The end of the Cold War wrought a shift in international legal priorities and preoccupations, including among feminists. When feminist approaches to international law, particularly to human rights and humanitarian law, began to make headway in the early 1990s, they had already left behind some of the anti-imperial and anti-military emphases of much of the internationally informed feminism of the 1970s and 80s. Here, I revisit some of those Cold War feminist approaches, with the hope of informing today's much-needed international legal attention to peace, disarmament—including nuclear disarmament—and global inequality.

Rescuing the “other woman” has been an intractable feature of international and human rights legal interventions. This rescue narrative configures the “other woman,” invariably third world or from the Global South, as left behind in the movement toward progress and modernity. Part of the solution envisages the rescue and incorporation of the “other woman” into liberal rights discourse—the teleological endpoint of emancipation. Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and postcolonial feminist critiques have exposed the racial and civilizational discourses that shape these rescue missions and the epistemic violence they engender. Using the example of the military invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 2001–2021, I demonstrate how these discourses persist in contemporary women's human rights agendas and the carceral and securitized logics that they serve. I discuss the need to delink rights from rescue missions and the epistemic shifts required to move the critique in a meaningful and productive direction.

Advancing the goals of feminist international law in the twenty-first century requires renewed commitment to universality, and a deft multi-directionality. The iconic 1989 demonstration organized by British Asian women in support of the writer Salman Rushdie, condemned to death by a fatwa from Ayatollah Khomeini, provides a helpful metaphor. Campaigners from Southall Black Sisters and Women Against Fundamentalism led the protest carrying signs proclaiming: “A Women's Place Is in the World,” and “Our Tradition Is Struggle, Not Submission.”1 The women stood between two groups of men: a phalanx of British Muslim fundamentalist demonstrators denouncing Rushdie and calling for blasphemy laws, and white far right National Front protestors who opposed those fundamentalists with racist rhetoric. The women human rights defenders (WHRDs) challenged both groups of men, were threatened by both. Though encircled, they were determined to create their own space for multi-directional resistance.

In The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Critique (Boundaries),1 amidst observations about masculine bias in treaty law, co-authors Christine Chinkin and Hilary Charlesworth queried the masculine configuration, i.e., the gender of jus cogens or peremptory norms. A peremptory norm is “accepted and recognized by the international community . . . as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of international law having the same character.”2 Interrogating whether jus cogens privileged the experiences of males over that of females, they challenged jus cogens’ presumed universality and its intended utility. Accepted peremptory norms, they averred, exerted a silencing, deleterious impact on core feminine values such as sexual equality or freedom from gender discrimination.3 Decades after the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (VCLT) codification of jus cogens, the International Law Commission (ILC) reified a non-exhaustive list of peremptory norms that explicitly excluded gender-based discrimination.4 This essay proposes a “jus cogens redux” to revive Chinkin and Charlesworth's question by peering at several threads in the thwarted conversations about whether freedom from gender discrimination rises to peremptory norm status. The conversational threads lay tattered by positive law's reliance on enumerated treaty provisions and accepted precepts of customary international law. They are frayed by normative law's philosophical, moralists’ approach. Neither the positivist law nor the normative law's concepts of how to determine jus cogens values grapples with gender or gender minorities. By default, each retains a masculine approach that configures the gender of jus cogens as “non-female.”