic and instrumental, the human being should exert a tutelary responsibility towards animals, averting the squandering and misuse of their vitality.

3.2 Kant on Mental Disorder: Personal Responsibility or Tragic Misfortune?

The reasons for Kant’s more sympathetic stance towards non-rational animals than towards the mentally ill deserve addressing. We must keep in mind that in eighteenth-century Germany and other European countries, people with mental disorders did not elicit compassion or sympathy, as both institutions and common sense viewed them as a charge that the rest of the community had to care for. In this vein, we cannot reasonably expect that Kant would be immune to such a commonly accepted opinion about human failure allegedly rooted in mental illness. Moreover, the medical approach at the time to such conditions left a lot to be desired, which leads Kant to argue against the confinement of these persons in asylums as was common during this era.

Kant manifested an overt interest in the causes and potential cures for mental disorders, at least since the pre-critical writing An Essay on the Maladies of the Head (1764). In his view, philosophers would be better equipped than physicians for inspecting the disturbed mind, particularly in the case of mental disorders in their early stages. In fact, Kant states that the philosopher could provide service for the mentally ill without requiring fees in exchange (MH 2: 271), as he views this as a sort of civil service. Already in the pre-critical period, Kant pondered potential treatments for the mentally ill, concluding that labelling and diagnosing ‘the frailties of the head’ (MH 2: 260) would be helpful insofar as it could allow society ‘to recognize these loathsome maladies in their gradual origination’ (MH 2: 260), while also taking into account their prevalence both in society and in isolation. As he does later in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), Kant posits in 1764 that there are two main categories of mental disorders. The first group conserves the use of understanding to some degree, so that phantasies can be managed through judgement or reason. The second group, however, has completely lost the capacity to grasp any rational argument, and moreover, appealing to reason with these subjects might be ‘extremely detrimental’ (MH 2: 270).

Kant develops his mature exploration of the abilities, weaknesses, and illnesses of the central epistemic faculty of the human mind in the published Anthropology. The evolution of this account can be also traced throughout the sequence of Lectures on Anthropology, in notes taken by Kant’s students over decades. The defects of the cognitive faculty are thus divided into two groups: melancholia/hypochondria and sheer mental derangement manifesting in different types of mania. The first, melancholia, makes the subject aware of the imaginary diseases he falsely believes to suffer, yet he is unable to get rid of this feeling. Kant seems to commiserate with the unfortunate destiny of the individual suffering from this sort of disorder, as he ‘will never really be happy in life’ (Anth 7: 213). In this vein, suicide is mentioned, but only as ‘the effect of a raptus’ (Anth § 50, 7: 213) common in victims of mental disorder. Kant also hints to the human mind’s power to control morbid feelings in the third part of The Conflict of the Faculties (CF 7: 97–116), in which he states that those suffering from hallucinations are not deserving of compassion, given that before their affliction, these people did not apply the effort required to change their pathological mental habits. In this case, it seems that Kant views melancholic individuals as responsible for their own suffering.

Discussing the second group of mental disorders, Kant points out that these do not necessarily display sheer madness, even if they may progress to that stage. In this context, Kant focuses on the importance of determining with certainty whether one accused of a crime was in his right mind or suffering from deranged judgement or understanding when perpetrating the offense. Kant argues for assigning such a judgement to the philosopher rather than to a forensic physician. To support this argument, he references a contemporary trial that had absolved a woman from the death penalty for killing ‘a child out of despair’ (Anth § 51, 7: 214 f.) after the judge considered her insane. As Kant stresses, the definition of insane people does not consist in gleaning ‘true conclusion from false premises’ (Anth § 51, 7: 214 f.), for in such a case all criminals might be called ‘insane’. Kant’s account of mental disorder is in fact quite concerned about potentially blurring the boundaries between culpable individuals and subjects devoid of responsibility as a result of mental disease, viewing this as a detrimental bias for penal justice. Kant’s aforementioned example, following the legal institutions and the courts of his time, confirms his view that judges had not yet developed a clear concept of the borders of human responsibility, often showing too much sympathy for the motivations and purposes of a criminal mind upon confusing it with a deranged mind. This would seem to conflict with Kant’s claims that insane people be treated with pity and care, yet Kant seems to hint to the fact that only subjects suffering an incurable illness should not be punished upon committing misdeeds and crimes.

With regard to the commonwealth’s social responsibility towards insane or mentally ill people, Kant claims that these individuals should retreat from society to enter hospitals and asylums, where they will not bother ‘normal’ social life with their pathologies. In this vein, Kant dissuades his public and readers from marrying into families with antecedents of mental disorders, emphasizing the hereditary elements of these diseases, which he considers the ‘most profound degradation of humanity’ (Anth § 52, 7: 214). Even if he views mental disorder as a universal pathology, there are parts of Kant’s account that demand an intersectional approach able to highlight gender, class, and racial factors that might characterize the profile of some people labelled ‘insane’. In this sense, women appear as the central focus of Kant’s description of certain mental disorders, while the race and class of those suffering from mental illness is generally disregarded. When considering the impact of the role of culture on Kant’s categories of mental disorders, it would seem that at least in some cases, a European cultural bias could lead to the labelling of certain cultural behaviours as pathological expressions of a disordered mind.Footnote ²⁸ In any case, Kant does not further develop the relation between the diagnosis of mental illness and the anthropological experience of geographical and cultural difference beyond some scattered anthropological remarks. From what we can glean from his writings, anthropological interaction across cultures is expected to increase tolerance of foreign habits and attitudes that would be considered unacceptable for fellow citizensFootnote ²⁹, and in turn perhaps blur the line between mental health and insanity.

