The Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 is familiar to all international lawyers. Like a catechism, we are taught that the ICJ will not proceed with a case where the legal interests of a State not before the Court “would not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision.” Mollengarden and Zamir's proposal that the Court should dispense with the Monetary Gold principle feels almost heretical. The authors contend that the ICJ Statute sets out a framework for balancing the interests of third parties through the use of the intervention procedure, and that Monetary Gold “disrupts that balance.” Monetary Gold is, they submit, to be treated as only a judicial decision, entitled under Article 36(1)(d) of the Statute to little deference as a source of legal principle. I suggest taking an altogether different approach. The best way to understand the place of the Monetary Gold principle is in the context of the ICJ's rule making powers pursuant to Article 30(1) of the Court's Statute. These rule making powers are not limited to the promulgation of formal Rules of Court but extend to the determination of appropriate procedures during the hearing of a case. These procedural rules (small r), articulated in the context of particular cases, may in time evolve into formal Rules of Court through an iterative process. Monetary Gold is an instance of the Court defining a small r procedural rule in a manner that is consistent with the Court's Statute.

In “The Monetary Gold Principle: Back to Basics,” Zachary Mollengarden and Noam Zamir claim that the well-known principle runs against fundamental ICJ statutory provisions. It would “depart” from Article 36(1), “undermine” Article 62, “import factors external” to Article 59 and “obscure . . . rather than illuminate . . . the relevant rules of law” contrary to Article 38(1). Additionally, the policy considerations upon which the principle is allegedly based—compliance, due process, and legitimacy—would support its abolition, rather than its perpetuation. I argue that the authors’ claims are unpersuasive in relation to Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute (consent of the parties to adjudication) since they fail to distinguish between having jurisdiction in a case and exercising jurisdiction to decide a claim. The authors also overestimate the role of Article 62 in securing third-party interests, since only intervention as a party, rather than a non-party, is sufficient to overcome the Monetary Gold limitation.

Zachary Mollengarden and Noam Zamir want to take back to basics the principle associated with the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Monetary Gold) judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Their “categorical” and mostly doctrinal claim, underpinned by policy concern about “the tensions between the bilateral presuppositions of the Statute and the increasingly multilateral nature of international affairs and international disputes” is “that the Monetary Gold principle is irreconcilable with the ICJ Statute's jurisdictional architecture.” The tension between bilateralism and community interests often provides an attractive analytical perspective, and points raised by the authors might be relevant in calibrating certain aspects of the principle. But its wholesale critique, while skillfully put, is ultimately unpersuasive. Careful consideration of basic instruments and issues is commendable but an exclusive focus that does not engage with the broader international legal process will miss its unmistakable and widespread endorsement of the Monetary Gold principle. Even the concern about the multilateral context ultimately counts against rather than in favor of their argument. Multilateral sensitivities can already be articulated within the four corners of Monetary Gold, and Mauritius/Maldives, delivered just as the ink was drying on the first draft of this essay, is a perfectly timed example for that.

Zachary Mollengarden and Noam Zamir base their conclusion that the Monetary Gold principle should be abandoned on both legal considerations and policy implications. These two elements, however, do not receive equal attention in the article. This essay unpacks the authors’ dismissal of the idea that, by subjecting jurisdiction to consent, the principle makes compliance with awards from the ICJ more likely. Based on the notion that judicial decisions should be understood as embedded within wider political bargains, I contend that while consent might be indicative of states’ willingness to abide by a judicial decision, what ultimately matters for changing state policy towards compliance is the set of incentives that states face in the context of these wider political bargains. Thus, the essay argues, in line with Mollengarden and Zamir, that abandoning the Monetary Gold principle need not make the Court less effective. However, it will not necessarily make it more impactful either. Beyond Monetary Gold and in relation to its role in world politics more broadly, the Court's impact rests, ultimately, on how political actors––including the ICJ itself––mobilize rulings strategically.

The purpose of this essay is to explore the two main ways in which community interests have been taken into account in international adjudication. First, special procedural tools have been devised in order to accommodate the multilateral dimension of certain disputes into the traditionally bilateral scheme of international adjudication. It will be shown that such tools have been of little use for the protection of community interests. Second, legal relations engendered by community interests have been conceptualized in a bilateral manner so that they could fit adjudicative bilateralism. It may seem counterintuitive, but it will be maintained that this second avenue offers the most concrete, yet not entirely satisfactory, means to adjudicate community interests. Finally, the essay argues that the Monetary Gold rule proves a useful test to properly understand the different logic of these two avenues.