Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 September 2011
This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties – even when devised to quell internal threats – can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus increase the likelihood of democratization. Using a dataset of authoritarian regimes in 108 countries from 1946 to 2002 and accounting for simultaneity, the analysis models transitions to democracy and to a subsequent authoritarian regime. Results indicate that authoritarian legislatures are associated with a lower probability of transition to a subsequent dictatorship. Authoritarian parties, however, are associated with a higher likelihood of democratization.
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31 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.
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46 Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship. Because these data are coded as of 31 December each year, we recode these variables with the previous year's observation for years in which there is a transition. Without these changes to the institutions variables, the coding would be endogenous by construction.
47 This variable for parties measures de facto parties which are parties that exist outside the ruling front. This variable does not code whether the parties have seats in the legislature.
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60 If the control for Military regime is excluded from the specification, legislatures decrease the likelihood of democratization, a finding consistent with Hypothesis 2.
61 Predicted probabilities calculated from Models 6 and 9 in Table 3, respectively. We use CLARIFY and set Cold War to zero with all other variables set to their mean or median values. For CLARIFY, see Tomz, Michael, Wittenberg, Jason and King, Gary, ‘Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation’, American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000), 347–361Google Scholar. For each regime type, we set the duration variables to the in-sample mean value for each regime type. For military regimes, this value is 7, for personalist regimes 12, and for party regimes 20. The instrument for parties () is a continuous variable, so we take the median from the distribution of 's that lies below the first cut-point (zero parties); the median between the cut-point (one party); and the median from the distribution of 's that lies above the second cut-point (two parties). For , we use the median for the subset of 's that lie below the mean predicted value as ‘no legislature’ and the median for the subset of 's that above below the mean predicted value as ‘legislature’. These latter values are close to the 25 percentile and the 75 percentile of the distribution of 's.
62 Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World; Magaloni, ‘Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule’.
63 Geddes, ‘Authoritarian Breakdown’.
66 Geddes, ‘Authoritarian Breakdown’.
67 We also checked these results with a Heckman selection model where the first stage models selection into one of three categories: no parties; one party; multiple parties. The results from this analysis suggest that multiple parties increase the likelihood of democratization. Among non-personalist regimes, the likelihood of democratization is 0.6 per cent, increasing to 0.8 per cent with one party, and increasing again to 3.1 per cent with multiple parties.
68 In a random effects specification, though, these coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
69 We did not estimate separate samples for military and party-based regimes because nearly all party regimes have a legislature.
70 There are many fewer observations for military regimes than for dominant party regimes, reflected in the larger standard error estimate for Parties in military regimes.
71 Gandhi and Przeworski, ‘Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats’; Abel Escribà-Folch, ‘El Destino de los Dictadores tras el Poder ¿Quién y Cómo Puede Castigarlos?’ Revista de Estudios Polìticos, 140 (2008), 105–33. Concretely, these data are coded as the Effective Head of Government: (1) presidents in presidential democracies; (2) prime ministers in parliamentary and mixed democracies, except in the cases of Djohar in Comoros and Preval in Haiti; (3) general-secretaries of the communist party in communist dictatorships, except in the case of Deng Xiaoping in China; (4) kings, presidents and de facto rulers in non-communist dictatorships, except in the cases of Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, where the effective head is sometimes the prime minister; and (5) military or other figure, when sources indicate that the nominal head is a puppet figure.
72 Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, ‘Introducing Archigos’. The Archigos data are episode data, with one observation per leader per country. The Archigos variable Post Tenure Fate indicates the fate of the leader in the period up to one year after the leader lost power: 0 (OK), 1 (Exile), 2 (Imprisonment, including house arrent) or 3 (Death).
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74 The results in columns 5 and 6 remain if we exclude those regimes that have regularized leadership turnover: Brazil (1964–85), El Salvador (1948–82), Mexico (1929–2000), Uruguay (1973–84) and Tanzania (1986–2002/censored).
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76 Gandhi and Przeworski, ‘Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats’; Magaloni, ‘Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule’; Geddes, ‘Party Creation as an Autocratic Survival Strategy’. For a view which parallels ours, see Cox, Gary, ‘Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975–2000’ (unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego)Google Scholar.
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81 Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry, ‘Dictatorial Peace?’; Reiter and Stam, ‘Identifying the Culprit’; Weeks, Jessica, ‘Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve’, International Organization, 62 (2008), 35–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wright, ‘Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain?’ Fjelde, Hanne, ‘Generals, Dictators, and Kings: Authoritarian Regimes and Civil Conflict, 1973–2004’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 27 (2010), 195–218CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Michael Albertrus, ‘Political Regimes and Poverty Reduction, 1950–2002’, presented at the Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Chicago, 2009.
82 Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa; Huntington, ‘How Countries Democratize’; Bratton and van de Walle, ‘Patrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa’; Geddes, ‘Authoritarian Breakdown’.