¹ “The United States and the Mandates” Michigan Law Rev., Vol. 23, pp.11,22, May, 1925.

² Full text printed in Editor and Publisher, Vol. 55, No. 27, 2nd Ser., pp. 1-28, Dec. 2, 1922. See also Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. 2, Chap. 34.

³ Chirol, The Occident and the Orient, pp. 170-177; Republique Francaise, Ministere des A ffaires Etrangeres, Rapport sur la situation de la Syrie et du LCban, 1922-23, p. 37 et seq.; Buell, International Relations, pp. 88-89.

⁴ Wright, “Syrian Grievances against French Rule”, Current History, Feb. 1926, pp. 687-693.

⁵ Arabs of Damascus originally estimated the killed at 5000 or more, while General Sarrail reported 137 killed, including French soldiers and Armenians killed by the insurgents, as well as residents killed by the bombardment.

⁶ This account is taken from a statement by General Sarrail published in La Syrie of Beyrut, Nov. 20, 1925; from articles by Henri de Kerillis in the Echo de Paris, Sept. 28 to Oct. 6, 1925, severely criticizing General Sarrail for his handling of the Druse revolt; from French official reports to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, Oct. 23, 1925 (Minutes of 7th session, p. 81), and Feb. 19, 1926 (seen only in newspaper reports Feb. 19, 1926); from the account by a reporter on the spot in the London Times of Oct. 25, 1925 (said by residents of Damascus to be accurate); from account of bombardment by Rev. Elias Newman of Damascus, an eyewitness, published in Current History, Jan. 1926

⁷ League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 7th session, p. 81.

⁸ Lorimer, Institutes of the Law of Nations, Vol. 1, pp. 101, 157, 161.

⁹ Bonfils, 8th ed. (Fauchille), Vol. 1, p. 31;Google Scholar Holtzendorff, Elements p. 50 and Rev. de droit int., Vol. 8, p. 18; Fiore, , International Law Codified, Borchard trans., secs. 395, 399 Google Scholar; Risley, , The Law of War, p. 40;Google Scholar Oppenheim, , International Law, 3rd ed. Vol. 1, pp. 35, 180;Google Scholar Dickinson, , Equality of States, p. 131 et seg., 223 et seq., who quotes from numerous writers.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Sir Scott, William in The Madonna del Burso, 4 C. Rob. 169, 172, 1802;Google Scholar The Hane, Hurtige, 3 C. Rob. 324, 325, 1801;Google Scholar The Helena, , 4 C. Rob. 3, 6, 1801.Google Scholar See Scott's, Cases on International Law, 1st ed. pp. 2-3, 45-48.Google Scholar

¹¹ Dickinson, op. cit., pp. 223-229. Oppenheim holds that states outside the family of nations have no rights at all under international law (op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 36), and that those not recognized on a basis of equality have only such rights as are specified by treaty or may be implied from exchange of diplomatic officers (op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 35, 180, and infra, note 18).

¹² Oppenheim, , op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 50, 53; Walker, , History of the Law of Nations, Vol. 1, pp. 41, 124.Google Scholar

¹³ Hirst, F. W., The Arbiter in Council, p. 230.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Lieber's Code, General Orders No. 100, U. S. Army, 1863, Art. 57. See also U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, Art. 41.

¹⁵ Higgins, , The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 496.Google Scholar

¹⁶ China, Japan, Liberia, Persia, Siam, and Turkey were members of the Hague Conferences. All of these, except Turkey, are members of the League of Nations, as is Abyssinia.

¹⁷ U. S. Rules of Land Warfare, 1914, Art. 41; Bonfils, , 8th ed. (Fauchille), sec. 1083 Google Scholar; Morgan, , War book of the German General Staff, 1915, p. 87;Google Scholar Bordwell, , The Law of War, p. 140 Google Scholar; Garner, , International Law and the World War, Vol. 1, p. 292;Google Scholar Oppenheim, , op. dt., Vol. 2, p. 108.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Oppenheim, op. dt., Vol. 1, p. 180.

