Element contents
Wittgenstein on Aspect Perception
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 November 2020
Summary
The perception of what he calls 'aspects' preoccupied Wittgenstein and gave him considerable trouble in his final years. The Wittgensteinian aspect defies any number of traditional philosophical dichotomies: the aspect is neither subjective (inner, metaphysically private) nor objective; it presents perceivable unity and sense that are (arguably) not (yet) conceptual; it is 'subject to the will', but at the same time is normally taken to be genuinely revelatory of the object perceived under it. This Element begins with a grammatical and phenomenological characterization of Wittgensteinian 'aspects'. It then challenges two widespread ideas: that aspects are to be identified with concepts; and that aspect perception has a continuous version that is characteristic of (normal) human perception. It concludes by proposing that aspect perception brings to light the distinction between the world as perceived and the world as objectively construed, and the role we play in the constitution of the former.
Information
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Online ISBN: 9781108878012Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 26 November 2020
References
Agam-Segal, R. (2019). ‘Avner Baz on Aspects and Concepts: A Critique’. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1610049CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austin, J. L. (1999). How to Do Things With Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Baylis, G. C. and Driver, J. (1995). ‘One-sided edge assignments in vision: figure-ground segmentation and attention to objects’. Current Directions in Psychological Science 4(5): 140–146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baz, A. (2000). ‘What’s the Point of Seeing Aspects?’. Philosophical Investigations 23(2): 97–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baz, A. (2003). ‘On When Words are Called For: Cavell, McDowell, and the Wording of Our World’, Inquiry 46(4): 473–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baz, A. (2010). ‘On Learning from Wittgenstein, or What Does it Take to See the Grammar of Seeing Aspects?’. In Seeing Wittgenstein Anew. Day, W. and Krebs, V. (eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press: 227–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baz, A. (2011). ‘Aspect Perception and Philosophical Difficulty’. In Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, McGinn, Marie and Kuusela, Oskari (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press: 697–713.Google Scholar
Baz, A. (2012). When Words are Called For. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baz, A. (2017a). The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Baz, A. (2017b). ‘Motivational Indeterminacy’. European Journal of Philosophy 25(2): 336–57.Google Scholar
Baz, A. (2018). ‘Wittgenstein and the Difficulty of What Normally Goes Without Saying’. In Language, Form(s) of Life, and Logic: Investigations after Wittgenstein. Martin, C. (ed.). New York: de Gruyter: 253–276.Google Scholar
Baz, A. (2019). ‘Bringing the Phenomenal World into View’. In Wittgenstein on Objectivity, Intuition, and Meaning. Conant, James and Greve, Sebastian (eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press: 100–118.Google Scholar
Baz, A. (2020). The Significance of Aspect Perception: Bringing the Phenomenal World into View. New York: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Block, N. (2010). ‘Attention and Mental Paint’. Philosophical Issues 20(1): 23–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Block, N. (2014). ‘Seeing-As in the Light of Vision Science’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89(3): 560–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eilan, N. (2013). ‘On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein’s Response to Kohler’. Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy 2(3): 1–19.Google Scholar
Floyd, J. (2010). ‘On Being Surprised: Wittgenstein on Aspect-Perception, Logic, and Mathematics. In Seeing Wittgenstein Anew. Day, W. and Krebs, V. (eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press: 314–337.Google Scholar
Frege, G. (1999). The Foundations of Arithmetic. Austin, J. L. (trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.Google Scholar
Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. David Carr (trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.Google Scholar
Husserl, E. (1998). The Paris Lectures. Koestenbaum, P. (trans.). Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Guyer, P. and Wood, A. (trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kant, I. (2000). Critique of the Power of Judgment. Guyer, Paul (ed.), Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Koffka, K. (1927). The Growth of the Mind: An Introduction to Child-Psychology (second edition), M. R. Ogden (trans.). New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.Google Scholar
Köhler, W. (1947). Gestalt Psychology: An Introduction to New Concepts in Modern Psychology. New York: Liveright.Google Scholar
McGinn, M. (1997). Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
McGinn, M. (2010). ‘Wittgenstein and Internal Relations’, European Journal of Philosophy 18(4): 495–509.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1968). The Visible and the Invisible. Lefort, C. (ed.), and Lingis, A. (trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.Google Scholar
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1996/2012). Phenomenology of Perception. Colin Smith (trans.)/Donald Landes (trans). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Modiano, P. (1999). Dora Bruder. Kilmartin. J. (trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Mulhall, S. (1990). On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Mulhall, S. (2001). ‘Seeing Aspects’. In Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader. Glock, H-J (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Schroeder, S. (2010). ‘A Tale of Two Problems: Wittgenstein’s Discussion of Aspect Perception’, in Cottingham, J. & Hacker, P.M.S. (eds.), Mind, Method, and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny. New York: Oxford University Press: 352–371.Google Scholar
Searle, J. (2015). Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Strawson, P. (1982). ‘Imagination and Perception’. In Kant on Pure Reason. Charles, Ralph Walker, Sutherland (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press: 82–99. (Originally published in Experience and Theory, Foster and Swanson (eds.). Amherst, Mass. and London: University of Massachusetts Press and Duckworth, 1971.)Google Scholar
Travis, C. (2015). ‘Suffering Intentionally?’. In Wittgenstein and Perception. Campbell, M. and O’Sullivan, M. (eds.). New York: Routledge: 45–62.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty. Anscombe, G. E. M. and von Wright, G. H. (eds.). Anscombe, G. E. M. (trans.). New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1980a). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I, Anscombe, G. E. M. and von Wright, G. H. (eds.), tr. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1980b). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II, Anscombe, G. E. M. and von Wright, G. H. (eds.), tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1980c). Culture and Value, von Wright, G. H. (ed.), Winch, P. (tr.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1982). Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I, von Wright, G. H. and Nyman, H. (eds.), tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1983). Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, Barrett, Cyril (ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (1992). Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II, von Wright, G. H. and Nyman, H. (eds.), tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Pears, D. and McGuinness, B. (trans.). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (2009a). Philosophical Investigations, Part I, G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (trans.). Malden, MA: Basil-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. (2009b). Philosophical Investigations, Part II, G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (trans.). Malden, MA: Basil-Blackwell, 2009.Google Scholar
Wollheim, R. (1980). Art and Its Objects (second edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Accessibility standard: Unknown
Why this information is here
This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.Accessibility Information
Accessibility compliance for the HTML of this element is currently unknown
and may be updated in the future.
- 19
- Cited by