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Series: Elements in Epistemology
Reliabilism and its Rivals
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2026
Summary
According to reliabilism, whether a belief is justified is a matter of whether it was reliably formed. Reliabilism is one of the leading theories of justification, and it holds important explanatory advantages: it sheds light on the connection between justification and truth, and it offers to situate justification within a naturalistic worldview. However, reliabilism faces well-known problems. One promising strategy for overcoming these problems is to modify reliabilism, combining it with elements of views that have been traditionally regarded as rivals, such as evidentialism. This Element offers an opinionated survey of the prospects for reliabilist epistemology, paying particular attention to recent reliabilist-evidentialist hybrid views.
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- Series: Elements in EpistemologyOnline ISBN: 9781009645485Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 05 February 2026
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