¹ This is the ideal type of the Utopian position rather than the empirical description of any particular historic type. In actuality, and this is true particularly of the present, the Utopian position in international affairs is not always consistent with its philosophic premises.

² It ought not to need special emphasis that a principle of social conduct, in contrast to a law of nature, allows of, and even presupposes, conduct in violation of the principle. Tucker, Robert W., in “Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political ‘Realism’” in this Review, Vol. 46, pp. 214–224 (03, 1952)Google Scholar, has missed this and many other points in his zeal to find contradictions where there are none.

³ “This [the realist] doctrine,” writes one historian—Tannenbaum, Frank, “The Balance of Power versus the Coördinate State,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, p. 173 (06, 1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar—“is confessedly, nay gleefully, amoral. It prides itself upon being realistic and takes Machiavelli as its great teacher. It is contemptuous of the simple beliefs of honest men, jeers at the sentimentalism of those who believe that men may strive for peace among nations, and looks upon democracy as a hindrance to skilled diplomacy. It looks with a certain derisive superiority upon the great leaders of this nation from Jefferson and John Quincy Adams to Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and describes them as moralistic and sentimental, and suggests that our models ought to be Richelieu, Clemenceau and Bismarck. Its adherents believe that international wars instead of being made by men and supported by institutions humanly contrived have their origin in the nature of man himself and are inevitable.”

Another historian, Schlesinger, Arthur Jr., in “Policy and National Interest,” Partisan Review, Vol. 18, p. 709 (11–Dec., 1951)Google Scholar, however, gives Ambassador Kennan a clean bill of moral health. “But what differentiates,” he writes, “the Kennan approach from that of, for example, the followers of Professor Hans J. Morgenthau is that he takes the revelations of international amorality in his stride; more than that, he comprehends them in his understanding of the tragedy of history. Mr. Kennan, in other words, is deeply moral, rather than moralistic, like Judge Hull, or immoral, like the boys who have just discovered that politics involve power.”

“This dreadful doctrine,” we are told (by Tannenbaum, pp. 173–174), “has now won wide acceptance by teachers and scholars in the field of international relations and has, in fact, become the leading theme in such circles in many of our largest universities. It has become the science of international relations—and who would quarrel with science, especially when it comes packaged in good clear English and from high sources? But it is not science. It is, in fact, only poor logic based upon false premises, and its claim to be a science is only a bit of unholy conceit.”

It may be remarked in passing that to dispose of a scientific theory as “fashionable” or a “fad,” as some do with regard to political realism, may reveal something about the state of mind of the writer, but reveals nothing at all about the scientific value of the theory.

⁴ Tannenbaum, , in the article cited above, and in “The American Tradition in Foreign Relations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, pp. 31–50 (10, 1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Our Foreign Affairs (New York, 1924), pp. 246 ff.Google Scholar

⁶ “The United States and the Balance of Power,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 3, pp. 401–449 (Nov., 1941)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Tannenbaum, , “The Balance of Power versus the Coördinate State,” (cited above, note 3), p. 173Google Scholar.

⁸ “Democracy and Efficiency,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 87, pp. 293–294 (03, 1901)Google Scholar.

⁹ Tannenbaum, p. 177.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Dunning, William Archibald, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics (New York, 1931), p. 351Google Scholar.

¹² Tannenbaum, pp. 195–196.

¹³ “A Few Words on Non-intervention,” Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical (London, 1875), pp. 153–178Google Scholar.

¹⁴ The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1934)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ “Helvidius, in Answer to Pacificua, on President Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality,” in Letters and other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia, 1867), Vol. 1, p. 611Google Scholar.

¹⁶ See, on this point, Morgenthau, Hans J., “International Organizations and Foreign Policy,” in Foundations of World Organization: A Political and Cultural Appraisal, Eleventh Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Bryson, Lyman, Finkelstein, Louis, Lasswell, Harold D., MacIver, R. M. (New York, 1952), pp. 377–383Google Scholar.

¹⁷ The difference in these two attitudes is well illustrated by the following passage from a recent Moon Mullins cartoon. An elderly representative of the Utopian school aska little Kayo: “Remember the golden rule. Now, supposing that boy slapped you on the right cheek, what would you do?” Whereupon Kayo replies realistically: “Jest how big a boy are you supposin'?”

¹⁸ New York Times, August 14, 1952, p. 1.

¹⁹ Feller, A. H., “In Defense of International Law and Morality,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 282, p. 80 (07, 1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1951), p. 34Google Scholar.

²¹ See, for instance, “The Machiavellian Utopia,” Ethics, Vol. 55, pp. 145–147 (Jan., 1945)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Ethics and Politics,” in Approaches to Group Understanding, Sixth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Bryson, , Finkelstein, , and MacIver, (New York, 1947), pp. 319–341Google Scholar; “The Escape from Power in the Western World,” in Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture, Seventh Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Bryson, , Finkelstein, , and MacIver, , pp. 1–12Google Scholar; Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago, 1946), Chaps. 7, 8Google Scholar; “Views of Nuremberg: Further Analysis of the Trial and Its Importance,” America, Vol. 76, pp. 266–267 (12 7, 1946)Google Scholar; “The Twilight of International Morality,” Ethics, Vol. 58, pp. 79–99 (01, 1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “The Political Science of E. H. Carr,” World Politics, Vol. 1, pp. 127–134 (10, 1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Politics Among Nations (New York, 1948), Ch. 14Google Scholar; “National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy: The Primacy of the National Interest,” The American Scholar, Vol. 18, pp. 207–212 (Spring, 1949)Google Scholar; “The Pathology of Power,” American Perspective, Vol. 4, pp. 6–10 (Winter, 1950)Google Scholar; “The Moral Dilemma in Foreign Policy,” in The Year Book of World Affairs, 1951 (London, 1951), pp. 12–36Google Scholar.

²² Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, pp. 174–175Google Scholar.

²³ The Works of The Right Honorable Edmund Burke, 4th ed. (Boston, 1871), Vol. 4, pp. 80–81Google Scholar. Cf. also Burke, , “Speech on A Bill for Shortening the Duration of Parliaments,” May 8, 1780, in Works, Vol. 7, p. 73Google Scholar: “I must see, to satisfy me, the remedies; I must see, from their operation in the cure of the old evil, and in the cure of those new evils which are inseparable from all remedies, how they balance each other, and what is the total result. The excellence of mathematics and metaphysics is, to have but one thing before you; but he forms the best judgement in all moral disquisitions who has the greatest number and variety of considerations in one view before him, and can take them in with the best possible consideration of the middle results of all.”

²⁴ America, Vol. 86, p. 700 (March 29, 1952)Google Scholar. See also Cecil, Algernon, “The Foreign Office,” in The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919 (New York, 1923), Vol. 3, p. 605Google Scholar, concerning Lord Salisbury: “Always, however, the motive of his policy was to be found in the political interests as opposed to the political sympathies of Great Britain; and in this way his treatment of Foreign Affairs is at the opposite policy from that of Palmerston or Gladstone.” Cf. also the general remarks in Leighton, Alexander H., Human Relations in a Changing World (New York, 1949), pp. 155 ffGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ See, on this point, Letwin, Shirley R., “Rationalism, Principles, and Politics,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 14, pp. 367–393 (July, 1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stebbing, L. Susan, Ideals and Illusions (London, 1941)Google Scholar; Holloway, Vernon H., Religious Ethics and the Politics of Power (New York, 1951)Google Scholar; and Fosdick, Dorothy, “Ethical Standards and Political Strategies,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 57, pp. 214 ff. (1942)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.