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On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Extract

The quest for a hierarchy of international human rights continues unabated, despite the impressive challenge raised by Professor Weil to the notion of “relative normativity” of international legal norms. To illustrate: in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, a suit brought under the (First) Judiciary Act of 1789, Judge Harry T. Edwards discussed whether torture, as distinguished from terrorism, “is among the handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual [civil] responsibility.”

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1986

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References

1 Weil, , Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AJIL 413 (1983)Google Scholar.

2 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

3 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1982) (Alien Tort Claims Act, which provides federal courts with jurisdiction over actions by an alien for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States).

4 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring).

5 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (New Application) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ Rep. 4 (Judgment of Feb. 5).

6 Id. at 32. In United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), the Court referred to the “fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 1980 ICJ Rep. 3, 42 (Judgment of May 24). In the Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the Court stated that the “denial [by South Africa] of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.” 1971 ICJ Rep. 16, 57 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).

In a statement on human rights, Secretary of State Kissinger declared that while there will always be differences of view as to the precise extent of the obligations of government . . . there are standards below which no government can fall without offending fundamental values, such as genocide, officially tolerated torture, mass imprisonment or murder, or the comprehensive denial of basic rights to racial, religious, political, or ethnic groups. Any government engaging in such practices must face adverse international judgment.

Statement by Sec’y of State Kissinger before the OAS General Assembly, 75 Dep’t St. Bull. 1, 3 (1976).

7 [1976] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 2 at 99, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.1 (pt. 2).

8 Id. at 73. For the text of Article 19(3)(c), see id. at 95.

9 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/19, at 6.

10 UN Press Release (Geneva) No. SG/SM/617, July 24, 1985.

11 Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 702 comment l (1 Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Draft Restatement].

12 See generally Sohn, , The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals rather than States, 32 Am. U.L. Rev. 1, 6162 (1982)Google Scholar. Regarding the interdependence and equal status of human rights, see id. at 63. See also Alston, , Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AJIL 607, 612 (1984)Google Scholar.

13 Brownlie, , Causes of Action in the Law of Nations, 50 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 13, 40 (1979)Google Scholar.

14 UN Press Release (Geneva) No. HR/1735, Aug. 7, 1985, at 2. See generally Schachter, , International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 Recueil des Cours 12, 33132 (1982 V)Google Scholar; Humphrey, , Political and Related Rights, in 1 International Law of Human Rights: Legal and Policy Issues 171, 17174 (T. Meroned. 1984)Google Scholar; Shestack, , The Jurisprudence Of Human Rights, in id. at 69, 99101 Google Scholar; Boven, van, Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights, in 1 The International Dimensions of Human Rights 43, 5357 (K. Vasak ed., P. Alston Eng. ed. 1982)Google Scholar; Marks, , Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?, in International Law: A Contemporary Perspective 501 (R. Falk, F. Kratochwil & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1985)Google Scholar; Vasak, , Pour une Troisiéme Génération des Droits de l’Homme, in Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet 837 (C. Swinarski ed. 1984)Google Scholar; Alston, supra note 12.

15 Mcnair, A., The Law of Treaties 217 (1961)Google Scholar. For a recent discussion of the hierarchical character of Article 103, see Flory, Article 103, La Charte des Nations Unies 1371 (J. Cot & A. Pellet eds. 1985).

In the Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, the Court stated that the member states of the United Nations, representing the vast majority of the international community, had the power to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality and the capacity to bring international claims against states not members of the United Nations. 1949 ICJ Rep. 174, 185 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11). See also UN Charter art. 6, para. 2.

16 ESC Res. 9, 2 UN Escor 400, 401 (1946).

17 See, e.g., Arts. 228 and 234, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), 298 UNTS 11.

18 Gormley, , The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens, in The Right to Life in International Law 120, 12526 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1985)Google Scholar.

19 Schachter, , The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in Dispute Settlement Through the United Nations 301, 305 (K. Raman ed. 1977)Google Scholar.

