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Mathematical Pluralism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2024
Summary
Mathematical pluralism is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of pure mathematical structures, each with their own internal logics; and that qua pure mathematical structures they are all equally legitimate. Mathematical pluralism is a relatively new position on the philosophical landscape. This Element provides an introduction to the position.
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- Online ISBN: 9781009091640Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 18 April 2024
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