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Wittgenstein on Logic and Philosophical Method
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 May 2022
Summary
This Element outlines Wittgenstein's early and later philosophies of logic, and explains Wittgenstein's views regarding the methodological significance of logic for philosophy. Wittgenstein's early philosophy of logic is presented as a further development of Frege's and Russell's accounts of logic, and Wittgenstein later philosophy as a response to problems with his early views, including confusions about idealization and abstraction in logic. The later Wittgenstein's novel logical methods, such as the method of language-games, are outlined, and the new kind of logical naturalism developed in his later philosophy described. I conclude by discussing the later Wittgenstein on names.
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- Online ISBN: 9781108981125Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 23 June 2022
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