1 The UN Unit on Apartheid has published valuable surveys, including ST/PSCA/SER.A/10 of 1970: “Industrialization, foreign capital and forced labour in South Africa,” by Sean Gervasi. See also, for capital inflows, ST/PSCA/SER.A/11, also of 1970: “Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa.“

2 e.g.. Dr. N. Diederichs, a prominent Afrikaner National Party leader: “We are the bearers of the values that made the West great. We are Europe in Africa.” [Sunday Express, Johannesburg, 17 December 1967). And Prime Minister Vorster: “We are of Africa, we understand Africa, and nothing is going to prevent us from becoming the leaders of Africa in every field.” (Newscheck, 8 November 1968).

3 U.S. News and World Report, 14 November 1966.

4 Sunday Express, Johannesburg, 11 December 1966.

5 House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 14 May 1968.

6 R. , Molteno, Africa andSouth Africa, Africa Bureau, London 1971 p. 9.Google Scholar

7 R. Blankenheimer to the Executive Association of South Africa, 21 January 1970: “South Africa's Role in Africa: An American Viewpoint”.

8 United Nations document: A/9023/Add.3 of 19 September 1973 .

9 Financial Times, London, 14 June 1973.

10 See United Nations document: A/9023 (Part III ).

11 Ibid.

12 Amilcar Cabral: The fundamental characteristic of Portuguese colonialism in our time is a very simple fact: Portuguese colonialism, or, if you prefer it, the Portuguese economic infrastructure, is unable to afford itself the luxury of neocolonialism. It is from this point that we can understand the stubborn hostility of Portuguese colonialism towards our peoples. (Address at Dar es Salaam in 1965, published in French in La Lutte de Liberation nationale dans les Colonies portugaises. Algiers, Information CONCP, Algiers. Or, from a different angle of approach, A. R. Wilkinson, “Insurgency in Rhodesia 1957-1973,” Adelphi Paper No. 100, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1973, p. 29: Portugal, one of Europe's least developed countries and heavily reliant on exclusive access to its colonial market and raw materials was not in a position to follow the example of France and Britain who, with their wider interests, had much less reason to fear foreign competition and were, therefore, able to exercise indirect economic and political influence in their erstwhile colonies.

13 Details of constitutional modifications are summarized in United Nations document: A/9023/Add.3.

14 United Nations document: A/9023 (Part IV) .

15 In Portuguese-controlled Africa “the foreign investor (now) enjoys a higher priority than the Portuguese investor… “ Financial Times, London, 23 July 1969. Since 1964, “there is only a limited number of activities in which a majority of Portuguese capital is required. More important, any mining activity may be 100 percent foreignowned or financed.” ibid.

16 A point carefully noted by the liberation movements: e.g., Mozambique Revolution (organ of FRELIMO), 25 September 1969, p. 10: “Another contradiction within Portugal's colonial and foreign policy is that while it needs South Africa's support to maintain Mozambique and Angola (as Portuguese colonies), it is also afraid of a South African takeover of these regimes, with the support of the whites resident there…“

17 United Nations document: A/9023 (Part IV), for other figures in this paper on Portuguese defense spending.

18 United Nations document: A/8723/Rev.1.

19 Wilkinson, “Insurgency in Rhodesia,” p. 38: Portugal's continued military presence in the African territories is to a considerable extent dependent on her NATO membership. She manufactures her own small arms and light automatics—some of them, like the NATO Type G-3, are made under West German licence. In 1966 West Germany sold Portugal 40 Fiat G-91 fighter-bombers. These aircraft, originally designed for NATO defence requirements, are also suitable for COIN (counterinsurgency) role, since the G-91 needs only a short runway. Between 1967 and 1969 Portugal received four frigates and four submarines from France and is also supplied with French Alouette helicopters and Nordatlas transport aircraft. Without assistance from the NATO countries, the Portuguese war effort could not be sustained for very long.

20 Ibid., p. 42: Not desiring any question about its capacity to control these territories, Lisbon has always denied the presence of South African or Rhodesian armed units—whether troops or armed police—and Pretoria and Salisbury have, of course, complied with this wish for discretion. At the same time, Lisbon has thought it useful to emphasize its own importance in the region. The end of Portugal in Africa would threaten the end of South Africa and Rhodesia as well, the Portuguese PrimeMinister, Dr. Caetano, said yesterday. If Portugal pulled out, he said, it would not only be Angola and Mozambique who would be the victims of “African independence madness“ that aimed to expel the whites. It would create a threat to South Africa and Rhodesia, a threat effective and immediate because of an economic blockade of those east-coast ports vital to their substance—Beira and Lourenjo Marques. (Band Daily Mail. Johannesburg, 27 July 1973).

