Element contents
Wittgenstein and Russell
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 February 2024
Summary
Responding to Russell is a constant throughout Wittgenstein's philosophizing. This Element focuses on Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's theories of judgment in the summer of 1913. Wittgenstein's response to these criticisms is of first-rate importance for his early philosophical development, setting the path to the conceptions of proposition and of logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This Element also touches on further aspects of Wittgenstein's responses to Russell: the rejection of Russell's and Frege's logicisms in the Tractatus, the critique of Russell's causal-behavioristic philosophy of mind in Wittgenstein's 'middle' period, the Russellian origins of notions of privacy dialectically treated in Philosophical Investigations, and the discussion of 'surveyability' of mathematical proof in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which is, again, a response to Russellian logicism.
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Online ISBN: 9781108946858Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 28 March 2024
Bibliography
Brentano, F. C. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, vol. 1. Duncker & Humblot.Google Scholar
Church, A. (1976). “Comparison of Russell’s Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with That of Tarski”. Journal of Symbolic Logic 41(4): 747–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Connelly, J. (2011). “On Props, Wittgenstein’s June 1913 Letter, and Russell’s Paralysis.” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 31(2): 141–66.Google Scholar
Connelly, J. (2014). “Russell and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Judgement.” Theoria 80(3): 232–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Connelly, J. (2021). Wittgenstein’s Critique of Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement. Anthem.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, D. (1969). “On Saying That”, In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Clarendon, 93–108.Google Scholar
Diamond, C. (1991). “What Nonsense Might Be,” In The Realistic Spirit. MIT Press, 95–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diamond, C. (2000). “Does Bismarck Have a Beetle in His Box?” In Crary, A. and Read, R., editors, The New Wittgenstein. Routledge, 262–92.Google Scholar
Diamond, C. (2018). “Commentary on José Zalabardo’s ‘the Tractatus on Unity.’” Australasian Philosophical Review 2(3): 272–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dreben, B., and Floyd, J. (1991). “Tautology: How Not to Use a Word.” Synthese 87: 23–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elkind, L. D. C., and Landini, G., eds. (2018). The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Springer.Google Scholar
Engelmann, M. L. (2018). “Phenomenology in Grammar.” In Kuusela, O., Ometităa, M., and Uçan, T., eds. Wittgenstein and Phenomenology. Routledge, 22–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
(manuscript). Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Remarks.Google Scholar
Fisher, D. and McCarty, C. (2016). “Reconstructing a Logic from Tractatus.” In Costreie, S., ed. Early Analytic Philosophy. Springer, 301–24.Google Scholar
Floyd, J. (2001). “Number and Ascriptions of Number in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.” In Floyd, J. and Shieh, S., eds. Future Pasts. Oxford University Press, 145–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Floyd, J. (2021). Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Floyd, J. (2022). “‘Surveyability’ in Hilbert, Wittgenstein and Turing.” Philosophies 7.Google Scholar
Floyd, J. and Kanamori, A. (2016). “Gödel vis-á-vis Russell.” In Crocco, G. and Engelen, E. M., eds. Kurt Gödel. Presses Universitaires de Provence, 243–376.Google Scholar
Floyd, J. and Shieh, S. (forthcoming). “Modality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.” In Zalabardo, J., ed. The Tractatus: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Frascolla, P. (1997). “The Tractatus System of Arithmetic.” Synthese 112(3): 353–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frege, G. (1979). Posthumous Writings. Ed. Hermes, H., Kambartel, F., and Kaulbach, F.. Trans. Long, P. and White, R.. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Giaretta, P. (1997). “Analysis and Logical Form in Russell: The 1913 Paradigm.” Dialectica 51(4): 273–93.Google Scholar
Goldfarb, W. D. (1989). “Russell’s Reasons for Ramification.” In Savage and Anderson 1989, 24–40.Google Scholar
Goldfarb, W. D. (2018). “Wittgenstein against Logicism.” In Reck, E. H., ed. Logic, Philosophy of Mathematics, and Their History. College Publications, 171–83.Google Scholar
Griffin, N. (1985). “Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.” Philosophical Studies 47(2): 213–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Griffin, N. (1991). “Was Russell Shot or Did He Fall?” Dialogue 30(4): 549–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Halimi, B. (2013). “Structured Variables.” Philosophia Mathematica 21(2): 220–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hanks, P. W. (2007). “How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.” Synthese 154(1): 121–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hintikka, J. (1956). “Identity, Variables, and Impredicative Definitions.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 21: 225–45.Google Scholar
Hochberg, H. (1976). “Russell’s Attack on Frege’s Theory of Meaning.” Philosophia 18: 9–34.Google Scholar
Hylton, P. (1990). Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Johnston, C. (2012). “Russell, Wittgenstein, and Synthesis in Thought.” In Zalabardo, J., ed. Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 15–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jubien, M. (2001). “Propositions and the Objects of Thought.” Philosophical Studies 104(1): 47–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klement, K. C. (2004). “Putting Form before Function: Logical Grammar in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein.” Philosopher’s Imprint 4(4): 1–47.Google Scholar
