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The United States and the Rights of Neutrals, 1917-1918

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Alice M. Morrissey
Alice M. Morrissey*
Affiliation:
Elmira College
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Extract

In April, 1917, when the Balfour mission visited the United States to arrange for American cooperation with the Allies, Frank L. Polk, Counsellor for the Department of State, jocosely said, “You will find that it will take us only two months to become as great criminals as you are.” Polk’s forecast has become common opinion, while American disclaimers of participation in crime are forgotten. The truth is that the United States continued to insist that certain Allied practices were illegal and refused to cooperate in them. On two separate occasions the Department of State informed members of the Balfour mission that the American attitude toward certain belligerent maritime measures remained unchanged. Mr. Lester H. Woolsey, then Law Adviser, later Solicitor, for the Department of State, wrote in a memorandum summarizing the attitude taken by American representatives in oral discussions with the British: “Great Britain has heretofore attained the objects set forth… through her exercise of belligerent maritime measures, depending upon the prize court to condemn property violating those measures. The United States regards certain of the measures in question as illegal; …” A few days later Mr. Woolsey, in discussing two proposals for bunker control suggested to him by the British, said:

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , January 1937 , pp. 17 - 30
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1937

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References

1 Hendrick, Burton J., Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page (3 vols., Garden City, 1923–1925), Vol. II, p. 265.Google Scholar

2 U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, Vol. II, p. 867.

3 Ibid., p. 876.

4 U. S. Dept. of State, Policy of the United States toward Maritime Commerce in War, edited by Carlton, Savage (2 vols., Washington, 1934–1936), Vol. II, p. 790.Google Scholar

5 U. S. Treaty Series, No. 756.

6 U. S. For. Rel., 1916, Supp., p. 422.

7 Savage, , op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 525–526.Google Scholar

8 U. S. For. Rel., 1915, Supp., pp. 153–154 and 585; see also Savage, op. cit., Vol. II, pp.280–281.

9 Ibid., pp. 789–790.

10 U. S. For. Rel., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, p. 866.

11 Ibid., 1914, Supp., pp. 373 and 251–252 for illustrations.

12 Ibid., p. ix.

13 Ibid., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, p. 920.

14 Ibid., 1914, Supp., pp. x and 233–234; Ibid., 1916, Supp., pp. 385 and 483.

15 U. S. For. Rel., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, pp. 920–921.

16 The belligerent right to punish unneutral service gave rise to little controversy during the period of American neutrality or belligerency. The naval rules mentioned transmission of information in the interest of the enemy by radio but embodied no essential departure from tradition.(Ibid., pp. 929–930.) The conception, however, was occasionally invoked in new situations. For example, Germany tried to control neutral commerce by granting safe–conducts to vessels in the danger zone, if assurance were given against re–export of the cargo or discharge of contraband at enemy ports. (Ibid., p. 1083.) France declared vessels accepting safe–conducts to be in the service of the enemy, and the United States protested that such control might deprive a vessel of its neutral character. (Ibid., pp. 1084–1085 and 1093.)Branding as unneutral service the acceptance of a German safe–conduct is interesting but led to no development of the doctrine. Again, the Dutch asserted and the Americans denied that employment of chartered Dutch ships in the war zone to carry troops and munitions of war to Europe would be unneutral service. (Ibid., pp. 1439 and 1461.)The records show no extension of the bases of condemnation for unneutral service during American belligerency.

17 Lansing, Robert, War Memoirs (Indianapolis and New York, 1935), pp. 19–21 and 125–126.

18 See Baxter, James P., 3rd, “Some British Opinions as to Neutral Rights, 1861–1865,” in this Journal, Vol. 23 (1929), pp. 525–527 Google Scholar; and Savage, , op. cit., Vol. II, p. 528.Google Scholar

19 U. S. For. Rel., 1916, Supp., pp. 591–592 and 604–608.

20 Ibid., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, pp. 1242–1243.

21 Ibid., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, pp. 1739–1740.

22 Ibid., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, p. 1242.

23 U. S. For. Rel., 1914, Supp., pp. 455–456 and 466.

24 Ibid., 1917, Supp. 1, p. 519.

25 Savage, , op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 697–698.Google Scholar

26 U. S. For. Rel., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, pp. 1769–1770, 1772–1773, 1775–1776, and 1781–1782.

27 Ibid., pp. 925–927 and 933–936.

28 Agreements were made with two Spanish lines running to Latin America to ensure search of vessels and control of shipments. (U. S. For. Rel., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, pp. 1730–1731.) The War Trade Board wished to arrange that Spanish vessels proceeding directly from Latin American ports to Spain be required to call at Puerto Rico to avoid being taken into Gibraltar or Kirkwall for examination. (Ibid., p. 1738) The Spanish lines preferred a private arrangement by which their ships would call, and, therefore, the United States took no official steps. Ibid., p. 1744 n.)

29 Ibid., pp. 100–1004 and 1010–1011.

30 For American assertions, see Ibid., 1915, Supp., pp. 394 and 589; for Lusitania, ibid. 1916, p. 171; for British prize cases, see Lloyds' Reports, Vol. V, p. 361 (Stigstad) and Vol. VII, p. 262 (Leonora). The Stigstad and Leonora cases are also reproduced in this Journal, Vol. 13 (1919), pp. 127 and 814.

31 U. S. For. Rel., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, pp. 804–865.

32 This memorandum, according to Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Polk, , summarized the American attitude, though it was not made the basis of a formal communication to the British. U. S. For. Rel., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, p. 865 n.Google Scholar

33 Ibid., pp. 865–870.

34 Ibid., pp. 908–910.

35 U. S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Monthly Summary, 1917–1918.

36 U. S. For. Rel., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, pp. 952–953.

37 Ibid., p. 961.

38 Ibid., p. 986.

39 Ibid., pp. 986–987.

40 Ibid., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, p. 1562.

41 Ibid., pp. 937, 939, 942, 950, 984–985.

42 For texts of agreements, see Ibid., pp. 1671–1674, 1339–1360, 1363–1371, 1584–1590, 1170–1181, 1240–1263.

43 U. S. For. Rel., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, p. 861.

1 Ibid., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, pp. 1253–1260, 1348–1352, 1408, and 1458–1460. See Wilson, G. G., “Taking Over and Return of Dutch Vessels, 1918–1919,” this JOURNAL, Vol. 24 (1930), pp. 694–702.Google Scholar

45 U. S. For. Rel., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, pp. 946–949.

46 U. S. For. Rel., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, p. 1022.

47 Idem.

48 Ibis., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, p. 997; ibis., 1918, Supp. 1, pp. 1023,1026, and 1027.

49 Ibid., p. 1077.

50 Ibid., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, pp. 809,899–902, and 924–926.

51 U. S. For. Rel., 1917, Supp. 2, Vol. II, pp. 938, 940, 940–941.

52 Ibis., pp. 942–943, 959–960, and 1005; ibis., 1918, Supp. 1, Vol. II, pp. 951, 953–954, 965–968, and 977.

53 U. S. War Trade Board, Report (Washington, 1920), pp. 148–149.

54 Hudson, Manley O., “Duration of War between United States and Germany,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. XXXIX (1926), p. 1045.Google Scholar