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The Future is a Moving Target: Predicting Political Instability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 February 2019

Drew Bowlsby Open the ORCID record for Drew Bowlsby [Opens in a new window] ,
Erica Chenoweth ,
Cullen Hendrix Open the ORCID record for Cullen Hendrix [Opens in a new window]  and
Jonathan D. Moyer Open the ORCID record for Jonathan D. Moyer [Opens in a new window]
Drew Bowlsby
Affiliation:
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
Erica Chenoweth
Affiliation:
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Cullen Hendrix
Affiliation:
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
Jonathan D. Moyer*
Affiliation:
Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
*
*Corresponding author. Email: jmoyer@du.edu
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Abstract

Previous research by Goldstone et al. (2010) generated a highly accurate predictive model of state-level political instability. Notably, this model identifies political institutions – and partial democracy with factionalism, specifically – as the most compelling factors explaining when and where instability events are likely to occur. This article reassesses the model’s explanatory power and makes three related points: (1) the model’s predictive power varies substantially over time; (2) its predictive power peaked in the period used for out-of-sample validation (1995–2004) in the original study and (3) the model performs relatively poorly in the more recent period. The authors find that this decline is not simply due to the Arab Uprisings, instability events that occurred in autocracies. Similar issues are found with attempts to predict nonviolent uprisings (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017) and armed conflict onset and continuation (Hegre et al. 2013). These results inform two conclusions: (1) the drivers of instability are not constant over time and (2) care must be exercised in interpreting prediction exercises as evidence in favor or dispositive of theoretical mechanisms.

Keywords

political instabilitypredictionquantitative modelingstate failure

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Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , October 2020 , pp. 1405 - 1417
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2019

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Bowlsby et al. Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XMGVO2
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