Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-75dct Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-16T01:45:17.536Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Harold G. Maier
Harold G. Maier*
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The fundamental principles that guide determinations about the appropriate relationship between state and national authority in matters affecting the foreign affairs of the United States began to evolve even before the ratification of the Constitution in 1789. The centralization of governmental power in this field is reflected in microcosm in the three great state papers of the United States. The nation began in 1776 as “United Colonies” that were “Free and Independent States” under the Declaration of Independence; developed into a “firm league of friendship” under the Articles of Confederation in 1781; and became a “more perfect union” created by the people, not by its constituent political units, under the Constitution in 1789.

Type
Distribution of Constitutional Authority
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 83 , Issue 4 , October 1989 , pp. 832 - 839
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 The Articles were drafted in 1776–1777 but were not ratified until 1781.

2 See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, els. 1 (duties and imposts), 3 (foreign commerce), 4 (immigration), 5 (foreign exchange rates), 10 (piracy, offenses against law of nations) and 11 (declare war); Art. II, §1, cl. 1 (executive power), §2, els. I (commander in chief) and 2 (treaty power, recognition power); Art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).

3 L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 15–16 (1972).

4 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 80, at 112–14 (A. Hamilton) (2 Bourne ed. 1901). See discussion in L. Henkin, supra note 3, chs. 1, 9. Cf. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) (“The Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments”).

5 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 262 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).

6 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236–37 (1796).

7 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).

8 See, e.g., Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1559–60 (1984).

9 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §112(2) (1987); see Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AJIL 740, 743 (1939).

10 U.S. Const. Art. VI.

11 373 U.S. 132 (1963), aff’g in part, rev’g in part 197 F.Supp. 780 (N.D. Cal. 1961).

12 id. at 142.

13 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

14 U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 4.

15 See text at note 12 supra.

16 424 U.S. 351 (1976).

17 See text at note 12 supra.

18 424 U.S. at 356.

19 Id. at 360 n.8 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78–79 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting)). Compare United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 198–200, 629 P.2d 231, 274–76 (1980).

20 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

21 Id. at 425. Compare New York Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 353, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312, 318, 361 N.E.2d 963 (1977) (treating the act of state doctrine as federal law because its misapplication might injure relations with foreign countries).

22 Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private International Matters, 5 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 133, 159–62 (1971); see Cheatham & Maier, Private International Law and Its Sources, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 27, 88–94 (1968). Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).

23 389 U.S. 429 (1968).

24 Id. at 441–42.

25 Id. at 459–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).

26 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).

27 See Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law in the United States, 10 Mich. J. Int’l L. 450, 473–76 (1989).

28 389 U.S. at 442.

29 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 86 (1824); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 470, 496 (1840); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 278–80 (1875); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 373 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).

30 See, e.g., In re Estate of Kish, 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968).

31 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312, 361 N.E.2d 963 (1977).

32 See, e.g., K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 75 N.J. 272,381 A.2d 774 (1977).

33 115 111. 2d 221, 503 N.E.2d 300 (1986).

34 Id. at 233, 503 N.E.2d at 307 (emphasis added).

35 For an early discussion of cases that support this conclusion, see Maier, supra note 22, at 168.