Klement, K. C. (2010). “The Functions of Russell’s No-Class Theory.” Review of Symbolic Logic 3(4): 633–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kremer, M. (2002). “Mathematics and Meaning in Tractatus.” Philosophical Investigations 25(3): 272–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landini, G. (1991). “A New Interpretation of Russell’s Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment.” History and Philosophy of Logic, 37–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landini, G. (1998). Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landini, G. (2007). Wittgenstein’s Apprenticeship with Russell. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landini, G. (2014). “Types* and Russellian Facts.” In Linsky, B. and Wishon, D., eds. Essays on The Problems of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, 233–75.Google Scholar
Landini, G. (2021a). Repairing Bertrand Russell’s 1913 Theory of Knowledge. Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landini, G. (2021b). “Tractarian Logicism.” Review of Symbolic Logic 14(1): 973–1010.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lebens, S. (2017). Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions. Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levine, J. (2004). “On the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ Argument and Its Bearing on Frege’s Theory of Sense.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 251–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levine, J. (2013). “Principia Mathematica, the Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment and Molecular Facts.” In Griffin, N. and Linsky, B., eds. The Palgrave Centenary Companion to Principia Mathematica. Macmillan, 247–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Linsky, B. (1999). Russell’s Metaphysical Logic. Center for the Study of Language and Information.Google Scholar
Linsky, B. (2011). The Evolution of Principia Mathematica. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Linsky, B. (2018). “The Near Riot over Negative Facts.” In Elkind and Landini 2018, 181–97.Google Scholar
MacBride, F. (2013). “The Russell–Wittgenstein Dispute: A New Perspective.” In Textor, M., ed. Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Macmillan, 206–41.Google Scholar
Marion, M. (1998). Wittgenstein, Finitism, and the Foundations of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Moltmann, F. (2003). “Propositional Attitudes without Propositions.” Synthese 135: 70–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1901). “Truth and Falsity.” In Baldwin, J. M., ed. Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. Vol. 1. Macmillan, 716–18.Google Scholar
Mühlhölzer, F. (2005). “‘A Mathematical Proof Must Be Surveyable.’” Grazer Philosophische Studien 71: 57–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Narboux, J. P. (2009). “Négation et totalité dans le Tractatus de Wittgenstein.” In Chauviré, C., ed. Lire le Tractatus de Wittgenstein. Vrin, 127–76.Google Scholar
Pears, D. F. (1977). “The Relation between Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory of Propositionsand Russell’s Theories of Judgment.” Philosophical Review 177–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pears, D. F. (1989). “Russell’s 1913 Theory of Knowledge Manuscript.” In Savage and Anderson 1989, 169–82.Google Scholar
Perovic, K. (2018). “Can We Be Positive about Russell’s Negative Facts?” In Elkind and Landini 2018, 199–218.Google Scholar
Pincock, C. (2008). “Russell’s Last (and Best) Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgement.” Mind 117(465): 107–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Potter, M. D. (2009). “The Logic of the Tractatus.” In Gabbay, D. M. and Woods, J., eds. Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 5. Elsevier, 255–304.Google Scholar
Proops, I. (2002). “The Tractatus on Inference and Entailment.” In Reck 2002, 283–307.Google Scholar
Proops, I. (2011). “Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions.” Philosophical Review 120(2): 151–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1961).“Logic and the Reificationof Universals.” In From a Logical Point of View. 2nd ed. Harvard University Press, 102–29.Google Scholar
Reck, E. H., ed. (2002). From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rhees, R., ed. (1984). Recollections of Wittgenstein: Hermine Wittgenstein, Fania Pascal, F. R. Leavis, John King, M. O’C. Drury. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ricketts, T. (1996). “Pictures, Logic, and the Limits of Sense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.” In Sluga, H. and Stern, D. G., eds. The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge University Press, 59–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ricketts, T. (2013). “Logical Segmentation and Generality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.” In Potter, M. D. and Sullivan, P. M., eds. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rogers, B. and Wehmeier, K. F. (2012). “Tractarian First-Order Logic: Identity and the N-operator.” Review of Symbolic Logic 5(4): 538–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rumfitt, I. (1994). “Frege’s Theory of Predication: An Elaboration and Defense, with Some New Applications.” Philosophical Review, 599–637.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, B. (1904). “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (III).” Mind 13(52): 509–24.Google Scholar
Russell, B. (1905a). “Necessity and Possibility.” In The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Vol. 4. Ed. Urquhart, A. and Lewis. Routledge, A. C., 507–20.Google Scholar
Russell, B. (1906a). “On Substitution.” In The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Vol. 5. Ed. Routledge, G. H. Moore., 129–232.Google Scholar
