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Austria, Prussia, and the Wars of Liberation, 1813–1814

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2014

Extract

The purpose of this article is to clarify the relative roles of Austria and Prussia during the Wars of Liberation of 1813 and 1814. It uses the very latest research concerning the military strategy adopted and emphasizes the input of Radetzky, using his handwritten account of the campaign, a document previously ignored by historians, despite the general's position as chief of staff of the allied coalition. The fact is that Anglo-American historians have failed to investigate the politics of the military alliance of 1813–1814 that constituted the Fourth Coalition. Myself apart, the only historian to examine that alliance with any regard to the Austrian viewpoint has been Gordon A. Craig in a brief but excellent analysis published as long ago as 1966. German historians have done little better. They simply neglect the Austrian archives.

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Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 2014 

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References

1 Craig, Gordon A., “Problems of Coalition Warfare: The Military Alliance against Napoleon, 1813–14,” in War, Politics and Diplomacy. Selected Essays, ed. Craig, Gordon A., 2245 (London, 1966)Google Scholar.

2 Chandler, David G.'s The Campaigns of Napoleon. The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier (New York, 1966)Google Scholar, includes only two works in German in his bibliography, which otherwise lists exclusively French and English ones. The Austrian army is written off fairly comprehensively on 666–67, where Radetzky (666) gets his only mention in 1,200 pages—“of the men of the second echelon only Radetsky (sic) rose above mediocrity.” Von Plotho's three volumes on the wars of 1813 and 1814 constitute one of the works in German mentioned in the bibliography—the other is a biography of von Wrede—but I doubt they were read by Chandler. Schwarzenberg is consistently despised, and the section on 1813–1814 appears to have been written without any reference at all to Austrian or German sources. Rothenberg, Gunther E.'s The Napoleonic Wars (London, 2001)Google Scholar devotes merely six pages to the 1813–1814 campaign, whereas Charles Esdaile, like Chandler, does not appear to know German and likewise restricts the bibliography in his Napoleon's Wars. An International History, 1803–1815 (New York, 2008)Google Scholar, to works in English and French. His chapter on 1813–1814, therefore, fails to mention Radetzky or even Gneisenau, omits even Trachenberg, and has more to say on diplomacy than on the campaigns. Dwyer, Philip G., ed., Napoleon and Europe (Harlow, 2001)Google Scholar, has nothing on the Wars of Liberation.

3 Craig, “Problems of Coalition Warfare.”

4 See Rothenberg, Gunther E., The Emperor's Last Victory. Napoleon and the Battle of Wagram (London, 2004)Google Scholar.

5 Ibid., 177.

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7 “The almost total loss of his horses in Russia dealt Napoleon a blow that was to prove fatal … In May 1813, when the campaign began, 17,000 of Napoleon's cavalrymen were still without horses. It was this shortage that was to deprive Napoleon of the chance of defeating the allies and exploiting battlefield successes in the spring of 1813. It was also a key factor in his fatal decision to agree to an armistice in the summer of 1813 in order to put his cavalry arm into proper shape.” Lieven, Dominic, “Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812–14),” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, New Series 7, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 283308, at 306–07CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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10 Quoted in Heydendorff, Walther, Österreich und Preußen im Spiegel der österreichischen Geschichtsauffassung (Vienna, 1947), 321Google Scholar.

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14 Alexsej Leon'tevič Naročnickij, “Russland und die napoleonische Hegemoniepolitk: Widerstand und Anpassung,” in Historismus und Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft, ed. Aretin and Ritter, 163–84, at 181: “die Sovjetische Aktenpublikationen zeigen eindeutig, daß das Zögern von König Friedrich Wilhelm III im Jahre 1813, mit Rußland ein Bündnis einzugehen, nicht so sehr auf seine sattsam Furcht als vielmehr auf die Ansprüche zurückzuführen war, die sein Vertreter Reinhold Friedrich Otto von Schoeler dem russischen Hof hinsichtlich der polnischen Territorien bereits 1812 unterbreitet hatte.”