As seen in his analytical chart categorizing various types of mental disorders, Kant distinguishes between disordered sensory representations and disordered judgement or reason. On the one hand, amentia makes the subject unable to construct a sound experience from her representations, while dementia apparently conforms to ‘the formal laws of thought’ (Anth § 52, 7: 215). In this case, however, the mind undergoes an ‘unhappy delusion’, insofar as it interprets glances, words and inconsequential actions as aggressions from imaginary enemies. Kant observes that amentia is particularly prevalent in women, as they are supposedly more susceptible to it due to their ‘talkativeness’ (Anth § 52, 7: 215).Footnote ³⁰ Sufferers from dementia, on the other hand, are depicted as subjects that do not require institutionalization, as they do not pose a risk, insofar as they are ‘concerned just with themselves’ (Anth § 52, 7: 215). In this way, they are differentiated from what Kant contemptuously calls ‘hospital buffoons’ (Anth § 52, 7: 215), a seemingly derogatory term for those needing medical and psychological assistance. Kant also addresses insania as a disorder resulting from ‘a deranged power of imagination’ (Anth § 52, 7: 215), in which the insane subject draws imaginary connections between unrelated phenomena, and vesania, which shows ‘the sickness of a deranged reason’ (Anth § 52, 7: 215). While insania makes the subject cheerful, those with vesania are described as self-enclosed subjects, fully bereft of common sense and isolated in the representation of their own contrived reality. Notably, they appear as ‘the calmest of all hospital patients’ (Anth § 52, 7: 216).

Here, we must ask whether Kant encourages feeling a sort of reflective sympathy regarding mentally ill people. In his account of mental disorder, Kant stresses the fact that the vesanic subject has devised an alternate reality, which entails a shift from common sense to a ‘logical private sense’ (Anth § 53, 7: 219) losing the potential for communication with others:

As the excerpt conveys, Kant attempts to dissect the very meaning of the German word Verrückung, whose traditional meaning refers to extreme mental disorder. In these insane subjects, their mental faculties do not fulfil an epistemic purpose, but rather serve simply to maintain their survival while they remain lost in a phantasy world, incapable of objectivity. To a certain extent, then, the life of the insane person is reduced to that of the animal, demeaning their humanity and making them a burden for their commonwealth. That said, Kant proceeds cautiously with regard to the institutional care of insane people. As we have seen, the pathological human mind appears radically excluded from the emotional and epistemic human community, in contrast with the ‘humanisation’ of animals in return for the aid and company they provide humans. Furthermore, Kant holds that even milder mental pathologies represent epistemic bubbles making the mentally disordered subject unable to compare their private judgements with the rules guiding our representations to acquire a universal value. Yet Kant also neglects the possibility of care required to treat different mental disorders, deeming this issue pragmatically unimportant for his account of mental derangement and illness. Put slightly differently, Kant’s sympathetic approach to non-human or non-rational living beings seems not to apply to the case of mental insanity, as the epistemic isolation of insane people deprives them of the recognition human beings show to non-human domesticated animals. In some cases, in Kant’s view, the blame for mental disorder falls on the negligence of the subject, while in others, it appears hereditary, but still undeserving of compassion. Yet, as mentioned at the onset of this subsection, Kant’s approach to mental disorder could not be interpreted without considering the ideological framework of his time. Thus, it would unfair to blame assign Kant the responsibility for not considering the social inclusion of mentally ill people a moral duty. Put differently, Kant was deeply under the influence of a quite utilitarian account of social membership, which was unable to conceive of the potential contributions of the mentally ill to the commonwealth, for instance, in proposing different perspectives on reality. Kant’s harsh approach to mental illness, however, does not relinquish society’s responsibility to care for these subjects through public and private asylums and hospitals, as the commonwealth has a duty not to aggravate the degradation of the humanity they embody.

4.1 Does Poverty Constitute Social Suffering in Kant’s View?

There has been much scholarship (Weinrib Reference Weinrib2003; Gilabert Reference Gilabert2010; Allais Reference Allais2014; Baiasu Reference Baiasu2014; Sánchez Madrid Reference Madrid, Nuria, Krasnoff, Satne and Madrid2018, Reference Madrid and Nuria2019; Holtman Reference Holtman2018; Loriaux Reference Loriaux2020; Davies Reference Davies2023; Pinzani Reference Pinzani2023; Blöser Reference Blöser2023) devoted to addressing Kant’s account of poverty as a critical phenomenon endangering the stability of the civil commonwealth required for preservation of the citizenry as a whole.Footnote ³⁴ The aim of this subsection, however, will be to inspect whether Kant views poverty as damaging to the confidence the subject has in her own ability. While Kant advocates for social meritocracy over the privileges of a parasitic aristocracy, he seems oblivious to the harmful effects of adversity and misery on the humanity of those who suffer from it, particularly that poverty often undermines the poor’s consciousness of their civil duty. It appears that in Kant’s view, the poor must always ask himself what he can do for the commonwealth, rather than demanding help and support from it. As Flikschuh points out in her interpretation of Kant’s theory of the state, an understanding of the specific aspects of the liberal approach that Kant endorses in his political philosophy is crucial (Flikschuh Reference Katrin and Denis2010: 69). In this account of political authority, metaphysical structures take priority over the demands of individuals, who would be unable to form any sort of civil union by simply gathering their bodies and demands.Footnote ³⁵