¹⁹ Wright, “Sovereignty of the Mandates”, this Journal , Vol. 17, p . 691 et seg.; Vol. 18, p . 306> et seq.

²⁰ For text, see this Jot jbn ai, Supp., Vol. 17, p.177.

²¹ This has been recognized under the class “C” mandate of Southwest Africa, which, however, gives the mandatory considerably more power than the class “A” mandate for Syria. Thus Kotze, J ., of the Supreme Court of South Africa in the case of Jacobus Christian v. Rex, 1923 (British Year Book of Int. Law, 1925, pp. 211, 219), which arose in connection with the Bondelzwart rebellion of 1922, said: “As the obligation to maintain law and order rests in the mandatory, it is its duty to suppressall disturbances of these, and to provide for the public safety, as well as to punish offenders.”The Permanent Mandates Commission expressed a similar opinion in its inquiry into this rebellion: “As regards the conduct of the military operations,it is not disputed that the administration, whenit became evident that hostilities were inevitable, acted wisely in taking prompt and effective steps touphold government authority and to prevent the spread ofdisaffection.” (League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 3rd session, p. 294.) See also, this Journal , Vol. 18, p. 306.

²² This flows from territorial sovereignty, the basic principle of modern international law. The state, writes Hall, “asserts authority as a general rule over all persons and things and decides what acts shall or shall not be done within its dominions.” (Higgins, ed., 8th, p. 56.)

²³ Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, p. 185 et seg.; supra, note 50.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 213 et seq.

²⁵ “Humanitarian intervention”, writes Stowell in an exhaustive and careful study of the subject, “is an instance of intervention for the purpose of vindicating the law of nations against outrage. For it is a basic principle of every human society and the law which governs it that no member may persist in conduct which is considered to violate universally recognized principles of decency and humanity. . . . However, the presumption in favor of the rectitude and legality of the action of the sovereign will not be impaired by an occasional abuse and instance of inhuman action. . . . In the absence of an effective sanction under international law to remedy these occasional abuses, we might not be justified in classing them as violations of international law”. (Intervention in International Law, pp.(51-52.) Of very different opinion is Hall who writes: “In giving their sanction to interventions of the kind in question jurists have imparted an aspect of legality to a species of intervention, which makes a deep inroad into one of the cardinal doctrines of international law; of which the principle is not even intended to be equally applied to the cases covered by it; and which by the readiness with which it lends itself to the uses of selfish ambition becomes as dangerous in practice as it is plausible in appearance. It is unfortunate that, publicists have not laid down broadly and unanimously that no intervention is legal, except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a breach of the law as between states has taken place, or unless the whole body of civilized states have concurred in authorizing it”. (Op.dt., pp. 343-344.) It will be noticed that the final qualification would justify many humanitarian interventions, and the preceding one would justify all such interventions if Stowell's theory were accepted.

²⁶ “When the authorities of an independent state”, writes Stowell, “persist in administering the law with injustice and cruelty so excessive as to constitute an intolerable abuse and to shock the opinion of other states, it has led in certain instances to intervention on what we may properly designate as the ground of denial of justice.” (Op. dt., p. 139.) It is interesting to recall that one of the humanitarian interventions most generally supported is that which France herself undertook at the request of the European Powers in 1860 on account of Turkish toleration of the massacre of Maronites in Syria by the Druses. (Ibid.,p. 63.)

²⁷ “Insurgents are organized bodies of men who for political purposes, are in a state of armed hostility tothe established government. There may be war in the ‘material sense’ which, because belligerency has not been recognized, has not become war in the ‘legal sense’, nevertheless those engaged may have legal status.” Wilson and Tucker, International Law, 8th ed., p. 63. See also,Lieber's Code, Art. 149; The Three Friends, 166 U. S. 1; The Lucy H., 235 Fed. Rep. 610, 1916; Montoya v. U. S., 180 U. S. 261, 1901; Lawrence, Principles of International Law, sec. 142; Higgins, in Hall's International Law, 8th ed., p. 46.