15 See Simon, Walter, “Variations in Nationalism during the Great Reform Period in Prussia,” The American Historical Review 59, no. 2 (January, 1954): 305–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Aaselstad, Katherine and Hagemann, KarenCollaboration, Resistance and Reform: Experiences and Historiographies of the Napoleonic Wars in Central Europe. 1806 and Its Aftermath. Revisiting the Period of the Napoleonic Wars in German Central European Historiography,” Central European History 39 (2006): 547–79Google Scholar, at 561: “Even after World War II, historians of West Germany depicted the early nineteenth century as an era of civic and democratic formation and early nationalism. Newer studies question this interpretation and underline the absence of consensus and the division among such key players as Stein and Hardenberg on principles of representation and government reform. They point out that a broad variety of reasons motivated reforms—patriotism was only one.”

16 See Aaselstad and Hagemann, “Collaboration, Resistance and Reform,” 561: “Other scholars have increasingly emphasized the limitations and negative effects of the reforms. As early as 1967 Reinhard Koselleck associated the oppressive Prussian bureaucracy with the wartime reforms. John Gillis later made similar points. Reforms were meant to strengthen and perfect Prussian bureaucracy not to undermine it.” See Koselleck, Reinhard, Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution. Allgemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung und soziale Bewegung von 1791 bis 1848 (Stuttgart, 1967)Google Scholar, and Gillis, John R., The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis 1840–60. Origins of an Administrative Ethos (Stanford, 1971)Google Scholar. See, too, Berdhal, Robert M., The Politics of the Prussian Nobility: The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770–1848 (Princeton, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which shows how the nobility exploited inconsistent regulations regarding freedom of movement and noble land tax exemptions in rural Prussia and stresses the continued aristocratic dominance of rural life, the civil service, and the officer corps.

17 See the older works for this: Simon, Walter M., The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement, 1807–1819 (Ithaca, 1955)Google Scholar, and Rosenberg, Hans, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660–1815 (Cambridge, 1958)Google Scholar; slightly more positive views can be found in Levinger, Matthew, Enlightened Nationalism. The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806–1848 (Oxford, 2000)Google Scholar and Rowe, Michael, ed., Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe. State Formation in an Age of Upheaval (Basingstoke, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Sheehan, John, “State and Nationality in the Napoleonic Period,” in The State of Germany. The National Idea in the Making, Unmaking and Remaking of a Modern Nation–State, ed. Breuilly, John, 47–59 (Harlow, 1992), at 53Google Scholar.

19 See Ibbeken, Rudolf, Preußen 1807–1813. Staat und Volk als Idee und Wirklichkeit (Cologne/Berlin, 1970)Google Scholar and von Münchow-Pohl, Bernd, Zwischen Krieg und Reform. Untersuchungen zur Bewußtseinlage in Preußen 1809–1812 (Göttingen, 1987)Google Scholar.

20 Wegert, Karl H., German Radicals Confront the Common People. Revolutionary Politics and Popular Politics, 1789–1849 (Mainz, 1982), 76, n. 7Google Scholar.

21 Quoted in Berding, “Das Geschichtliche Problem,” 206.

22 Ibid., 209.

23 Wegert, German Radicals Confront the Common People, 76–77.

24 For this episode, see Wegert, German Radicals Confront the Common People, 84–85.

25 For the information in the next paragraph on South Germany, see Plannert, Ute, “From Collaboration to Resistance: Politics, Experience and Memory of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Southern Germany,” Central European History 39, no. 4 (December 2006): 676705CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26 Heydendorff, Österreich und Preußen, 309.

27 Treitschke's History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul with an Introduction by William Harbutt Dawson (London, 1915), vol. I, The War of Emancipation, 613–14Google Scholar.

28 Ibid., 614.

29 On this theme, see Carl, Horst, “Der Mythos des Befreiungskrieges. Die ‘martialische’ Nation im Zeitalter der Revolutions-und Befreiungskreige, 1792–1815,” in Föderative Nation. Deutschlandkonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, ed. Langewiesche, Dieter and Schmitt, Georg, 63–82 (Munich, 2000)Google Scholar. According to Carl, p. 81, the Rhineland states were really pro-French, while Saxon hostility to Prussia was spectacularly revealed in May 1815 with the revolt of the Saxon regiments who were to be incorporated into the Prussian army. They remembered their enforced integration into the Prussian army by Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War.