Yet alternative readings of poverty relief as a public duty may be derived from Kant’s legal and political philosophy, as some of the interpreters mentioned argue for (Weinrib Reference Weinrib2003: 795–801; Gilabert Reference Gilabert2010: 411–413; Loriaux Reference Loriaux2020: 28–34; Blöser Reference Blöser2023: 294–297). Usually, these different accounts highlight that Kant does not disavow that poor people may ‘work [their] way up’ with the help of their effort and capacities to fulfil an active role for the commonwealth, as they have not lost their ability to support themselves especially if the state helps them to attain it. Generally, such readings hinge on the organicism underpinning Kant’s notion of the commonwealth, which claims a full-fledged reciprocity of means and ends among its social members. Moreover, Kant’s vision of an idealized liberal market does not easily lend itself to perceiving the obstacles posed by inequality and exploitation that cause economic hardship for countless people. The following well-known excerpt from the writing Theory and Practice provides a fruitful point of departure for discussing Kant’s remarks on poverty as a political concern:

Despite the many hurdles stemming from economic and social inequality, which force him to recognize a difference between passive and active citizenship, Kant truly believes ‘that anyone can work his way up from [the] passive condition to an active one’ (DR § 46, 6: 315).Footnote ³⁶ However, he neither enquires which means would best assist the subject in undertaking such a task nor how best to aid him in his struggle for social recognition.Footnote ³⁷ Thus, the reasons for the success or failure of individuals attempting to reach higher economic strata remain quite puzzling, insofar as there is nothing other than the market for labour and goods in which one can exhibit their capacities and merits. Along with this analysis of economic inequality, which Kant ascribes to the imbalance in inherited wealth stemming from a forgotten ‘original accumulation’, he also addresses the reaction of the state towards the increase in poverty as a social crisis. As the state embodies the universal will of a civil union, which does not overlap with that of society,Footnote ³⁸ Kant clearly neglects the individual experience of poverty – a demeaning situation that deprives the subject of his own autonomy – focusing rather on highlighting the social crisis the state must resolve. He tackles this issue precisely in a sequence of sections where he examines the attributes of the lawgiver in extreme, controversial, and uncertain circumstances. In this context, Kant reminds us that:

This excerpt allows focusing on the public authority of the lawgiver grounded in Kant’s legal and political philosophy, in which the economic power of some citizens is put under the control of the lawgiver. This representative of the united will of the nation may force the wealthy to guarantee the basic maintenance of those incapable of attaining any economic autonomy.Footnote ³⁹ Thus, the lawgiver must consider the needs of the citizenry as a whole in order to prevent eventual discord and upheaval, even if this economic support does not entail providing civil self-sufficiency to outcast members of society. Moreover, poverty relief will be enacted by the imposition of taxes on property or economic activity, or by public foundations providing assistance to the least fortunate members of society. Here, Kant openly argues for public funds to combat poverty, as he considers that donations often seek to profit off of the attention devoted to the poor, contributing to impoverishment among groups that were previously unaffected by this scourge.Footnote ⁴⁰ Moreover, he points out that the suggested measures should not constitute a parasitic relationship with active citizens. Put differently, Kant stresses the need to prevent care for the poor from becoming a perpetual state, which would both stifle the self-respect of the impoverished while also illegitimately burdening the self-sufficient part of the citizenry.Footnote ⁴¹ Kant claims that the state’s imposition of ‘legal levies’ on wealthy people, so that each generation can support ‘its own poor’ (DR 6: 326) is a bothersome burden, predicting that the beneficiaries of this economic aid might decide to stop trying to ‘work their own way up’, which would in turn inhibit the correct functioning of society.Footnote ⁴² On the same token, private pious and religious institutions should be averted given their potential to contribute to political paternalism, which threatens to spoil the individual initiative to overcome social obstacles.Footnote ⁴³

Given that in this context, happiness is understood as the result of individual success in the classical liberal market, following Adam Smith’s proposals, Kant does not attend to the pain and frustration inherent to the experience of poverty, which makes the impoverished completely dependent on the charity of ‘private’ others. The opposite of the impoverished subject, in Kant’s view, is the self-sufficient man, who has the wealth and property to fund his existence and has no master other than the commonwealth itself.Footnote ⁴⁴ In this sense, Kant assumes that an interdependence between individuals and their societal standing underpins the commonwealth and the understanding of civil self-sufficiency (Vrousalis Reference Vrousalis2022). Although only successful businessmen, civil officers, and independent workers may expect to be considered co-legislators, no human must be excluded in Kant’s account of citizenship, even if he cannot demonstrate active civil membership due to his lack of economic self-sufficiency. That said, the suffering of poor people is never the focus of this approach to social vulnerability, instead, they are consistently rebuked and blamed for missed actions and opportunities able to rectify their present circumstances.Footnote ⁴⁵ Kant does, however, recommend that wealthy benefactors not humiliate the needy out of respect for their value as humans (DR § 23, 6: 448–449). In this vein, it is helpful to dissect a reflection on the dark side of the classical virtue of magnanimity, praised by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics. In this passage, Kant views magnanimity as a threat to ascribing to any authority other than the will of the wealthy benefactor:

