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The Meaning of the Term Denial of Justice in International Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2017
Extract
The term “denial of justice” has been used widely to describe certain types of acts and omissions of States directed against foreigners deemed to be internationally illegal and justifying diplomatic interposition by the aggrieved State. There is no agreement, however, as to the precise scope of the term. In attempting to determine whether a single definite meaning can be assigned to the expression, emphasis must be placed upon its actual use in diplomatic practice and in the decisions of international tribunals, for the opinions of writers, no matter how authoritative, may not correspond with the practice of States. A few general considerations may be suggested by way of introduction.
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- Copyright © American Society of International Law 1936
References
1 See, e.g., F. S. Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (1932), 147.
2 “Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi.” D. 1. 1. 10. Also, Inst. 1. 1. The translation given is that of Abdy and Walker.
3 See, e.g., France, Code de Procédure Civile, Art. 506; and Code Civil, Art. 4.
4 See Nicholls, J., in Ex Parte Ryan, 124 La. 356, 370; 50 So. 385, 389.Google Scholar
5 E.g., Salvador, law of Sept. 29, 1886, Arts. 39 and 40, 77 Brit. & For. State Pap., 116. The Foreign Minister of Salvador, however, declared that the law applied only to claims based on acts of judicial authorities and did not preclude claims based on acts of other authorities. Senor Delgado to Mr. Hall, March 28, 1887, For. Rd., 1887, pp. 114–115. See also law of Mexico, May 28, 1886, 77 Brit. & For. State Pap., 1270; law of Costa Rica, Dec. 20, 1886, For. Rel., 1887, p. 97; law of Honduras, April 10, 1895, 87 Brit. & For. State Pap., 703; law of Venezuela, April 16, 1903, 96 ibid., 647.
6 E.g., Hall, Rivier, Vanselow, Wilson, Woolsey.
7 E.g., Antokoletz, Liszt, Oppenheim.
8 Hyde, 1 International Law, 491–492. J. B. Moore apparently takes the same point of view: 6 Digest of Int. Law, 651, and Proc. of Am. Soc. of Int. Law 1915, p. 18 (quoting with approval Dr. Gastao da Cunha). E. Wambaugh takes the same view: Proc. of Am. Soc. of Int. Law 1910, p. 128 ff. See also W. S. Penfield, ibid., 137–138; and Lapradelle et Politis, 2 Recueil des arbitrages internationaux, 31, “Affaire Croft,” note doctrinale. Calvo says: “Dans le langage général, déni de justice se dit de tout refus d’accorder à quelqu’un ce qui lui est &I.” 1 Dictionnaire de Droit Int., 237; but cf. the sentence following. F. de Martens says that the refusal to recognize any of the incontestable rights of an individual is a denial of justice justifying diplomatic interposition after failure of local remedies. Modern International Law, 5th Russ. ed. (1904), I, 346.
9 20 A. J. I. L. (1926), Spl. Supp., 176,193, and see 23 ibid. (1929), Spl. Supp., 219. See also Vattel, I, Bk. II, sees. 350 and 86, quoted by Halleck, Piédelièvre, and Westlake with seeming approval; De Visscher, 2 Bibliotheca Visseriana, 99–100; Strupp’s draft, Art. 6, 23 A. J. I. L. (1929), Spl. Supp., 235; less clearly the same view appears to be held by Anzilotti, 13 R. G. D. I. P., 21ff; and Fauchille, I Traité, 335. And see the project of the Institute of International Law, 22 A. J. I. L. (1928), Spl. Supp., 330.
10 Bevilaqua says: “Di-se denegágção de justica: (a) Quando o juiz, sem fundamento legal, repelle a petiçãia daquelle que recorre á justiça do pain, pars defender ou restaurar o seu direito; (b) Quando, postergando as formulas processuaes, impede a prova do direito ou a sus defeza; (c) Quando a sentença é, evidentemente, contraria aos principios universaes do direito.” 1 Direito Publico International (1911), 219. See also Art. 9 of the code proposed at the Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law, 1930, referred to by many speakers as a definition of denial of justice, 24 A. J. I. L. (1930), 500ff; Durand, in 38 R. G. D. I. P., 694ff; Hatschek, Outline of International Law, Manning’s trans. (1930), 284; and Boyd’s Wheaton (1880), 457.
11 22 A. J. I. L. (1928), 538, 558; and see Proc. of Am. Soc. of Int. Law, 1927, p. 34; and Eagleton, Responsibility of States (1928), 110-121. See also Phillimore, 2 Commentaries (3d ed.), 4–5; Calvo, 1 Dictionnaire (1885), 237; Dumas, De la Responsabilité internationale des Etats (1930), 206ff. Cf. . the project of the International Law Association, Report of the 37th Conference (1932), 44.
