No other issue in recent times has so troubled our relations [with Mexico]; no other problem has so taxed our determination to seek mutually satisfactory solutions to common problems; no other problem has so tested the sincerity and ingenuity of our diplomats; and no other problem has so challenged the mutual respect and goodwill that our two countries have for each other.

In part II of his article, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality under International Law, Mr. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata defends the legality of the armed attack on Israel launched by many Arab states, with Soviet assistance, on October 6, 1973. “Egypt and Syria,” he writes, “as the states vested with sovereignty, but illegally deprived of actual control, over territories occupied by Israel were … entitled to seek redress for the protection of their territorial integrity. Under the UN system they were probably under the obligation to resort first to peaceful methods. This they have done in vain for more than six years. Egypt, in particular, expressed officially its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the obligations provided for in Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) as broadly elaborated by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring. In response, Israel defiantly insisted on territorial expansion.” Under these circumstances, he argues, both Egypt and Syria (which had never accepted any version of Security Council Resolution 242 or given any assurances to Ambassador Jarring) had an inherent right of self-help under customary international law, or of self-defense under “a broad reading” of Article 51 of the Charter, in what he asserts was no more than an attempt to recover those territories by force.

The object of this article is to examine and evaluate the Fishermen's Protective Act, as reflecting the legal strategy of the United States in one particular area of its foreign relations law of importance to both the law of the sea and the law of international claims.

The question of voting procedure in international conferences convoked to codify international law has been discussed for more than a hundred years, starting with the first Geneva Red Cross Conference in 1864. At the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 important departures were made from the unanimity rule in favor of near-unanimity or quasi-unanimity. Further steps toward a two-thirds rule were taken by the League of Nations in connection with the Hague Codification Conference of 1930. The question arose anew when the first United Nations conferences were held, and in particular as soon as the United Nations started its ambitious program for the progressive development of international law and its codification, pursuant to Article 13(1) (a) of the UN Charter.