This tension between the virtue of beneficence and the legal demands for public assistance to society’s neediest individuals pervades Kant’s account of poverty and the duty of the ruler of the state to relieve it before it becomes a threat to society. I will address this in the next subsection. Although Kant’s remarks on poor people lack any solidarity and compassion in a contemporary sense, he does consider it demeaning for the poor to have to beg in the streets, rendering them dependent of the charity of others. In this sense, the beggar appears as the opposite of the individual who fulfils the duties of self-esteem as a rational and moral being. In fact, Kant even compares begging to robbery (DR 6: 326), as seen in the key passage quoted above. Furthermore, in the Lecture on Ethics Vigilantius, Kant affirms that the beggar depreciates ‘his personhood’ and with such a behaviour ‘displays the highest degree of contempt for himself’ (Eth-Vigil 27: 605), requiring the state to intervene as the primary supporter of the poor. Taking into account such excerpts, interpreters such as Allais argue for overcoming the limitations of charity and beneficence through the statist decision to intervene in order to appease the self-destructive cycle which traps the needy within the societally competitive space.Footnote ⁴⁶ Despite the evidently disparate reasoning of the Doctrine of Right and the Lectures on Ethics, it is also clear that public measures to alleviate poverty do not relinquish individual responsibility with regard to other human beings. Moreover, Kant’s awareness of the material conditions needed to exercise and concretize freedomFootnote ⁴⁷ does not demonstrate a discourse sympathetic with the demands that poor people might raise. On the contrary, the supreme commander of the civil union is entitled to obligate well off citizens to mitigate the damage that marginalized people cause for the commonwealth, without ever convening these vulnerable social groups to hear their complaints and hopes. Such a resistance against giving a voice to marginalized people outlines some limitations of Kant’s social imagination, which tends to reject the idea that vulnerable people may act as bearers of moral and political authority and thus help more advantaged subjects to enlarge their moral perception.Footnote ⁴⁸

4.2 The Moral Instinct to Alleviate the Effects of the ‘Injustice of the Government’

Kant’s account of poverty yields quite deceptive conclusions for interpreters searching for an argument for poverty relief based on compassion towards those living in vulnerable situations. Yet I would like to address, in this subsection, Kant’s call to the responsibility of all active citizens in alleviating the disfavoured situation of economically vulnerable members of the same commonwealth. As seen previously, Kant emphasizes that marginalized people belong to a commonwealth that the supreme commander is committed to protect, legitimating him to decide to tax wealthy citizens in order to maintain the worst off members of society. However, this decision stemming from the will of protecting the state and embodied in its population, does not guarantee active civil membership to the social groups benefitting from this assistance, as it is only the obligation to protect the commonwealth from any internal or external threat that guides this rationale. Thus, the social and civil advancement of individuals does not belong to this agenda, as such an advancement can only be realized by the efforts of these subjects themselves. Yet Kant discusses another aspect of economic inequality which directly addresses the personal responsibility of individual subjects, awakening their awareness of their complicity in historical injustices that their governments may have committed in the past and which might have become naturalized in the present. Kant’s view of beneficence, understood as the flipside of self-love, that is, ‘our need to be loved (helped in case of need) by others as well’ (DV 6: 393), is a key element in Kant’s struggle against unjust economic inequality. Put slightly differently, Kant views the happiness of others as an aim guaranteeing that we also will be, if necessary, ‘an end for others’ (DV 6: 393).Footnote ⁴⁹

The Lecture on Ethics Vigilantius, which focuses on the application of morals to practical life, also demonstrates this structure of interdependence underpinning Kant’s view of duty to othersFootnote ⁵⁰. It dismisses adopting, as a maxim, ‘indifference to the suffering and needs of others’ (Eth-Vigil § 12, 27: 496), even if an individual might fulfil his aims without considering his commitment to alleviate the material needs of the vulnerable.Footnote ⁵¹ This again relates to the Doctrine of Virtue, particularly to the fact that every finite rational being might, at some point, require ‘the assistance of others’ as he ‘may fall into a similarly needy condition’ (Eth-Vigil § 12, 27: 496). These excerpts provide textual evidence of the claim that Kant grounds his universal moral obligations on human vulnerability, seeking a system able to safeguard citizens from potential misfortunes. Put differently, an allegedly universal maxim of social indifference towards the suffering of others would not be in the best interest of anyone, insofar as all individuals are characterized by human frailty and the potential to be beset by future misfortune.Footnote ⁵²

Just as this possibility of misfortune and indigence argues for a moral duty to assist others, Kant also shows misgivings towards an overly enthusiastic realization of this obligation, which might risk the wealth and welfare of entire families. In this vein, Kant discusses the limits of the broad duty to provide assistance to others in need, stating that this does not command ‘determinate actions’ (DV 6: 393). In this way, prudence in the practice of beneficence must orient its realization in society. Beyond the proper exercise of duties towards others, Kant states that potentially beneficent (normally wealthy) people, should not boast about their donations and benefactions, revelling in their own generosity, insofar as their action responds to ‘the injustice of the government’ (DV § 31, 6: 454). This aforementioned public injustice is assumed to have benefited the ancestors of the presently wealthy class, while simultaneously harming the ancestors of those now poor. In this way, the subject feeling he has carried out a meritorious duty by sharing part of his wealth with the poor is admonished to view his action as a rectification of a past injustice in which he is at least somewhat complicit.Footnote ⁵³