20 Resolution of normative conflicts is discussed in T. Meron, Human Rights Law-Making in the United Nations: A Critique of Instruments and Process, ch. IV (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 1986). See also Meron, , Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AJIL 754 (1982)Google Scholar.

21 Goodrich, L., Hambro, E. & Simons, A., Charter of the United Nations 373 (1969)Google Scholar. In an important study, Professor Sohn has pointed out that the reference to “basic human rights” in the U.S. Tentative Proposals of 1944 was preceded by other references, e.g., that of President Roosevelt in his 1941 “Four Freedoms” message to “four essential freedoms.” The United States Bill of Rights of 1942 and the Declaration of 1943 spoke of “human rights.” Sohn, , A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, the United Nations and Human Rights: Eighteenth Report 4447 (1968)Google Scholar. For discussions at San Francisco, see id. at 48–56 and documents cited therein.

22 Kelsen, H., The Law of the United Nations 29 (1966)Google Scholar. Professors Cot and Pellet have observed that little importance should be attached to the distinction between references in the Charter to fundamental human rights and to human rights tout court. Cot & Pellet, Préambule, in Cot & Pellet (eds.), supra note 15, at 1, 14.

23 213 UNTS 221.

24 For the official text, see Organization of American States, Handbook of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System 29, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.60, Doc. 28, rev.1 (1983).

25 Reprinted in 21 ILM 58 (1982).

26 Van Boven, supra note 14, at 44.

27 Id.

28 See generally Meron, , The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AJIL 283, 296305 (1985)Google Scholar.

29 Draft Restatement, supra note 11, §702 Reporters’ Note 9 (listing examples of relevant U.S. statutes); Schachter, , International Law Implications of U.S. Human Rights Policies, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 63, 75 (1978)Google Scholar; Meron, Teaching Human Rights: An Overview, in 1 Meron (ed.), supra note 14, at 1, 20 & nn.98–100.

30 48 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 1A) at 8–9, UN Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970).

31 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/9, at 5. On the right to leave, see generally Lillich, Civil Rights, in 1 Meron (ed.), supra note 14, at 115, 151–52.

32 GA Res. 36/55, 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, UN Doc. A/36/51 (1981).

33 GA Res. 217A, UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).

34 See generally E. Daes, The Individual’s Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2 (1983).

35 See generally Schindler, , The International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights, Int’l Rev. Red Cross, No. 208, Jan.–Feb. 1979 Google Scholar, at 3, 6.

36 Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 ECR 3727, 3744–45, 29 Common Mkt. L.R. 42, 64(1980 III).

37 [1976] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, supra note 7, pt. 2 at 73, 85–86.

38 Opened for signature May 23, 1969, UNTS Regis. No. 18,232, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679 (1969).

39 [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 169, 248, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.

40 [1976] 2 id., supra note 7, pt. 2 at 85.

41 [1966] 2 id., supra note 39, at 248. Sir Ian Sinclair has questioned the status of a new multilateral treaty which, at the time of its conclusion, would be in conflict with an earlier rule of jus cogens. Sinclair, I. , The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 226 (2d ed. 1984)Google Scholar. But would such a conflict arise where the international community has accepted, through a very large majority’s support for a new general multilateral treaty, the formulation of a new rule of jus cogens? Would such acceptance not indicate the emergence of a new rule of jus cogens and the modification of the previous rule of jus cogens even before the entry into force of the new treaty?

42 1970 ICJ Rep. 4, supra note 5.

43 Id. at 32.

44 Id. at 47.

45 Id.

46 GA Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966).

47 I. Sinclair, supra note 41, at 213; Schachter, supra note 14, at 196–99, 341–42.

48 See generally Schachter, supra note 29, at 66–74; Schachter, supra note 14, at 200.

49 Draft Restatement, supra note 11.

50 Id. §703 Reporters’ Note 3.

51 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-sixth session, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 237 n.299, UN Doc. A/39/10 (1984); Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-seventh session, 40 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 39, UN Doc. A/40/10 (1985).