30 “I wished for the empire of the world and to ensure it unlimited power was necessary for me.” Napoleon quoted during the Hundred Days in Kohn, Hans, “Napoleon and the Age of Nationalism,” Journal of Modern History 22 (March 1950): 2137, at 32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 See Sked, Alan, Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation (Basingstoke, 2008), 43 and 4546Google Scholar.

32 For a breakdown, see von Friederich, Rudolf, Geschichte der Hebstfeldzuges 1813 (Berlin, 1904), vol. I, 224Google Scholar. Of Blücher's 104,974 men, 66,490 were Russian, and 38,484 were Prussian.

33 Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 559. For Meinecke, see Meinecke, Friedrich, The German Age of Liberation, 1795–1815, with an Introduction by Peter Paret (Berkeley, 1977), 118Google Scholar.

34 See Ein Memoire Radetzkys, das Heerenwesen Österreichs beleuchtend, aus dem Jahre 1809,” Mitteilungen des k.k. Kriegsarchivs (1884), 361–70Google Scholar.

35 See Sked, Metternich and Austria, 41–42.

36 For the German response to Austria's war effort in 1809, see Heydendorff, Österreich und Preußen, 294–99. But see, too, Bock, Helmut, Ferdinand Schill (Berlin, 1998)Google Scholar; Stutzer, Dietmar, Andreas Hofer und die Bayern in Tyrol (Munich, 1983)Google Scholar; Pfaundler, Wolfgang, Der Tyroler Freiheitskampf 1809 unter Andreas Hofer. Zeitgenossische Augenzeugenberichten und Dokumente (Munich, 1984)Google Scholar; and Eyck, F. Gunther, “Loyal Rebels.” Andreas Hofer and the Tyrolean Uprising of 1809 (Lanham/New York, 1986)Google Scholar.

37 Rothenberg, Gunther E., The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (London, 1977)Google Scholar, 172, writes: “The Landwehr was part of the great effort made by Austria in 1809. That year saw a great army raised though official estimates of 600,000 did not materialize. Actual field strength amounted to 265,000 effectives, including 15,000 Landwehr. Major combat elements included 35 regiments of cavalry, 78 regiments of infantry, 9 Jäger battalions and 4 regiments of field artillery. During the campaign Austria was in fact slightly superior to the French in the number of guns, though not in the weight of its fire. It was a considerable effort and for the first time in history words like ‘fatherland’ and ‘liberty’ were used to animate the spirits of the army. The troops fought exceedingly well, but after Aspern Charles lost his nerve, while patriotic zeal expanded after Wagram. … the Landwehr was deactivated. Neither the Emperor Francis nor Prince Metternich … relished the idea of an armed populace. The Emperor resolved to undertake no further military adventures with which he connected the Landwehr, but placed his faith in the regular military establishment and though some 50 Landwehr battalions were brought back to service in 1813, they served only as fillers. Regulars fought the battles of 1813–14.”

38 See Hagemann, Karen, “‘Be Proud and Firm Citizens of Austria!’ Patriotism and Masculinity in Texts of the ‘Political Romantic’ Written during Austria's Anti-Napoleonic Wars,” German Studies Review 29, no. 1 (February, 2006): 4162Google Scholar. This seems to be based on Zohetbauer, Ernst, Die Landwehr gegen Napoleon. Österreichs erste Militz und der Nationalkrieg von 1809 (Vienna, 1999)Google Scholar.

39 Ingrao, Charles W., The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618–1815, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2000), 219CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40 Ibid., n. 1.

41 Meinecke, Friedrich, The Age of Liberation, 1795–1815, with an introduction by Peter Paret (Berkeley, 1977), 117Google Scholar.

42 Treitschke's History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Eden and Paul, Cedar with an introduction by William Harbut Dawson (London, 1915) 554–55Google Scholar.