²⁸ Rolin, Le Droit Modeme de la guerre, Vol. 1, p. 143. “When insurgency exists, the armed forces of the insurgents must observe and are entitled to the advantages of the laws of war in their relations to the parent state.” (Wilson and Tucker, op. dt., p. 64.) Infra, note 30. Westlake's observations,supra, note 18, would not apply to insurgents who are politically organized.

²⁹ “Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their government, or a portion of it, or against one or more of its laws, or against an officer or officers of the Government.” Lieber's Code, sec. 149. The revolutionary movements in Colombia, 1885, Chile, 1891, Brazil, 1893, Haiti, 1902, were treated as insurrections in American state papers and by such text writers as Wilson, International Law, 1910, pp. 43-49; Lawrence, op. cit., sec. 142; Hyde, International Law, Vol. 2, sec. 826. The United States has treated the revolutionary factions in Mexico since 1912 as insurgents. Ex parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938, 1913.

³⁰ With reference to the Philippine insurrection of 1899, Magoon, legal adviser of the War Department, reported: “While engaged in suppressing such insurrection the government may properly exercise the rights of a belligerent. . . . As long as the United States is authorized to exercise the rights of a belligerent, there are no limitations on such exercise excepting those imposed by the laws and usages of war.” (Magoon, Reports, pp. 211, 216.) See also Lieber's Code, Art. 152 et seq.; The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635, 670.

³¹ Stowell, op. cit., p. 125 et seq.; infra, note 54.

³² The Three Friends, 166 U. S. 1; Hyde, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 77. “In this connection, I am constrained to call your attention to the obvious fact that since there is now no recognized state of belligerency in Mexico, the rules and laws governing warfare and the conduct of neutrality are not involved.” Acting Sec.of State Wilson to the Mexican Ambassador, March 8, 1912, U. S. For. Rel., 1912, p. 740. See also Wright, “Changes in the Conception of War”, this Journal , Vol. 18, p. 759.

³³ Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. >163, 167; Vol. 2, pp. 69,75.

³⁴ IV Hague Convention, 1907,Art. 2; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 1918.

³⁵ “According to the views of the High Contracting Partiesthese provisions, the wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit, are intendedtoserve as a general rule of conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relation with the inhabitants. . . . Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that,incases not included in the regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain underthe protection and the rule of the principles ofthe law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”Preamble to Hague Conventions on Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, 1899, 1907, Higgins, Hague Peace Conferences, p. 209.

³⁶ Hague Regulations, 1907, Art. 25; U. S. Rules ofLand Warfare,1914, Art. 212.

³⁷ Hague Regulations, 1907, Art. 26; U. S. Rules, Arts. 216, 217.

³⁸ U. S. Rules, Art. 217, 218.

³⁹ Hague Reg. 1907, Art. 27; U. S. Rules, Art. 225; Garner, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 424. See also similar rules with respect to naval bombardment, IX Hague Convention, 1907, Arts. 1, 5, 6, and aerial bombardment, XIV Hague 1907 and proposed Hague rules of aerial warfare, 1922, Arts. 22-26, Moore, International Law and Some Current Illusions, pp. 241-247.

⁴⁰ Annuaire, 1913, pp. 533-534.

⁴¹ See Garner, , op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 421 Google Scholar; Westlake, , International Law, Vol. 2, pp. 87-89;Google Scholar Bonfils, , 8th ed. (Fauchille), Vol. 2, secs. 1094-1098.Google Scholar

⁴² U. S. Rules, Art. 219, especially insists on notice and opportunity to leave to neutral consuls and diplomatic officers.

⁴³ See quotation from Von Moltke, note to U. S. Rules, Art. 10, and discussion of views of Clausewitz, Hartmann, Von Moltke, Lueder, and others in Garner, op. d t, Vol. 1, pp. 178 183; Westlake, chapters on the Principles of International Law, pp. 238-244. The latter recognizes that terrorism may be necessary against uncivilized and unorganized populations in certain circumstances, supra, note 18.