52 UN Doc. A/CN.4/389, at 9 (1985). In 1985, the ILC amended Article 5(d)(iv) of the Riphagen draft, emphasizing that the principle stated in it applied to international customary law as well. The relevant part of Article 5 as provisionally adopted by the ILC reads as follows:

2. In particular, “injured State” means

. . .

(e) if the right infringed by the act of a State arises from a multilateral treaty or from a rule of customary international law, any other State party to the multilateral treaty or bound by the relevant rule of customary international law, if it is established that:

. . .

(iii) the right has been created or is established for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . .

Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-seventh session, supra note 51, at 54. The commentary explained that “[t]he term ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ is here used in the sense which is current in present-day international relations.” Id. at 58.

53 UN Press Release (Geneva) No. HR/1733, Aug. 6, 1985, at 2.

54 Schachter, supra note 29, at 70. Principle 2 of the Principles for the International Law of the Future emphasized the duty of each state to “treat its own population in a way which will not violate the dictates of humanity and justice or shock the conscience of mankind.” 38 AJIL Supp. 72, 74 (1944). These terms can be traced to the preambular Martens clause to (Hague) Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS No. 539. See Meron, , On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument, 77 AJIL 589, 593 & n.24 (1983)Google Scholar.

55 See, e.g., Suy, , Droit des Traités et Droits de l’Homme, in Völkerrecht Als Rechtsordnung— Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit—Menschenrechte: Festschrift Für Hermann Mosler 935, 93637 ( Bernhardt, R., Geek, W., Jaenicke, G. & Steinberger, H. eds. 1983)Google Scholar; Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law 512 (3ded. 1979)Google Scholar.

56 See I. Sinclair, supra note 41, at 203–26, and the literature mentioned in id. at 236 n.8; Weil, supra note 1; Whiteman, , Jus Cogens in International Law, With a Projected List, 7 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 609 (1977)Google Scholar; Domb, , Jus Cogens and Human Rights, 6 Israel Y.B. Hum. Rts. 104 (1976)Google Scholar; Schwelb, , Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AJIL 946 (1967)Google Scholar; Espiell, Gros, Self-Determination and Jus Cogens, in UN Law/Fundamental Rights 167 (A. Cassese ed. 1979)Google Scholar.

57 Frowein, Jus Cogens, [Instalment] 7 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 327, 328 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1984).

58 Mcdougal, M., Lasswell, H. & Chen, L., Human Rights and World Public Order 33850 (1980)Google Scholar. The authors state that “many of the policies about human rights would appear to be so intensely demanded that they are acquiring. . . not merely the status of ‘international concern,’ but in addition that of jus cogens or of a global bill of rights.” Id. at 185. They regard the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “as established customary law, having the attributes of jus cogens. Id. at 274. They suggest that “the great bulk of the contemporary human rights prescriptions” are identifiable us jus cogens. Id. at 345. The view of these learned authors finds support in the statement of Judge Tanaka that “the law concerning the protection of human rights may be considered to belong to the jus cogens.” South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 ICJ Rep. 250, 298 (Judgment of July 18) (Tanaka, J., diss. op.). Also, Verdross argues that “all rules of general international law created for a humanitarian purpose” constitute jus cogens. Yerdross,Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AJIL 53, 59 (1966).

Sinclair, who disagrees with the attempts to regard all human rights as jus cogens, asks whether rights subject to progressive realization under Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Economic Covenant) can constitute jus cogens. I. Sinclair, supra note 41, at 217. For the text of the Economic Covenant, see GA Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966). For a view that not all human rights are jus cogens, see also Schachter, supra note 14, at 339; Higgins, , Derogations under Human Rights Treaties, 48 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 281, 282 (1976–77)Google Scholar.

59 Draft Restatement, supra note 11, Reporters’ Note 10; see also 2 id. §331(2) comment e and Reporters’ Note 4. See generally Schachter, supra note 14, at 333–38.