43 See Heydendorff, Österreich und Preußen, 303 and compare Rothenberg, The Napoleonic Wars, 174.

44 von Friederich, Geschichte der Hebstfeldzuges 1813, 146–47. But see Sked, Alan, Radetzky. Imperial Victor and Military Genius (London, 2011)Google Scholar, chap. 1 for his background.

45 For details, see Alan Sked, Radetzky, 34–36.

46 Rothenberg, Gunther E., The Napoleonic Wars (London, 2001), 178–79Google Scholar.

47 Quoted in Regele, Oskar, Radetzky. Leben, Leistung, Erbe (Vienna/Munich, 1957), 120Google Scholar.

48 Blanning, Tim, The Pursuit of Glory. Europe, 1648–1815 (London, 2007), 641Google Scholar.

49 Colonel, the Hon. Cathcart, George, Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany in 1812 and 1813 (London, 1850), 195Google Scholar. Cathcart, who had been brought up in Russia where his father had been ambassador, spoke fluent Russian and was the British commissioner to the Russian army. He was violently pro-Russian and anti-Austrian. His colleague Stewart, commissioner to the Prussian army commented: Cathcart will be more of a Russian than an Englishman soon, he is so bigoted to his Emperor.” (See Sir Webster, Charles, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812–1815. Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe (London, 1950), 140Google Scholar.

50 Anonymous, (but really by Heller von Hellwand, with whom Radetzky had arranged for this ghost-written autobiography to be published on his death), Der k.k.österreichische Feldmarschall Graf Radetzky. Eine biographische Skizze nach dem eigenen Dictaten und der Correspondenz des Feldmarschalls von einem österreichischen Veteranen (Stuttgart/Augsburg, 1857), 149Google Scholar: “As far as the Russians are concerned, it has become a habit always to claim that their forces are always stronger than they really are and no general, apart from their commander and quartermaster general knows their actual strength.”

51 von Friederich, Geschichte der Hebstfeldzuges 1813, vol. I.

52 Müffling wrote:: “It must be observed that however well Blücher's espionage was organized in Germany, here in France it could succeed but little in procuring intelligence by means of spies.” The French liked the money offered but were too afraid of Napoleon. See von Müffling, Baron Karl, The Memoirs of Baron von Müffling. A Prussian Officer in the Napoleonic Wars (London, 1997), 388Google Scholar.

53 Novak, Johann Friedrich, ed., Briefe des Fedldmarschalls Füsten Schwarzenberg and seine Frau, 1799–1816 (Vienna/Leipzig, 1913), 332–33Google Scholar.

54 Quoted in Kerchnawe, H. and Veltzé, Alois, Feldmarschall Karl Fürst zu Schwarzenberg, der Führer der Verbündeten in den Befreiungskriegen (Vienna/Leipzig, 1913), 166Google Scholar.

55 Bibl, Viktor, Radetzky. Soldat und Feldherr (Vienna, 1955), 191–92Google Scholar.

56 Nitsche, Österreichische Soldatentum, 178. Metternich boasted after one such council: “When in one of these war councils summoned by Prince Schwarzenberg, at which Tsar Alexander was present, it proved impossible to reach agreement between the different views of the commanders …. I spoke on behalf of the plan of Prince Schwarzenberg as having the greater assurance of success … My verdict was declared conclusive.” Czech State Archives, Prague, Acta Clementina, Carton 26.

57 The latest study, which includes a section on Metternich and Napoleon, is Sked, Alan, Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation (Basingstoke, 2008)Google Scholar. But see, too, Kissinger, Henry, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822 (London, 1957)Google Scholar; Kraehe, Enno E., Metternich and the German Question, vol. I, The Contest with Napoleon, 1799–1814 (Princeton, 1963)Google Scholar; and Schroeder, Paul W., The Transformation of European Politics, 1783–1848 (Oxford, 1994)Google Scholar. In German, see Karl Obermann, “Diplomatie und Außenpolitik im Jahre 1813, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Rolle Metternichs,” in Das Jahre 1813, ed. Straube, 131–60, and Oncken, Wilhelm, Österreich und Preußen im Befreiungskriege, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1876, reprint, Hildesheim, 1998)Google Scholar.

