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All Policies Are Glocal: International Environmental Policy Making with Strategic Subnational Governments

Abstract

National governments have intensified their attempts to create international institutions in various policy fields such as the environment, finance and trade. At the same time, many subnational policy makers have begun to duplicate international efforts by setting their own, stricter policies while others remain inactive or enact more lax regulation. This ‘glocalization’ of policy creates a complex and potentially costly patchwork system of regulations. To shed light on this phenomenon, this article analyzes the interaction between subnational and national governments within a game-theoretic model of international treaty negotiations. The glocalization of regulatory policy can be understood as an attempt by subnational policy makers to strategically constrain or empower national governments in international negotiations. The study finds that the shadow of international treaty formation gives rise to within-country and cross-country policy balancing dynamics that may explain some of the subnational policy polarization that is currently observable in many countries. The article specifies the conditions under which these dynamics occur, spells out empirically testable hypotheses and identifies possible theoretical extensions.

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Copyright
The online version of this article is published within an Open Access environment subject to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution licence http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Department of Political Science, University of St.Gallen (email: michael.bechtel@unisg.ch); Department of Political Science, Columbia University (email: ju2178@columbia.edu). Michael M. Bechtel gratefully acknowledges support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant #PP00P1-139035). A supplementary online appendix is available at www.mbechtel.com/index.php/research and http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123413000495.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

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British Journal of Political Science
  • ISSN: 0007-1234
  • EISSN: 1469-2112
  • URL: /core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science
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Supplementary Materials

Bechtel and Urpelainen Supplementary Material
Appendix

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