60 A later draft omitted “consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” from the list of peremptory norms. Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) §702 comment n, Reporters’ Note 10 (Tent. Final Draft, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Tent. Final Draft].

61 Whiteman, supra note 56, at 625–26.

62 It is suggested that detentions occurring during a time of emergency and that comply with the requirements of Article 4 of the Political Covenant are not arbitrary. Tent. Final Draft, supra note 60, §702 Reporters’ Note 10. But the requirements of Article 4 are addressed primarily to the conditions for the proclamation of an emergency, not the standards governing detention procedures (due process). The notion of arbitrariness must refer to the character of the procedures of detention themselves, rather than only to the legality of the state of emergency under which they are authorized. Is there not a danger that the suggestion made in Reporters’ Note 10 might be invoked to support the claim that every detention that takes place in a time of emergency in compliance with Article 4 is nonarbitrary, despite the prevalence of arbitrary detentions in such situations?

63 Van Boven, supra note 14, at 46.

64 Suy, supra note 55, at 938.

65 Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion No. OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ser. A: Judgments and Opinions No. 3, para. 61 (1983).

66 Buergenthal, , The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AJIL 22, 25 (1985)Google Scholar (footnote omitted). On reservations and jus cogens, see generally I. Sinclair, supra note 41,at 211–12.

67 60 Y.B. Inst. Int’l L. 214 (1983 II).

In opposing Doehring’s proposal, Briggs argued that “the concepts of asylum and human rights were introduced as a sort of unilateral jus cogens justifying violation of obligations.” Id. at 230. McDougal, in supporting the proposal, argued that “for some two hundred years there had been decisions to the effect that the responsibility of the State in respect of the protection of aliens overrode national laws. States could not unilaterally, and a fortiori bilaterally, override human rights.” Id.

It is of interest to note that Frowein and Kühner single out the danger of torture as justifying nonextradition. Frowein, & Kühner, , Drohende Folterung ah Asylgrund und Grenze für Auslieferung und Ausweisung, 43 Zeitschrift Für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 537 (1983)Google Scholar.

68 60 Y.B. Inst. Int’l L., supra note 67, at 234.

69 Id.

70 Id. at 259.

71 Id. at 306.

72 Mosler, H., The International Society as A Legal Community 1920 (1980)Google Scholar. Contra Stein, , The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 457, 481 (1985)Google Scholar.

73 [1980] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 30, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1 (pt. 2). See also infra note 87.

74 Id. at 33. See generally Gaja, , Jus Cogens beyond the Vienna Convention, 172 Recueil Des Cours 271, 29697(1981 III)Google Scholar.

75 H. Mosler, supra note 72, at 18.

76 1980 ICJ Rep. 3, supra note 6.

77 Id. at 41.

78 Meron, supra note 54, at 601–02 & n.69.

79 Draft Restatement, supra note 11.

80 Marek, , Sur la Notion de Progrés en Droit International, 38 Annuaire Suisse de Droit International 28, 35 (1982)Google Scholar.

81 Id.

82 Jaenicke, International Public Order, in Encyclopedia, supra note 57, at 314, 317.

83 UN Doc. A/34/583/Add.1, at 96 (1979).

84 Id. For the text of Geneva Convention No. IV, see 6 UST 3516, TIAS No. 3365, 75 UNTS 287.

85 UN Doc. A/34/583/Add. 1, supra note 83, at 98.

86 See generally Alston, supra note 12; Meron, Reform of Lawmaking in the United Nations: The Human Rights Instance, 79 AJIL 664 (1985).

87 The ILC’s commentary to draft Article 12(b) on state responsibility (part 2) mentions the reluctance of some members to apply the concept of jus cogens outside of the framework of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Other members, however, supported the retention of that article. The view was expressed that “a provision relating to jus cogens required . . . a procedural provision along the lines of that provided for in the Vienna Convention.” Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-seventh session, supra note 51, at 48.