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Monetary Unions, Regional Financial Arrangements, and Central Bank Swap Lines: Bypasses to the International Monetary Fund?

  • Rohinton P. Medhora (a1)
Abstract

The situation calls for international cooperation, and all the parties at the Bretton Woods Conference understood this. A pool of international reserves that was readily accessible under mutually agreed upon rules by its members would be a “global public good,” providing considerable efficiency over having all countries solely hold their own stock of international reserves. Since balance of payments shocks are typically asynchronous across countries and over time, the principles of pooling and insurance would assure a net gain from the arrangement.

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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
References
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2 For more detail, see Rohinton Medhora, The West African Monetary Union: Institutional Arrangements and the Link with France, 13 Canadian J. Dev. Stud. 151 (1992); Jean-Claude Tchatchouang, The CFA Franc Zone: A Biography, in 2 The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics (Célestin Monga & Justin Yifu Lin eds., 2016).

3 Bernard J. Laurens & Antonio Pancorbo, Central African Economic and Monetary Union: Financial System Stability Assessment, International Monetary Fund (2015).

5 Frits van Beek et al., The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: Institutions, Performance, and Policy Issues, International Monetary Fund (2000).

6 Christoph M. Schmidt, The Threat of Greek Debt Relief, Project Syndicate (2015).

7 See IMF Survey: Evolution Not Revolution: Rethinking Policy at the IMF, International Monetary Fund (2016).

8 See Jonathan D. Ostry et al., Neoliberalism: Oversold?, International Monetary Fund (2016).

9 The G10 currently has eleven members: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

10 See Barry Eichengreen, The International Financial Architecture and the Role of Regional Funds (2010); Randall C. Henning, The Global Liquidity Safety Net: Precautionary Facilities and Central Bank Swaps, in Global Financial Governance Confronts Rising Powers: Emerging Perspectives on the New G20 (Randall C. Henning & Andrew Walter eds., 2016).

This work was completed as part of the International Collaboration for Capitalizing on Cost-Effective and Life-Saving Commodities (i4C) that is funded through the Research Council of Norway's Global Health & Vaccination Programme (GLOBVAC Project #234608).

Funding information has been added since original publication. See 10.1017/aju.2017.78

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  • ISSN: -
  • EISSN: 2398-7723
  • URL: /core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law
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