12 The British Yearbook of International Law, 1932,P. 108ff, but he makes it clear that he does not consider denial of justice applicable to such delinquencies as lack of protection, or as the sole ground of diplomatic interposition in behalf of nationals. Essentially the same view is expressed by Borchard, Diplomatic Protection (1916), 330, 336, in the Harvard Draft Convention on Responsibility of States, Art. 9, 23 A. J. I. L. (1929), Spl. Supp., 133ff, by De Visscher, “Le Deni de Justice en Droit International,” Academie de Droit Int., Extrait du Recueil des Cours (1936), p. 26, and by Holier, La Responsabilite Internationale des Etats (1930), 41. Cf. Art. 4 of Project No. 16 of the American Institute of International Law, 23 A. J. I. L. (1929), Spl. Supp., 232; Ralston, The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals (1926), 86; and The Federalist, Lodge’s ed. (1889), No. 80, p. 495.
13 Wambaugh, Proc. of Am. Soc. of Int. Law, 1910, 128ff ; and Borchard, op. cit., 330.
14 Typical is Art. 18 of the German-Mexican treaty of 1882, Martens, Nouv. Rec. Gån., 2d sår., Vol. 9, p. 484. For similar treaties see ibid., Vol. 12, p. 682; Vol. 13, p. 690; Vol. 15, p. 843; Vol. 19, p. 842; and Vol. 22, p. 313. See also the British-Bolivian treaty of 1911, Brit. Treaty Series, 1912, No. 17; and Art. 3 of the Convention Relating to Rights of Aliens, 1902, adopted by the Second International Conference of American States, Sen. Doe. 330, 57 Cong. 1 Bess., 228.
15 Art. 6 of the treaty between Spain and Peru, 1897, Martens, Nouv. Rec. Gen., 2d ser., Vol. 32, pp. 69, 71.
16 See also the British-Uruguay treaty of 1918, Brit. Treaty Series, 1919, No. 3.
17 “The law of nations, founded upon justice, equity, convenience, and the reason of the thing, and confirmed by long usage, does not allow of reprisals, except in case of violent injuries directed or supported by the State, and justice absolutely denied in re minim dubia by all the tribunals and afterwards by the Prince.” Quoted in The Zamora (1916), 2 A. C. 77, 94 (Privy Council).
18 See Mr. Bayard to Mr. Hall, Nov. 29, 1886, For. Rel., 1887, p. 81, Moore, 6 Digest of International Law, 268; and Mr. Gresham to Mr. Sheehan, Aug. 25, 1894, Moore, 6 Digest of International Law, 272.
19 Moore, 6 op. cit., 270, quoting from Mr. Blaine to Mr. Caamano, May 19, 1890. See Mr. Everett to Mr. Marsh, No. 24, Feb. 5, 1853, 8 Ex. Doc. 9, 33 Cong. 2 Bess., Moore, 6 op. cit., 262; Mr. Davis to Moseby, June 23, 1873, Moore, 6 op. cit., 661; Mr. Bayard to Mr. Copeland, Feb. 23, 1886, Moore, 6 op. cit., 699; Lord Palmerston, speaking in the House of Commons on the Don Pacifico case, June 25, 1850, Hansard’s Debates, CXII, 382, Moore, 6 op. cit., 681f; Mr. Hay to Signor Carignani, Aug. 24, 1901, For. Rel., 1901, p. 308, Moore, 6 op. cit., 674, and Mr. Adee to Signor Carignani, Oct. 10, 1901, For. Rel., 1901, p. 810, Moore, 6 op. cit., 675; Mr. Blaine to Mr. Ryan, June 28, 1890, Moore, 6 op. cit., 281; Mr. Neill to Mr. Hay, No. 817, Nov. 19, 1903, For. Rd., 1904, p. 678, Moore, 6 op. cit., 722; and Moore, 6 op. cit., 668.
20 See Mr. Fish to Mr. Foster, Dec. 16, 1873, Moore, 6 op. cit., 265; and Mr. Bayard to Mr. Jackson, Sept. 7, 1886, Moore, 6 op. cit., 680.
21 See Mr. Cadwalader to Mr. Foster, Sept. 22, 1874, Moore, 6 op. cit., 678.
22 See Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Morgan, May 17, 1884, For. Rel., 1884, p. 358, Moore, 6 op. cit., 679; but cf. General Instructions for Claimants, Dept. of State, Jan. 30, 1920, quoted in Hyde, 1 op. cit., 495, n. 2.
