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Introduction to the Symposium on Unilateral Targeted Sanctions

  • Anne van Aaken (a1)
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Abstract
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
References
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1 Int'l Law Comm'n, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 31, 75, 129 para. 8, 137 para. 3 & art. 54 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA and ARSIWA Commentary].

2 For a comprehensive overview on the effects of comprehensive as well as targeted sanctions, see Daniel W. Drezner, Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice, 13 Int'l Stud. Rev. 96 (2011).

3 Even if they do not cause a change in state behavior, sanctions may still be effective as expressions of what other states consider to be the law.

4 Oana A. Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 212 Yale L.J. 252 (2011). In international law, this mechanism is used pervasively.

5 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 UNTS 29. Article 4 bans the import of the controlled substances listed in the Annexes from nonparties.

6 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 UNTS 243. Articles III, IV, and V regulate the trade in endangered species differently depending on how endangered the species is. Without import and export certificates, no trade can take place.

7 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 UNTS 57. Article 4 stipulates that hazardous waste may not be exported to Antarctica, to a state not party to the Convention, or to a party having banned the import of hazardous wastes.

8 For a discussion on the different positive functions of unilateralism aside from enforcement, see Monica Hakimi, Unfriendly Unilateralism, 55 Harv. Int'l L.J. 105 (2014).

9 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 1, at 128 para. 2.

10 ARSIWA, supra note 1, art. 42(a).

11 Id. art. 42 & 119 para. 13. But see Christian Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2010) (suggesting that nonforcible countermeasures in case of the violation of an erga omnes obligation are allowed under conditions analogous to those applying to a state specially affected by a breach); Institute de droit international, Resolution on Obligations and Rights Erga Omnes in International Law art. 5(3), IDI Res. I/2005 (2005), 71(2) Ann. IDI 286 (same).

12 ARSIWA, supra note 1, art. 48 & 126 para. 1.

13 Id., art. 48 & 127 para. 11.

14 Id., art. 54 & 139 para. 6.

15 ARSIWA, supra note 1, art. 50.1(b).

16 See UN Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, at para. 70 (Jan. 3, 1995). With respect to Syria, see, for example, Idriss Jazairy (Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights on His Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/54/Add.2 (Sept. 11, 2018).

17 Cf. Alexandra Hofer, The Efficacy of Targeted Sanctions in Enforcing Compliance with International Law, 113 AJIL Unbound 163 (2019); Drezner, supra note 2.

18 J. Mark Munoz, Advances in Geoeconomics (2017).

20 Jo Wrighton, Paris Leaps to Defense of Danone Against Pepsi, Wall St. J. (July 21, 2005).

21 See Joshua P. Zoffer, The Dollar and the United States' Exorbitant Power to Sanction, 113 AJIL Unbound 152 (2019).

22 Cf. How the American Takeover of a French National Champion Became Intertwined in a Corruption Investigation, Economist (Jan. 17, 2019) (discussing the takeover of parts of Alstom by GE).

23 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, State Responsibility for “Targeted Sanctions”, 113 AJIL Unbound 135 (2019).

24 Hovell, supra note 19.

25 Id. at 140.

26 David S. Cohen & Zachary K. Goldman, Like it or Not, Unilateral Sanctions Are Here to Stay, 113 AJIL Unbound 146 (2019).

27 Zoffer, supra note 21.

28 The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) acts as a sort of Euro-denominated clearing house for Iran to conduct trade with European companies. In effect, INSTEX works as a barter arrangement operating outside of the U.S.-dominated global financial system.

30 Hofer, supra note 17.

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AJIL Unbound
  • ISSN: -
  • EISSN: 2398-7723
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