58 Ibid.

59 Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 577.

60 Ibid., 579.

61 Ibid., 583.

62 Ibid., 580.

63 Ibid., 631.

64 Ibid., 674–75.

65 Letters of Lady Burghersh (afterwards Countess of Westmorland) from Germany and France during the Campaign of 1813–14 (London, 1893), 160–61Google Scholar.

66 Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 562.

67 Ibid., 559.

68 Meinecke, The German Age of Liberation, 1795–1815, 118.

69 Hoborn, Hajo, A History of Modern Germany, 1648–1840 (Princeton, 1964), 430Google Scholar.

70 Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 555.

71 Sked, Radetzky, 43.

72 Griewank, Karl, ed., Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen, 3rd ed. (Leipzig, 1939)Google Scholar, Gneisenau to Radetzky, St. Arnold, 15 January 1814, 282–84.

73 See Bibl, Radetzky. Soldat und Feldherr (Vienna, 1955)Google Scholar, 145. On 2 August 1813 an Austrian government official, Michael Ambruster, wrote a letter to the Police Ministry complaining of Radetzky's strong pro-German views and recommending that he should speak only of “Austrian patriotism,” speak of Germany as rarely as possible and not to refer to “German freedom” as understood by future enemies such as members of the Tügenbund.

74 For a very detailed reconstruction of events at Trachenberg based on Stadion's reports and other documents, see Woynar, Karl, “Österreichs Beziehungen zu Schweden und Dänemark vornehmlich seine Politik bei der Vereinigung Norwegens mit Schwedens in den Jahren 1813 and 1814. Mit Benützung von Akten der k.u.k. Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv in Wien,” in Archiv für österreichische Geschichte 77 (1891): 379537Google Scholar.

75 Quoted from the Kreigsarchiv der großen Generalstabs in Berlin by Roloff, Gustav in, “Die Entstehung des Operationsplan für den Herbstfeldzug von 1813,” in Militär-Wochenblatt 58 and 60 (1892): 1564–72Google Scholar and 1612–18, at 1618, n. 1.

76 The Trachenberg Protocols as taken down in French are given by Cathcart, Commentaries on the War, as Appendix VI, 372–73. von Friederich, Geschichte der Hebstfeldzuges 1813, 91–92, gives them in German.

77 von Friederich, Geschichte der Hebstfeldzuges 1813, 96.

78 von Friederich, Geschichte der Hebstfeldzuges 1813, covers the history of the planning process better than anyone else in chap. 3, 71–99, of his first volume. This quote is from 97.

79 Ibid. 97. The other impressive account is Roloff, “Die Entstehung des Operationsplan.”

80 Roloff, “Die Entstehung des Operationsplan,” 1615. According to Roloff, Radetzky's views were probably already reasonably well known, but in any case the allies would have done anything to accommodate the Austrians.

81 Quoted in Markham, Felix, Napoleon (New York, 1966), 206Google Scholar.

82 Radetzky, Notaten für die Feldzüge 1813 und 1814; Radetzky Nachlaß, Vienna, Kriegsarchiv. This is a 200-page handwritten account of the campaigns by their chief of staff.

83 Ibid.

84 On Clausewitz's “biased and second-hand criticism” of Schwarzenberg and his failure to understand a strategy of attrition, see Gordon A Craig's War, Politics and Diplomacy, 27 and 73–74.

85 Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 617.

86 von Friedrich, Geschichte der Hebstfeldzuges 1813, 99.

87 Ibid., 96.

88 Ibid., 99.

89 For the most recent account, see Sked, Radetzky, chap. 2.

90 von Plotho, Carl, Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich in den Jahren 1813 und 1814, 3 vols. (Berlin 1817), vol. 2, 56Google Scholar.