21 See Ahmad, Barakat, “South Africa's Military Establishment”, UN Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 25/72, December 1972.Google Scholar Unconfirmed but evidently well-based reports in 1973 indicated that South African forces outside the Republic might then number some 4,000 in Rhodesia and 2,000-4,000 in Tete district of Mozambique, as well as a considerably larger force in the Caprivi strip of northeastern Namibia and in northern Namibia to the west of the Strip. The total could be taken to be a minimum of 12,000 in Rhodesia, Mozambique and Namibia, though it may well be larger. That it could certainly be much enlarged, at least on a short-run basis, is shown by comparing it with total army strength, normally at a level of 10,000 regular troops and 80,000 trained reserves in “citizen” (or “commando“) units, as well as “a large Police Force of about 30,000 loc. cit. In a standing emergency, moreover, these forces could certainly be further increased. It should be noted, however, that the 80,000 individuals who comprise the “citizen force” and “commandos” are all whites of whom a majority, normally occupy positions of control or command, or other administrative responsibility, in the economic life of South Africa. How far the system could spare a large proportion of them for long-term service outside the Republic must be a question of great pregnancy for the twenty-three generals who now command the Defence Force of the Republic.

22 “The Coloured Corps”, drawn from the Coloured community of South Africa as distinct as distinct from the Bantu (i.e., fully indigenous African) community, was established in April, 1963, for administrative jobs such as drivers, guards, stretcher bearers, cooks, clerks and storemen. I t is an integral part of the Armed Forces units. The training of its members in the use of weapons is limited to “the handling of single-shot small arms for self-defence and the protection of Government property.” (Barakat Ahmad, “South Africa's Military Establishment,” p. 8.)

23 The Times. London, 23 December 1970.

24 The Daily Telegraph, London, 24 December 1970 .

25 Long manifest in meetings between Portuguese and South African military commanders and staff officers; in intelligence exchange and joint planning, etc. (e.g., 77ie Times, London, 12 March 1968.)

26 The Times, London, 17 June 1974.

27 Al J. Venter, Portugal's War in GuinS-Bissau, Munger Africana Librarv Notes, California Inst, of Technology, Pasadena, 1973.

28 Venter, p. 191 .

29 The Daily Telegraph, London, 21 June 1974.

30 Vvhen speaking at a press conference in Lourenco Marques, 11 May 1974

31 By the middle of June there were probably several dozen parties or. would-be movements in Angola, mainly on a regional or provincial basis of appeal. Many of these were no doubt perfectly genuine responses to a regained political freedom, or at least partial freedom: of such was the Frente Democratica da Huila, and others like it elsewhere in the country. But trends of the Mozambican type of Joana SimKo-GUMO were also on the scene, and were the beneficiaries of a fond official attention. Thus the Luanda press of June 22, notably O Comercio, gives prominent space to the formation of a movement called the Uniao Nacionalista Angolana, and its leader Engineer Angelino Alberto, who is presented as an important and serious leader of African nationalist opinion—just as Joana Simao had been so presented in Lourengo Marques. Engineer Alberto was eager to show that UNA was not a new body but had been founded, as Nto-Bako, long before. He was quite right in this, but perhaps he was not quite wise from his own point of view. For the public record of Nto-Bako (Nto-Bako Angola, to give it its fuller name) is one of long-standing and more or less complete collaboration with, if not subservience to, the Portuguese colonial authorities. Alberto himself has long acted as a Portuguese agent in one form or another, and, according to John Marcum (Revolution in Angola, MIT Press, vol.1, p. 93, 1969), was after 1961 “a collaborator with the Portuguese police in Angola.” Marcum describes him as a former bus conductor. Travellers' reports late in June said that UNA was much promoted in the western districts as a main opponent of MPLA. The inferences are obvious.

32 The Paris fortnightly Afrique-Asie (21 July 1974) published the texts (in French translation) of three long and extremely detailed letters attributed, apparently on sure grounds, to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. The first was addressed to General Luz Cunha when the latter was Portuguese commander-in-chief in Angola, and was dated 26 September 1972; the second was to Lt. Col. Ramires de Oliviera, then chief of the Portuguese army staff in the eastern operational zone, based in Luso, and dated 25 October 1972; and the third was also to Col. de Oliviera, dated 7 November 1973. The same issue also printed one reply to Savimbi from Col. de Oliviera, dated 4 November 1972. The texts bear on a variety of forms of close but concealed cooperation between the Portuguese armed forces and Savimbi and UNITA, and appear to be of a kind which would be very hard to fabricate.