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  • Cited by 8
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Dowding, Keith 2016. Emotional appeals in politics and deliberation. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, p. 1.


    Gaertner, Wulf Christian 2016. WICKEDNESS IN SOCIAL CHOICE. Journal of Economic Surveys, p. n/a.


    Grossi, Davide and Pigozzi, Gabriella 2014. Judgment Aggregation: A Primer. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, Vol. 8, Issue. 2, p. 1.


    Núñez, Matías 2014. The strategic sincerity of Approval voting. Economic Theory, Vol. 56, Issue. 1, p. 157.


    Endriss, Ulle 2013. Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting. Theory and Decision, Vol. 74, Issue. 3, p. 335.


    Cariani, Fabrizio 2011. Judgment Aggregation. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 6, Issue. 1, p. 22.


    Ward, Hugh and Weale, Albert 2010. Is Rule by Majorities Special?. Political Studies, Vol. 58, Issue. 1, p. 26.


    Goodin, Robert E 2008. Deliberative Lies. European Political Science, Vol. 7, Issue. 2, p. 194.


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In Praise of Manipulation

  • KEITH DOWDING (a1) and MARTIN VAN HEES (a2)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000712340800001X
  • Published online: 07 December 2007
Abstract

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the ‘sincerity argument’, according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the ‘transparency’ argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.

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British Journal of Political Science
  • ISSN: 0007-1234
  • EISSN: 1469-2112
  • URL: /core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science
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