⁴⁴ See quotation from Von Moltke, note to U. S. Rules, Art. 10, and discussion of views of Clausewitz, Hartmann, Von Moltke, Lueder, and others in Garner, op. d t, Vol. 1, pp. 178 183; Westlake, chapters on the Principles of International Law, pp. 238-244. The latter recognizes that terrorism may be necessary against uncivilized and unorganized populations in certain circumstances, supra, note 18.

⁴⁵ U. S. Rules, Arts. 379, 380, 381, 385, 386; Wright, Minn., L. R., Vol. 5, pp. 524-529.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ U. S. Rules, Arts. 382, 386.

⁴⁷ U. S. Rules, Arts. 371-374, citing Curry v. Collins, 37 Mo. 324, 328.

⁴⁸ Hague Reg. 1907, Art. 53; U. S. Rules, Arts. 353, 354, 386.

⁴⁹ Garner, , op. tit., Vol. 1, p. 441. See also Westlake's observation, supra, note 18.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Borchard, op. tit., pp. 187-188; Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 255-258. “Foreigners have a right to compensation when they are injured as to their personsoras to their property in the course of a riot, of an insurrection or of a civil war: . . . (c) when the injury is the result of an act contrary to the laws, committed by a government official, or (d) when the obligation to compensate is established by virtueof the general principles of the law of war.” Rules of Institute of International Law, 1900, Annuaire, Vol. 18, p. 254; Oppenheim, op.cit., Vol. 1, p. 262.

⁵¹ IV Hague Convention, 1907, Art. 3; U. S. Rules, Art. 363.

⁵² With the well-recognized principle of retroactivity of recognition, the new status would date from the beginning of the insurrection, and the new regime would enjoy whatever rights a belligerent state would have hadfrom that time. Oetjen w. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 1918; Luther v. Sagor, Ct. of Appeal, 1921, 37 Times L. R., 777.

⁵³ The Treaty of Versailles imposed such requirements on the defeated party (Arts. 228, 232), and the report of the peace conference committee on responsibility considered these provisions declaratory of existing law. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Doc. 106, pp. 325-334. The United States Treaty of Peace with Germany imposed pecuniary responsibility on Germany for American civilian losses, and these have been adjudicated by an arbitral commission. Borchard, this Journal , Vol. 19, p. 133, Vol. 20, p. 69. See also, IV Hague Convention, 1907, Art. 3, and Wright, Minn. L. R., Vol. 5, pp. 536-539.

⁵⁴ These cases are discussed by Stowell, op. dt., pp. 120, 125-136.

⁵⁵ The existence of a right to oppose acts contrary to law, and to use force for the purpose when infractions are sufficiently serious, is a necessary condition of the existence of an efficient international law. Hall, ,op. dt., p. 342.Google Scholar See also, Grotius, , De Jure Belli acPads, book II, c. i. sec. 2, par. 2; c. 20, sec. 40 pars. 1, 4; c. 25, sec. 6 and Prolegomena, sec. 18;Google Scholar Vattel, , Droit des Gens, prelim, sec. 22; Westlake, op. dt., Vol. 1, p.318; Stowell, op. dt., p. 455; Wright, this Journal , Vol. 19, p. 92; supra, note 25.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Supra, note 50.

⁵⁷ Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. 6, p . 928 et seq., 940 et seq. Several cases before the British-AmericanClaims Commission in 1924 were decided on the basis that compensation would be due neutral states for losses from belligerent action contrary to the law of war. See this Joubnal , Vol. 18, p . 835.

⁵⁸ This isspecific in Arts. 11 and 15. Article 17 reads:“In the event of a dispute between a member of the League and a state which is not a member of the League, or between states not members of the League, the state or states not members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in theLeague for the purposes of such dispute, upon suchconditions as the Council may deem just.” Though itis not expressly stated that the invitation must be first suggested by a League member, this seems tobe implied. The effort of Egypt to get her controversy with Great Britain after the Sirdar's murder in 1924 before the League failed because no League member suggested an invitation under this article. TheSecretary-General looks upon his duties as limited to executing requests of League members or resolutions of League organs. He would not invite an outside state to submit a case to the Council or Assembly on hisown initiative. In any case, Article 17 refers only to outside “states”, so it could not apply toinsurgent bodies.