91 The Rev. Randolph MA, Herbert, ed., Private Diary of Travels, Personal Services, and Public Events during Mission and Employment with The European Armies in Campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814, from the Invasion of Russia to the Capture of Paris. By General Sir Robert Wilson CMT, 2 vols. (London, 1861), vol. 2, 86Google Scholar.

92 Ibid., 464.

93 Ibid., 183–84.

94 For the Swiss episode and Radetzky's memorandum on it, see Oncken, Wilhelm, Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreichs und der Befreiungskriege, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1884–1886), vol. 2, 720–21Google Scholar.

95 Quoted by Radetzky in his Notaten.

96 The panic can be felt in Radetzky's account of the ultimately failed negotiations in his Notaten.

97 Schwarzenberg, Karl Fürst, Feldmarschall Fürst Schwarzenberg (Vienna, 1964), 277Google Scholar.

98 See Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812–1815, 212–13.

99 On Blücher, see Uffindell, Andrew, The Great Generals of the Napoleonic Wars And Their Battles, 1805–1815 (Staplehurst, 2003), chap. 8Google Scholar.

100 von Friederich, Geschichte der Hebstfeldzuges 1813, 237.

101 For the sovereigns' decision to change his orders, see Radetzky's Notaten. For the lack of spirit in the Prussian army for any pursuit, see Müfffling, The Memoirs of Baron von Müffling, 388.

102 Radetzky, Denkschriften militärisch-politisch Inhalts aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlaß des k.k. österreichischen Feldmarschalls Grafen Radetzky (Stuttgart/Augsburg, 1858)Google Scholar (Entwurf für die künftigen Operationen (Tepliktz, 4 September 1813), 164–65Google Scholar.

103 Ibid., 171–73.

104 This is the nearest thing to the original Radetzky Plan, because it obviously copies it, although the original has never been found. This is to be found in von Bernhardi, Theodor, Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des kaiserl. Russ. Generals von Infanterie Carl Friedrich Grafen von Toll, 5 vols. (Leipzig, 1858), vol. 4, Beilage II, 814–16Google Scholar.

105 Griewank, Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen, 269–73; Gneisenau to Clausewitz, 16 November 1813.

106 Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann, König in Preußens großer Zeit. Friedrich Wilhelm III, der Melancholiker auf dem Thron (Siedler Verlag, n.d. or n.p.), 304.

107 “They felt obliged to follow the will of the Emperor Alexander,” wrote Radetzky in his Notaten.

108 Quoted in Parkinson, Roger, The Hussar General. The Life of Blücher. Man of Waterloo (London, 1975), 137Google Scholar.

109 Radetzky, Notaten.

110 See Griewank, ed., Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen, 288–89; Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Brienne, 2 February 1814.

111 See Griewank, ed., Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen, 266–67. Gneisenau first made his request on 31 October 1813.

112 Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 613: “The Russian troops had a hero-worship for King Frederick William who knew how to speak to them in their mother tongue.”

113 Radetzky, Notaten.

114 Ibid.

115 Griewank, ed., Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen, 294–300; Gneisenau to Clausewitz, Paris, 28 April 1814.

116 Bibl, Radetzky, 130.

117 Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 634.

118 Ibid., 633.

119 Radetzky explains these in detail in his Notaten.

120 Griewank, ed., Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen, 286–88. Gneisenau to Stein, Dammartin le St. Pierre, 27 January 1814 and 290–93; Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Laon, 10 March, 1814.

121 “Had Winzingerode done his duty, the fate of France would have been decided.” See Griewank, ed., Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen, 290–93; Gneisenau to Hardenberg, Laon, 10 March, 1814.

122 Müffling, The Memoirs of Baron von Müffling, 167–68.

123 Ibid., 170.

124 “I decisively defeated Napoleon at Laon.” Blücher to Bonin, Paris, 30 April 1814. See Capelle, Wilhelm, ed., Briefe des Feldmarschalls Blücher (Leipzig, 1942), 5455Google Scholar.

125 Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, 644.

126 Ibid., 645.

127 Quoted in Parkinson, The Hussar General, 195–96.

128 Quoted in Schwarzenberg, Feldmarschall Fürst Schwarzenberg, 355.