Russell, B. (1906b). “On the Nature of Truth.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 7: 28–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, B. (1910–11). “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11: 108–28. (KAKD).Google Scholar
Russell, B. (1910). “On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood.” In Philosophical Essays. Longmans, Green, 147–59. (NTF).Google Scholar
Russell, B. (1912b). “What Is Logic?” In The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Vol. 6. Ed. Slater, J. G. and Frohmann, B.. Routledge, 55–6.Google Scholar
Russell, B. (1919b). “On Propositions.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, (2), 1–43. (OP).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Russell, B. (1944). “Replies to Criticisms.” In Schilpp, P. A., ed. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. Open Court, 680–741.Google Scholar
Russell, B. (1984). The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Vol. 7: Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript. Ed. Eames, E. R. and Blackwell, K.. George Allen & Unwin.Google Scholar
Savage, C. W. and Anderson, C. A., eds. (1989). Rereading Russell. University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Van der Schaar, M. (2013). G. F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sheffer, H. M. (1913).“A Set of Five Independent Postulates for Boolean Algebras, with Application to Logical Constants.” Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 14(4): 481–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shieh, S. (2012). “Logic, Modality, and Metaphysics in Early Analytic Philosophy.” In Haaparanta, L. and Koskinen, H., eds. Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic. Oxford University Press, 293–318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shieh, S. (2014). “In What Way Does Logic Involve Necessity?” Philosophical Topics 42(2): 289–337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shieh, S. (2015). “How Rare Is Chairman Mao?” In Weiss, B., ed. Dummett on Analytical Philosophy. Macmillan, 84–121.Google Scholar
Shieh, S. (2017). “Pragmatism, Apriority, and Modality: C. I. Lewis against Russell’s Material Implication.” In Sachs, C. and Olen, P., eds. Pragmatism in Transition. Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Shieh, S. (2019). Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy. Vol.1: Necessity Lost. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Shieh, S. (2021). “ Strict Implication and the Pragmatic A Priori.” In Kammer, Q., Narboux, J. P., and Wagner, H., eds. C. I. Lewis. Routledge, 104–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shieh, S. (2022). “On Attempting to Solve the Direction Problem.” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 42: 132–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shieh, S. (forthcoming). Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy. Vol. 2: Necessity Regained. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Soames, S. (2014). The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy. Vol. 1: The Founding Giants. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Soames, S. (2017). The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy. Vol. 2: A New Vision. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Sommerville, S. (1981). “Wittgenstein to Russell (July 1913): ‘ Am Very Sorry to Hear ... My Objection Paralyses You.’ ” In R. Haller and W. Grassl, eds. Proceedings of the 4th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 182–8.Google Scholar
Stanley, J. and Williamson, T. (2001). “Knowing How.” Journal of Philosophy 98(8): 411–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stern, D. G. (1995). Wittgenstein on Mind and Language. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stern, D. G. (2007).“Wittgenstein,the Vienna Circle, and Physicalism, a Reassessment.” In Richardson, A. and Uebel, T., eds. The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press, 305–31.Google Scholar
Stevens, G. (2003). “Re-examining Russell’s Paralysis: Ramified Type-Theory and Wittgenstein’s Objection to Russell’s Theory of Judgment.” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 23(1): 5–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stout, G. F. (1910). “The Object of Thought and Real Being.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11: 187–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sullivan, P. M. (2001). “A Version of the Picture Theory.” In Vossenkuhl, W., ed. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Akademie, 89–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Turnau, P. (1991). “Russell’s Argument against Frege’s Sense-Reference Distinction.” Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 11: 52–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weiss, M. (2017). “Logic in the Tractatus.” Review of Symbolic Logic 10(1): 1–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Whitehead, A. N. and Russell, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press. (PM).Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1913). “Notes on Logic.” In Notebooks, 1914–1916. Trans. Anscombe, G. E. M.. 2nd ed. Blackwell, 93–107. (NL).Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. Ramsey, F. P.. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1975). Philosophical Remarks. Trans. White, R. and Hargreaves, R.. University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1978). Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Trans. Anscombe, G. E. M.. revised. MIT Press. (RFM).Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1979). Notebooks, 1914–1916. Ed. von Wright, G. H. and Anscombe, G. E. M.. Trans. Anscombe, G. E. M.. 2nd ed. Blackwell. (NB).Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1997). Philosophical Investigations. Trans. Anscombe, G. E. M.. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (2008). Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Ed. Blackwell, B. McGuinness.. (WC).Google Scholar
- 1
- Cited by