23 See Memorandum of the Sardinian Government, 48 Brit. & For. State Pap., 442 (1857–1858).
24 See also Mr. Lansing in note to the Mexican Government, Nov. 30, 1919, quoted in Hyde, 1 op. cit., 493, n. 2, where, however, the term is apparently applied to the original injustice committed by a court, and not to the failure of local remedies.
25 The American delegate at the Hague Codification Conference of 1930 said: “The question as to when responsibility in the international sense arises is, so far as the work of this committee is concerned, academic in character… . It is not necessary for us to determine … when State responsibility arises.” 24 A. J. I. L. (1930), 500, 505-506.
26 Hyde, 1 International Law, 493; Fitzmaurice, Brit. Yearbook of Int. Law, 1932, pp. 93, 96. For a reported expression of the opposite view see, e.g., 24 A. J. I. L. (1930), 505
27 See p. 634, supra.
28 Mr. Bayard to Mr. McLane, June 23, 1886, Moore, 6 op. cit., 266; Mr. Marcy to Mr. Jackson, April 6, 1855, Moore, 6 op. cit., 283; J. Q. Adams to Commissioners under the Florida treaty with Spain, March 9, 1822, Moore, 5 Arbitrations, 4504; Ribeyro, Foreign Minister of Peru, to Pacheco, Spanish Minister, April 13, 1864, Fontes furis Gentium, Ser. B, Sec. 1, Tom. 1, Pars 1, p. 930. See also Lord Palmerston, supra, n. 19; Mr. Gresham to Mr. Osborn, May 17, 1893, Moore, 6 Dig. Int. Law, 669; and Mr. Blaine to Mr. Ryan, June 28, 1890, supra, n. 19. Cf. Atty. Gen. Bradford, 1 Op. Atty. Gen., 54.
29 See Mr. Bayard to Mr. Scott, Sept. 3, 1885, For. Rel., 1885, p. 925, Moore, 6 Digest of Int. Law, 757.
30 See Mr. Mariscal to Mr. Fish, March 9, 1875, For. Rel., 1875, II, pp. 978–979, and Mr. Fish’s reply, March 18, 1875, ibid., 980; Mr. Evarts to Mr. Baker, Oct. 15, 1880, For. Rel., 1880, pp. 1041–43, Moore, 6 Digest of Int. Law, 769; Signor Carignani to Mr. Hay, Nov. 14, 1901, For. Rd., 1901, p. 297; and Baron von Riedeneau to Mr. Hay, April 28, 1899, For. Rel., 1899, p. 37.
31 “The claimants’ demand being based on the admittedly unlawful seizure by Spanish authorities of property belonging to American citizens, this injury is sufficient ofitself to entitle the claimants to a standing before this commission, even if no allegation of a denial of justice be superadded to the original demand. Article V of the agreement of 1871 confers upon this commission jurisdiction of all claims for injuries of that character. It makes no exception against those parties who may not have resorted to or exhausted the remedies offered by the courts of Cuba.” Baron Blanc, Umpire, in the case of Young, Smith & Co., U. S. and Spanish Claims Commission under the agreement of 1871, Moore, 3 Arbitrations, 3148. See also the Baldwin case, ibid., 3126-27; Burn’s case, ibid., 3140; Pratt’s case, ibid., 3141; the Napier case, ibid., 3152-53; The Betsey, ibid., 3187; The Mechanic, ibid., 3214; Metzger’s case, For. Rel., 1901, p. 275; El Triunfo case, For. Rel., 1902, p. 870; The Orinoco Steamship Company case, Ralston and Doyle, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, p. 90; the words of Roscoe Pound, U. S. Arbitrator, reported in the Cayuga Indians case, American and British Claims Arbitration under the Agreement of 1910, Report of Fred K. Nielsen, American Agent, Washington (1926), 258; and The David .1. Adams,ibid., 531.
32 See the Tagliaferro case, Ralston and Doyle, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, p. 765; the Poggioli case, ibid., 869; the Montano case, Moore, 2 Arbitrations, 1634; and the Ruden case, ibid., 1655.
33 The distinction between “denial of justice” and “notorious injustice” is mentioned expressly in the Cotesworth & Powell case, Moore, 2 Arbitrations, 2051, 2053, where, however, denial of justice is said to include “undue and inexcusable delays in rendering judgment.” See also British Commissioner’s dissenting opinion in the Mexican Union Railway, Ltd., case, Decisions and Opinions of Commissioners, 1929–1930, Claims Commission between Great Britain and Mexico under Convention of 1926, p. 171; the Medina case, Moore, 3 Arbitrations, 2317; Driggs’ case, ibid., 3160; Idler’s case, Moore, 4 Arbitrations, 3516; and the Venezuelan Commissioners’ opinions in the Rudloff case, Ralston and Doyle, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, p. 191, and in the Company General of the Orinoco case, Ralston and Doyle, Report of French-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission of 1902, p. 303. Cf. the Martini case, 25 A. J. I. L. (1931), 554, 567.