The Lecture on Ethics Collins provides key remarks regarding the interdependence of the duties of goodwill, embodied in the duty of benevolence,Footnote ⁵⁴ and the duties of indebtedness, relying on the respect of the subject towards the sacred ‘rights of others’ (Eth-Collins 27: 415). Even if ‘[t]he right of the other should keep him secure in everything [as] it is stronger than any bulwark or wall’ (Eth-Collins 27: 415), Kant also addresses the ‘instinct of benevolence’, which he understands as a feeling inserted by Providence into the human heart to aid in the fulfilment of moral actions. It is this moral instinct – not for justice, but rather for benevolence – that will make the human being willing to rectify an injustice that may have benefited him or that he may have unwittingly performed:

This passage shows Kant’s account of justice in its fullest form, as the natural propensity to be kind and bountiful with others results in beneficent actions. That said, Kant emphasizes that such actions, once carried out, should not be ascribed to the moral quality of the doer, as he would have ‘repaid [the benefited] what [he had] helped to take away through a general injustice’ (Eth-Collins 27: 415–416). Later in these sections, Kant stresses that had individual subjects reflected on the rights of others before retaining ‘more of this world’s goods than his neighbour’ (Eth-Collins 27: 415–416) there would not be such a yawning chasm between the rich and poor of the commonwealth. In fact, this double-sided account of justice reveals the priority of the rights of other citizens with respect to the rights of the wealthy, which often arise from past injustices, that is, the original division of land. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, Kant is also concerned about the destructive impact that the instinct of benevolence might have on property rights. Therefore, he dissuades acting systematically ‘from benevolence merely’, as this would risk the property titles already authorized by the public power of the state. Furthermore, were benevolence to reign in society, all competition would vanish due to an alleged naturalization of luxury:

This ‘shadowy’ image portrays one of the most dreadful phantasies in Kant’s view: ‘the empty longing of a self-defeating Golden Age’ (CB 8: 122–123). In this situation, civilization decays because there is no need to make an effort or work to obtain material benefits or moral progress. Kant suggests that moralists and teachers be careful in preaching such acts of kindness, as he understands that good sense and measure should guide the education in benevolence.Footnote ⁵⁵ In this way, from the point of view of the agent, the broad duty towards others entails some threats. Kant’s account of benevolence also addresses the impossibility of enforcing the accomplishment of benevolent actions, at least insofar as they are not reformulated as a mandatory measure issued by the ‘supreme commander’ (DR 6: 325) of the commonwealth. Moreover, these kinds of actions belong to a special type of right, that is, equity, which can enforce coram foro interno, but not coram foro externo, insofar as one’s conscience is internal and private (Eth-Collins 27: 433). In sum, while Kant does not discard the fact that the moral consciousness of citizens might influence the perception they have of the suffering of others, he considers that there is a limitation of the ability of moral duties to shape relations among individuals.

Although both the instinct of benevolence, and the exercise of it, might lead to unduly disrespecting the rights of other citizens out of concern for marginalized people, Kant demonstrates the key role of moral education in cultivating a sound awareness of social injustice and how individuals might rectify it. To begin with, he reproaches the subject who first ensures that all his own material needs are met, ‘and thereafter thinks to pay off their tribute to the benefactor by giving something to the poor’ (Eth-Collins 27: 455). If educators could help to change this egoistic mindset, Kant assures that poverty could be eradicated from our societies – individual agents would be more conscientious in their actions, as opposed to simply donating their excess wealth to needy people, demeaning them in the process.Footnote ⁵⁶ Moreover, this approach to benevolence touches on the fact that individuals should inquire within as to whether they have partaken ‘in public and general oppressions’ (Eth-Collins 27: 432), which would render a donation not an act of spontaneous kindness, but rather the rectification of a prior misdeed.

At the same time, Kant condemns the willingness of the subject to be beneficent, as this leads to the loss of his own property and economic position, thus contravening their own rights. Kant’s moral philosophy thus encourages the individual agent to contribute, prudently, to restoring justice in contexts and situations requiring improvement.Footnote ⁵⁷ Thus, the exercise of benevolence, as in the case of other moral virtues towards others, should not jeopardize the economic status of the donor, or as previously mentioned, generate more poverty in its attempt to offset present precarity. Perhaps, for this reason, Kant decided in the Doctrine of Right to accord the state decisive agency for intervening in the social crises of precarity and indigence. As seen in this section, this account does not focus on the victims of poverty and indigence, as their voices and demands are not directly addressed. Nevertheless, maintaining the subsistence of the poor becomes a duty both for the lawgiver and the individual citizen, although their power of intervention remains quite unequal.