⁵⁹ It might be, as the British Dominions are members, and by Article 1 of the Covenant other self-governing dominions or colonies may be voted in.

⁶⁰ There have been a number of insurrections in territory under control of League members since the League began, as in Ireland, Morocco, Southwest Africa, China, and several Latin American states.

⁶¹ Supra, note 54.

⁶² The general competence of the Council and Assembly is described as “matters within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world” (Arts. 3, 4). Apart from articles relating to specialmatters, such as armaments (Art. 8), mandates(Art. 22), and international cooperation (Arts. 23, 24), this “sphere of action” seems to be as follows: The Council can advise on sanctions in case of “external aggression”, “threat or danger of such aggression” against a League member (Art.10), or violation of LeagueCovenants (Art. 16), andit can propose steps to giveeffect to arbitral awards or judicial decisions between League members (Art. 13). The “whole League” is declared concerned with “any waror threat of war whether immediately affecting anyofthe members of the League or not”, and maytake action “to safeguard the peace of nations” (Art. 11, par. 1). The assembly may consider “any circumstance whatever, affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding betweennationsupon which peace depends” (Art. 11, par.2), and may “advise the reconsideration by membersof the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peaceofthe world” (Art. 19). The Council or Assemblymay request advisory opinions of the court (Art. 14),and may consider disputes between members(Art. 15), between members and outside states or between outside states (Art. 17) unless they are found“toarise out of matters which by internationallaw are solely within the domestic jurisdiction ofa party” (Art. 15). Thus, every phrase seems tobe carefully qualified to exclude political matters not affecting international relations (Infra, note 64).

⁶³ “If the question is held by the Court or by the Council to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, this decision shall not preventconsideration of the situation by the Council or by theAssembly under Article 11 of the Covenant.” (Geneva Protocol, Art. 5, par. 3.).

⁶⁴ The term “threat of war” occurs in Art. 11, but insurrection can hardly be considered a threat ofcivil war because the insurgents do not have power within themselves to convert insurrection into civil war. Achievement of belligerency depends upon recognition of that status by the parent state or third states. (Supra, note 32.) Furthermore, an interpretation which considered insurrection as a threat of civil war would logically have to consider all resistance to domestic law in the same light. This would extend the League's competence to practically all domestic administration and police, which clearly was not intended by the Covenant. The same consideration suggests that the phrases “peace of the world” (Arts. 3, 4) and “peace of nations” (Art. 11) do not include domestic peace.

⁶⁵ Supra, note 55.

⁶⁶ For procedure in Greco-Bulgarian affair, see League of Nations, Monthly Summary, Vol. 5, pp. 256-262, Oct. 1925.

⁶⁷ Covenant, Art. 22; Wright, this Journal , Vol. 17, pp. 701-703.

⁶⁸ Council investigations on the spot in political disputes, asthe Mosul boundary and Greco-Bulgarian commissions of 1925, would be precedents. The Permanent Mandates Commission has considered itself incompetent to senda commission on its own authority, though it might recommend such action to the council. Minutes, 3rd meeting, p. 291; 7th meeting, p. 125.

⁶⁹ Supra, note 21.

⁷⁰ Report of Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 3rd session, p. 290 et seq., and resolution of the Council, Dec. 13, 1923 (Official Journal, Vol. 5, pp. 340-341). See also debate and resolution of Assembly, Sept. 26, 1923 (Records of Fourth Assembly, Plenary meetings, pp. 89-93).

⁷¹ Ibid., 3rd meeting, p. 291; 7th meeting, p. 124.

⁷² Supra, note 68.

⁷³ Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 7th meeting, pp.16,132. The Commission sat from Feb. 19 to March 6, 1926.

⁷⁴ As in the Bondelzwart affair.