34 President of the Swiss Confederation, Arbitrator under the convention of 1891 between France and Venezuela, in the Fabiani case, Moore, 5 Arbitrations, 4878, at 4893–97. See also the case of Yuille, Shortridge & Co., Lapradelle et Foals, 2 Recueil dee arbitrages internationaux, 103–104; and the Martini case, 25 A. J. I. L. (1931), 554, 567.
35 Ralston and Doyle, Report of French-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission of 1902, pp. 121–122.
36 The only international law authority cited by thearbitrator is Holtzendorff, Handbuch des Völkerrechts.
37 Commissioners Zimmerman and Flores, in the case of the Interoceanic Railway of Mexico, Claims Commission between Great Britain and Mexico, Further Decisions and Opinions of the Commissioners, 1933, pp. 118, 126–127. See also the Brown case, American and British Arbitration, Report of FredK. Nielsen (1926), 198, 199; the Studer case, ibid., 552; the French claim as summarized by Plumley, the umpire, in the Company General of the Orinoco case, Ralston and Doyle, Report of French-Venezuelan Mixed Commission of 1902, p. 351; the French Commissioner’s opinion in the Massiani case, ibid., 234, and in the Fabiani case, ibid., 105; and the Romberg case, Lapradelle et Politis, 2 Recueil des arbitrages internationaux, 566.
38 As American Agent in the Cayuga Indians case, American and British Arbitration, Report of Fred K. Nielsen (1926), 250; as American Commissioner in the International Fisheries Co. case, U. S.-Mexican General Claims Commission, Opinions, 1930–1931, p. 23&, and in the Neer case, ibid., 1927, p. 78. See also Nielsen, International Law Applied to Reclamations (1933), 11.
39 See Bronner’s case, Moore, 3 Arbitrations, 3134; Parrott’s case, ibid., 3011; Glenn’s case, ibid., 3138; and The Ada, ibid., 3143.
40 U. S. Treaty Series, No. 678, Art. V.
41 The Neer case, U. S.-Mexican General Claims Commission, Opinions (1927), 73.
42 The Janes case, ibid., 117, 119.
43 “If it had a claim for denial of justice, for delay of justice, or gross injustice, or for any other violation of international law …”—case of the-North American Dredging Company of Texas, ibid., 30. Cf. the concurring opinion of Edwin B. Parker, American Commissioner, ibid., 34.
44 The Chattin case, ibid., 426-429. See also the Stephens case, ibid., 397,400–401.
45 Ibid., 429.
46 “The claimant should have been finally sentenced, thus resulting that he was unduly imprisoned for nearly 18 months. This long and unjustified delay constitutes a denial of justice”—McGregor, Mexican Commissioner, in the Dyches case, Opinions, 1928–1929, p. 197. This opinion was also signed by Sindballe, the Presiding Commissioner.
47 In addition to cases above cited, see the Quintanilla case, Opinions, 1927, p. 136; the Way case, Opinions, 1928–1929, p. 94; the Roper case, Opinions, 1927, pp. 205, 206; the Garcia case, Opinions, 1927, pp. 163, 169 (and 174 for Nielsen’s use of the term with apparently the same distinction) ; the Kennedy case, Opinions, 1927, pp. 289, 296; and the Mallen case, ibid., 254.
48 For references to the pleadings see the Kaiser case, Opinions, 1928–1929, pp. 80, 83; the McCurdy case, ibid., 137; and the Elton case, ibid., 1928–1929, pp. 301, 304. See also the Chattin case, quoted supra.
49 See American and Panamanian General Claims Arbitration, Report of Bert L. Hunt, Agent for the United States, 1934. The term was used in the pleadings, however. The American Agency took it “to comprehend all acts of governmental authorities, legislative, executive, and judicial, which result in the failure of parties concerned to receive substantial justice at the hands of such governmental agencies after due efforts have been exerted in the pursuit of their rights.” Ibid. , the Denham claim, 491, 500.
50 De Visscher, in his lecture at the Academy of International Law, cited supra, n. 12, argues in effect that the use of the term in some treaties makes its definition necessary. This argument is believed to be in reality one against, rather than for, a single definition; for there is no certainty that in all these treaties the term was used in a uniform sense. The actual common design of the parties to a treaty may not coincide with any formal, usual or otherwise, definition of a term.