5.1 Kant’s Failure as Therapist: The Challenge of Marie von Herbert

As seen in the section devoted to mental disorder, Kant manifests an overt discomfort towards the mentally ill, who, in his view, cannot have a role in society, and suffer from an incurable derangement of the faculties of the mind. As a matter of fact, Kant did not see much value in addressing such anthropological profiles, beyond fleshing out a useful analysis of the characteristics and categories of illness. For this reason, Kant’s correspondence with Maria von Herbert, a woman who sent three letters to Kant searching for solace and guidance, is interesting. Of course, Kant was not a therapist, but a bachelor living in a flourishing city in eighteenth-century Prussia, which does not bode for a very promising response to Maria von Herbert’s troubles. In this subsection, I will make some conjectures regarding the reasons for Kant to leaving the last letters of this young admirer unanswered. Yet more nuanced hypotheses could be added by scholars who lay out a more comprehensive account that highlights Kant’s bewilderment towards the questions that this woman set to him after having loosely read some of his writings.Footnote ⁵⁹ In the letters, Kant views the arguments and issues raised by von Herbert as evidence of a deranged mind possessed by an uncontrolled imagination, and thus decided to cease contact with her, only responding to the first of the three. That said, the correspondence between von Herbert (who Kant referred to as ‘the little day-dreamer’ (die kleine Schwärmerin)) and Kant showcase Kant’s demanding attitude towards his acquaintances and admirers, especially women.Footnote ⁶⁰ My main aim in this section will be determining what (if any) role suffering, respect, and moral contempt play in Kant’s responses to these anguished letters.

Maria von Herbert was the sister of Franz Paul von Herbert, a member of the industrial nobility of Klagenfurt, the patron of a white lead factory, and host of an intellectual anti-monarchist circle close to Friedrich Schiller. She reached out to Kant, whose authority she worshipped as if he were a kind of God, for guidance in regaining a reason to live following a failed relationship. Von Herbert addresses Kant seeking the solace she has not found in his writings following the rupture of her relationship, which dissolved as a result of a ‘protracted lie’ regarding the existence of a previous lover who seduced her into forfeiting her feminine honour. Most likely, the former love affair Maria mentions in her first letter to Kant resulted in a son born out of wedlock (Ritter Reference Ritter and Dyck2021: 138–143), massively disrupting the life of von Herbert, as we will see in the next subsection. In these desperate circumstances, which bring to mind Jane Austen novelsFootnote ⁶¹, von Herbert implores Kant for practical advice on how to regain her lost attachment to life:

Given Kant’s aseptic attitude towards human emotions, his response to the young woman’s request, which he deemed excessive, is revealing. Prima facie he attempts to act as a ‘moral physician’ would do, not as a ‘flatterer’, conveying to von Herbert that she must pay attention to the usual parts of a religious sermon, that is, doctrine [Lehre] and discipline [Strafe], which together provide the desired solace [Trost]Footnote ⁶², once the deranged mind recovers from its previous discomfort (Letter to Maria von Herbert 1792, Corr 11: 334). The philosopher promulgates a doctrine regarding the importance of distinguishing reticence from lack of sincerity in practical behaviour: as the former acts from the fear ‘that to reveal himself completely would make him despised by others’, the latter displays falseness in the utterance of thoughts. In this way, reticence results from the finitude of human nature, and does not spoil character, while dishonesty corrupts thinking as a positive evil, given that the dishonest speaker is aware of the falsehood of his speech. According to Kant, the former relationship of Maria von Herbert has not been merely concealed, as the woman positively lied about her lover, a transgression which ‘subverts the dignity of man in our own person and attacks the root of our thinking’. (Letter to Maria von Herbert 1792, Corr 11: 332). Thus, Kant sides with the beloved man to whom von Herbert gave all of her love, and who lost his trust in her and his love for her after the young woman demonstrated herself incapable of virtue. When considering Kant’s merciless reaction to the clear emptiness and desperation that Maria von Herbert was experiencing, a key element of the correspondence is Kant’s rebuke for having lied to her former lover, having concealed the existence of a previous one. When considering the strict morals women had to respect in Kant’s time, her decision might also be considered not ‘a disclosure of [a] lie’ (Corr 11: 333), but rather a brave act of parrhesia, which few women would have dared perform in a highly patriarchal society. Kant, however, is adamant that von Herbert’s fault lies in the mendacity of her confession regarding her previous lover, as, given that she was a woman, she was expected not to have had any previous romantic experiences.Footnote ⁶³ In this case, Kant fails to appreciate that moral laws are often intertwined with social mores, which have a greater impact on women than men, as women must protect their supposed sexual honour. Thus, Kant decides to respond to the request of Maria von Herbert with a formal and neutral interpretation of honesty as moral virtue, without acknowledging the potential moral value of the confession about her previous lover. He also reminds her that life includes misfortunes which must be faced with composure. While Kant’s counsel to behave with reticence might result in more hypocrisy than virtue, yet he neglects to mention this in his evaluation of the case.Footnote ⁶⁴

It is also noteworthy that after replying to von Herbert, Kant asked a mutual acquaintance, J. B. Erhard, how she had reacted to his letter. Erhard answered that ‘[Maria von Herbert] has capsized on the reef of romantic love. In order to realize an idealistic love, she gave herself to a man who misused her trust. And then, trying to achieve such love with another, she told her new lover about the previous one’ (Corr 11: 407). While he also adds that ‘I think she could still be saved’ (Corr 11: 407) if she would have a little more délicatesse, Erhard states that ‘hypersensitivity, private delusions, and fantasies’ have spoiled von Herbert’s moral judgement and imagination, leading to regrettable consequences.

