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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein and Social Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2025

Annalisa Coliva
Annalisa Coliva
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine

Summary

The last twenty years have witnessed a 'social turn' in analytic philosophy. Social epistemology has been crucial to it. Social epistemology starts by repudiating the kind of individualistic epistemology, which, since Descartes' Meditations and through Kant's maxim 'Think for yourself', has dominated philosophy. It is a sign of the deep erasure of Wittgenstein's ideas from many debates in analytic philosophy that neither his views against fundamental tenets of individualistic epistemology, nor his positive contribution to key themes in social epistemology are considered.This Element on Wittgenstein and Social Epistemology is the first comprehensive study of the implications of the later Wittgenstein's ideas for key issues at the core of present-day social epistemology, such as the nature of common sense and its relations to common knowledge; testimony and trust; deep disagreements in connection with genealogical challenges; and the meaning of 'woman' and the role of self-identification in the determination of gender.
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Keywords

Wittgensteinsocial epistemologyfeminist philosophydisagreementtrust

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Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
Online ISBN: 9781009551311
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 14 August 2025

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Wittgenstein and Social Epistemology
  • Annalisa Coliva, University of California, Irvine
  • Online ISBN: 9781009551311
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Wittgenstein and Social Epistemology
  • Annalisa Coliva, University of California, Irvine
  • Online ISBN: 9781009551311
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Wittgenstein and Social Epistemology
  • Annalisa Coliva, University of California, Irvine
  • Online ISBN: 9781009551311
Available formats
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