Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 November 2010
This article proposes that foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs) make civil war onset more likely when they damage state infrastructural power, as in the context of interstate war, and when they change the target’s political institutions as well as leadership. Using rare events logit to analyse civil war onset from 1920 to 2004, it is found that interstate war and institutional change are virtually necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for an FIRC to cause a civil war. Many control variables are included. The results are robust to different research design specifications; nevertheless, they cannot confirm that occupation troops make an FIRC more likely to spark civil war.
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44 Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, ‘Introducing Archigos’. Note that we code the effect of FIRC over a five-year window, and therefore we also looked at FIRCs in the 1915–19 period. We included two other relevant FIRCs from this period, Greece 1917 and Albania 1916. We did not include the 1917 or 1918 Belgium FIRCs as indicated by Archigos, as they concerned change in who governed the occupied territories of Belgium, though the Belgian government was still recognized as the national leadership.
45 Note that Archigos excludes some microstates included by COW, such as Grenada. Those cases are excluded here.
46 Lo et al., ‘Ensuring Peace’. There are a very small handful of cases in which a state lost an interstate war, did not immediately suffer an FIRC, but then suffered an FIRC soon after (within the next five years). France in the early 1940s is one example. If the FIRC war and FIRC non-war variables are recoded such that the FIRC war variable is coded 1 if a state suffers an FIRC for any reason during the five years following a loss in an interstate war, the results do not change.
47 Enterline and Greig, ‘Beacons of Hope?’ The data from John Owen’s article, ‘The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions’, include both successful and unsuccessful attempts at the foreign imposition of institutions, and hence inappropriate for use here.
48 Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’.
49 Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’; Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’.
51 Inflation conversion factors are employed where necessary.
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58 Multicollinearity among the independent variables was generally low, rising above 0.4 only for the correlation between the Democracy variable and the Development variables (0.49).
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60 We also ran the analysis with the ORIG/Enterline/Grieg measure of imposed political institutional change, and it was not statistically significantly related to civil war onset.
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62 Note that there are no cases of a non-war FIRC installing a democracy being followed by civil war onset, precluding us from including non-war-FIRC-install democracy as an additional dummy variable. The non-existence of such cases is more evidence that war and institutional changes are necessary conditions for making civil war onset more likely.
63 An interaction of Ethnic Fractionalization × Democracy is statistically significant, but its inclusion does not change the results on the FIRC variables. It does make the Ethnic Fractionalization variable insignificant, and the Democracy variable significant, though.
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65 The added country-year cases include Netherlands 1941–44, Belgium 1941–44, France 1943, Poland 1940–44, Austria 1939–44, Czechoslovakia 1940–44, Albania 1940–43, Yugoslavia 1942–43, Greece 1942–43, Norway 1941–44, Denmark 1941–44, Ethiopia 1937–40, Estonia 1941–45, Latvia 1941–45 and Lithuania 1941–45. Among these new cases, there was civil war onset only in Yugoslavia 1942.