After the first letter, Maria von Herbert continued to send others to Kant, who seems to have left them unanswered. In her second letter, the woman states that ‘the commandments of morality are too trifling for me’ (Letter from Maria von Herbert 1793, Corr 11: 401) and asks Kant for advice in putting an end to the ‘unbearable emptiness of soul’ she is suffering from. She also states her intention to visit the professor in Königsberg so as to hear Kant’s ‘life story’ and what had dissuaded him from marrying and having a family. It is easy to imagine the annoyance that such a proposal might have caused in Kant, a (somewhat misogynistic) confirmed bachelor. Maria von Herbert further describes herself as seized by a state of apathy impeding her from experiencing any pleasure in life and human interaction, and even leading her to contemplate suicide. While Kant ceased replying to this uncomfortable correspondence, he did forward von Herbert’s subsequent letters to the wife of an English salesman, Elisabeth MotherbyFootnote ⁶⁵, known to be a honourable and virtuous woman. Kant seems to have sent these letters as a sort of warning to Motherby about the threats that ‘curious’ mental derangement could pose to women and their integration in society, especially as Motherby and her husband were raising a daughter. Most likely, Kant had drawn the conclusion that von Herbert’s malaise was the result of a simple mental disorder, which he considered could be solved through the application of mental effort and moral willingness to combat the nihilism so common in the human mind.

In her third letter, Marie von Herbert shares with Kant that Erhard told her that Kant had inquired about her, begging him for more moral guidance, as she feels that Kant understands better than anyone the influence his writings have had on her life. Von Herbert describes the extreme suffering she is experiencing, and continually grapples with which course of direction to follow. She also depicts her psychic suffering as turmoil resulting from antinomies, which only her decision to commit suicide helps to overcome:

While the suffering Maria von Herbert expresses in her letters seems to concern the wise professor of Königsberg, it does not move him to a compassionate attitude towards the young woman, as he also left her third letter unanswered. Von Herbert committed suicide nine years later, drowning herself in the Drau River after a family party. Eight years later, in 1811, her brother Baron Franz Paul would also commit suicide. This failed correspondence between Kant and an anguished von Herbert highlights certain interesting material conditions playing a role in the respect for human dignity. I suggest two final remarks about Kant’s strict judgement of this woman’s despair. First, Kant’s appraisal of von Herbert’s behaviour insists on the moral requirement of enduring pain, labour, and suffering, which, notably, Kant does not ascribe to the animus effeminatus, understood as ‘the inability to endure evils’ (Eth-Vigil § 103, 27: 645). Instead, Kant mentions patience, the ‘ability to get used to suffering hardships’ (Eth-Vigil §103, 27: 645), (also traditionally a more feminine than masculine trait) as a helpful psychological tool for resisting evils and misfortune. Second, Kant conjectures in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that suicide committed by individuals suffering from mental disorders is an example of cowardice – not courage – as the subject is unable in such cases to find the inner strength of will necessary for coping with the disappointments of life:

According to these anthropological remarks regarding the cultural history of suicide, Kant states that those constantly complaining about the miserable lives they must endure ultimately seek to conflate two desires into one, that is, the desire to live a long life, and the desire to feel happiness and satisfaction. Kant’s moral theory, however, seeks to foster a character able to manage all possible setbacks and difficulties. In this way, the lack of a response to Maria von Herbert seems to relate to the fact that she did not intend to reclaim her own will, but rather approached Kant attempting to use philosophy as a means to self-fulfilment. On the contrary, the human doer must be aware of the weaknesses ensuing from her finitude, and consequently exercise patience in accepting the setbacks of life with calm and composure.Footnote ⁶⁶ Such obstacles, in Kant’s view, are not seen as valid reasons for losing one’s will to live.

5.2 The Sense of Honour as a Source of Female Suffering: Kant’s Legal Plea for Unmarried Mothers

Kant focuses on the infanticides perpetrated by single mothers in a section of the Doctrine of Right (DR 6: 335–337) shedding light on certain consequences ensuing from the nature of the civil union. In his view, the situation of these women represents a quandary for penal justice, as ‘the public justice arising from the state becomes an injustice from the perspective of the justice arising from the people’ (DR 6: 337). The dilemma consists in the fact that the judge cannot take the concept of honour denied to unwed women as an illusion, but rather as a moral condition that all women should meet under threat of exclusion from society and ignominy.Footnote ⁶⁷ Given this situation, it is not completely fair that penal justice condemns the infanticide committed. Moreover, penal justice is a balance between the suspicion of cruelty and indulgency, at least until a ‘barbarous and underdeveloped’ (DR 6: 337) legislation is modified to consider the difficult situation facing women in such circumstances.Footnote ⁶⁸

My aim in this subsection will be to determine whether, in the course of his enquiry, Kant recognizes the entangled situation of single mothers resulting from the competing social pressures of motherhood and feminine honour. In my view, Kant succeeds in highlighting a social structure mired in injustice that will not be remedied until legislation ceases to sanction the torture, beat, or publicly demean vulnerable women. Various Kantian scholars have offered different interpretations of these passages from the Doctrine of Right. Timmermann claims that ‘Kant is not … advocating lenience but certain legislative reforms, which are needed to dispel the perception that capital punishment is unjust’ (Timmermann Reference Timmermann2022: 1). This interpreter dissects the discussion about maternal infanticide in a) a standard view that discards capital punishment for the mother as the newborn is considered illegitimate; b) a reading that allows punishment as sexual mores change and the child is recognized by the law; and c) an interpretation that rejects the child’s murder under any circumstance. Taking this interpretation into account, I will engage in a dialogue with sundry interpreters seeking to grasp the aims of Kant’s apparent defence of unwed women (Wood Reference Wood1999: 370, f.31; Sussman Reference Sussman2008: 33; Pascoe Reference Pascoe2011: 5; Mertens Reference Mertens2017: 461). The following passage from the Doctrine of Right analyses the thorny issue of illegitimate children:

In this account, Kant highlights the impact of shame on the decision to murder a newborn who will not be recognized by the commonwealth.Footnote ⁶⁹ Kant suggests that civil society will guarantee the survival of these children rejected due to their illegitimate origin in sexual intercourse before marriage. Timmermann (Reference Timmermann2022: 13) claims that Kant does not truly view the newborn out of wedlock as ‘contraband’ inserted illegally within the commonwealth, but rather that he describes a view of natural children common among intellectuals of his time. Cesare Beccaria, highly criticized by Kant in the section of the Doctrine of Right regarding capital punishment, argues in his well-known writing Dei delitti e delle pene that to forfeit one’s honour would entail the subject’s regression to the state of nature (Beccaria Reference Beccaria1766: 47). Since the middle ages, torture, physical punishment, and execution were common in the German legislation on both maternal infanticide and sexual intercourse before marriage.Footnote ⁷⁰ While Kant does not see capital punishment as an instrument that degrades human dignity in the case of homicides (DR 6: 463), but rather as the result of a fully realized system of public justice, he considers that religious penance demeans the human dignity of unwed mothers. This is a key element for better grasping his remarks regarding the situation of unwed women committing infanticide.

In my view, Kant does not argue for lenience in the case of infanticide committed by unwed mothers as an exception to the ruling function of penal justice regarding the enforcement of sexual mores. Thus, I fully concur with Timmermann in claiming that Kant does not regard capital punishment as the fairest legal decision against the homicide that infanticide entails. Instead, he recommends that institutions and foundling homes protect children begotten outside of wedlock.Footnote ⁷¹ As in the case of poverty relief, Kant references ‘elderly unmarried people of both sexes’ (DR 6: 326) as a key element in finding a solution to the abandonment and murder of illegitimate newborns, as ‘[elderly unmarried people] are in part to blame for there being abandoned children’ (DR 6: 326). This last remark clearly places some of the responsibility for these children born out of wedlock on male ‘confirmed bachelors’, who the passage addresses as the likely culprits of the seduction and consequent social vilification of unwed women. In any case, Kant hesitates to advance his own proposals, which he deems quite tentative, as he is aware of the difficulties of solving this problem without offending either the rule of law or morality (DR 6: 327). In this same vein, in another section regarding the rights ensuing from the nature of the civil union, Kant sets forward measures such as the following:

The recourse to unmarried bachelors of both sexes, (which likely included widowers who did not remarry) to guarantee the maintenance of illegitimate children represents a demand that the wealthy segment of the commonwealth subsidizes its most vulnerable members. Importantly, men and women are affected by different obstacles resulting from the loss of their honour. While men must cope with the label of cowardice, women face social ignominy. It is also important to highlight that in the quoted passage Kant considers newborns born out of wedlock ‘an unwelcome addition to the population’, which supports the argument that he views these births as ‘contraband’ smuggled into the commonwealth. This civil reformist agenda thus seeks to remedy the injustice stoked by the combination of barbaric religious punishments, penal justice, and morality common in Kant’s time. We cannot however, affirm, without incurring in overstatement, that Kant’s argument is motivated by his solidarity with the unfortunate fate of unmarried mothers. As we have seen before, emotions, in Kant’s view, should never guide the practical reflection.Footnote ⁷² That said, these pages of the Doctrine of Right, clearly confirm his commitment to the improvement of the German institutions managing such moral quandaries, following action taken by the monarch Frederick the Great, who implemented ‘bio-political’ measures to detect clandestine pregnancies in Prussia and thus avoid eventual murders of newborns.Footnote ⁷³

The actions of the public authority regarding crimes related to female honour are intertwined, to some extent, with a history of ‘bio-politics’, as the vulnerabilities and strengths of the population are intended to offset the shortcomings of excluded social groups. Once again, Kant does not provide an account of social suffering based on the direct experience of unmarried mothers. That said, his view of the commonwealth still promotes providing support to those unfortunate individuals who have fallen into social dishonour, appealing to their inalienable human dignity, as in the case of poverty. Moreover, Kant seems to focus on the fact that infanticide of children born out of wedlock could be avoided if due measures were taken, which would also free these women from the oppression of religious authorities. Here, then, he manifests some awareness of the fact that the commonwealth should not ostracize dishonoured women, but on the contrary, provide them support in grappling with the threat of social ignominy through a regulated cooperation of individuals (taxation of bachelors of both sexes) – and the public authority (the foundation of foundling institutions run by the state). In sum, the Kantian commonwealth is quite sensitive to the barbaric spectacle of women suffering social condemnation, and does promote a determined agenda to progressively reduce the tensions between morality and right. In Kant’s view, individual agents are to be charged with a social responsibility that the public authority embodied in the lawgiver must also secure.Footnote ⁷⁴